People v. Taylor

Decision Date30 December 1988
Citation142 A.D.2d 410,536 N.Y.S.2d 825
PartiesThe PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. John TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Mario Malerba, Kew Gardens (Vincent Siccardi, of counsel), for appellant.

Patrick Henry, Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Mark D. Cohen, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and BROWN, WEINSTEIN and BALLETTA, JJ.

BALLETTA, Justice.

During the summer of 1984 a young woman, 19 years of age, was subjected to an evening of sodomy and attempted rape by an individual whom she knew from the neighborhood, and whom she later, although not immediately, identified as the defendant. At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to present expert testimony on the psychological phenomenon known as "rape trauma syndrome" as an explanation for the victim's failure to immediately identify her assailant. The defendant contends that this was error. We disagree.

In this case of apparent first impression, we hold that testimony with respect to the psychological phenomenon of rape trauma syndrome by a properly qualified expert is admissible in a rape case even where the victim is not a minor and the defense is not one of consent. Under the circumstances of this case, such evidence was relevant, a proper subject of expert opinion and not unduly prejudicial, and did not constitute an improper bolstering of the victim's credibility.

At approximately 9:00 P.M. on the evening of July 29, 1984, the victim, a 19-year-old resident of Southold, New York, received two telephone calls from a man claiming to be a friend of hers by the name of Paul. The caller told her that he was very upset and that he needed to talk to her, but that he couldn't speak to her over the telephone. The victim borrowed her mother's car and proceeded to meet him at a nearby location. A few minutes after arriving at the agreed-upon spot, a young man approached her parked vehicle. Believing that this man was her friend Paul, she released the locks and allowed him to enter the car. She immediately realized that the man was not her friend, but rather the defendant, a young man she had known from the neighborhood for years and whom she had seen the previous night. She told him that she knew that he was "John", whereupon the defendant ordered her at gun point to drive to Clark's Beach, a secluded location, where, at gun point, he sodomized her twice and attempted to rape her. This sexual assault continued for about 45 minutes, after which the defendant forced her to drive him back to the spot where he had entered her vehicle.

The victim immediately returned home between 11:00 and 11:30 P.M., woke her mother up and told her that she had been sexually attacked and that she was scared she was going to be killed. The victim's mother telephoned the police who arrived 10 minutes later. While waiting for the police to arrive, the victim, who was hysterical and sobbing, washed her face and drank some soda. Her hair was matted, her sweater on inside out, and she appeared to be very upset. Nevertheless, she gave a description of her assailant to the two police officers, speaking rapidly and jumping up and down as she did so.

Officer Baglivi drove the victim and her mother to the Southold Police Station, tape recording their conversation as they proceeded. The victim advised him of the two telephone calls she had received earlier that evening while they drove around and attempted to retrace the route taken to Clark's Beach with the defendant, the officer jotting down license plate numbers as he drove along.

The victim was interviewed at the police station by a Detective Burke, who advised her that he wished to tape record the interview. Her hair was still disheveled and matted; her sweater was still on inside-out, and she was in a highly upset state. She proceeded to relate, outside the presence of her mother, the circumstances of the sodomies and attempted rape earlier that evening. Again, just as she had told the officers earlier at her home, the victim indicated that she did not know her attacker.

After concluding this portion of the interview, Detective Burke shut the tape recorder off and asked the victim if she would step into a private room and change her clothing in order that the clothing she wore earlier that evening could be used as evidence in the investigation. As she finished changing her clothing, her mother told her that anything further that she could tell the police might be of help, whereupon the victim turned to her mother and stated, "John Taylor raped me". She immediately told Detective Burke the same thing, stating that she was "sure" that the defendant was her assailant. The victim made these statements at approximately 1:15 AM. After taking certain physical evidence, Detective Burke transported the victim, accompanied by her mother, to Eastern Long Island Hospital for a medical examination.

Upon arriving at the hospital, the victim was introduced to emergency room nurse Elizabeth Hug who observed that she was disheveled, pale, tremulous, very hesitant in speech, soft spoken, and in a "teary state". Nurse Hug was able to calm her sufficiently so as to complete the medical examination. She was thereafter released and went home.

The defendant was arrested later that day and subsequently identified by the victim in a lineup.

The defendant's first trial resulted in a hung jury. Following that trial, he sought to remove the case to the Supreme Court on the ground of prejudice and bias, and to recuse Justice Namm. The motion was denied (126 Misc.2d 537, 482 N.Y.S.2d 968).

Also, subsequent to that first trial, it was discovered for the first time that Officer Baglivi had tape recorded his conversation with the victim en route to the police station on the evening of July 29, 1984, but that the tape recording had been destroyed. As a result of this revelation, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Brady material (see, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) had been destroyed.

After a hearing, the court found that dismissal of the indictment was not warranted. Although the court found that a tape recording had indeed been made and destroyed, the court determined that it could not ascertain whether the destruction was intentional or inadvertent. The court further found that, in any event, there was no evidence to suggest that there was anything in the recording which went to the critical question of whether the victim could identify the perpetrator and thus it contained nothing that would assist the defendant in his examination of the People's witnesses. The court thereupon denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment as well as the defendant's motions to disqualify the Suffolk County District Attorney and to appoint a Special Prosecutor.

After a second trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding the defendant guilty of sodomy in the first degree (two counts) and attempted rape in the first degree.

I

During the course of the second trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Eileen Treacy as an expert witness with reference to the psychological phenomenon known as rape trauma syndrome. Ms. Treacy, a teacher at Herbert Lehman College of the City University of New York, had bachelor's and master's degrees in psychology, extensive experience in counseling sexual assault victims, and previous experience as an expert witness in forcible rape cases. She testified that the syndrome was first described in the American Journal of Psychiatry by Drs. Burgess and Holmstrom in 1974. Since that time, a very large amount of data and research has been collected, and the syndrome is recognized as a type of posttraumatic stress disorder, which is a diagnostic category that is accepted within the professional community (for a relatively recent summary of the research on rape trauma syndrome, see, Donohue, Another Door Closed: Rape Trauma Syndrome, 23 Gonzaga L Rev 1 ).

Ms. Treacy explained rape trauma syndrome as a two-phase reaction that the victim undergoes after having experienced a forcible rape or attempted forcible rape. The first phase, or the acute phase, occurs immediately after the attack and may last for a few weeks thereafter. The second phase, or the reorganization phase, is that period of time during which the victim generally is recovering from the initial shock and is attempting to carry on with her normal life.

There are three patterns of behavior which are generally manifested by forcible rape victims in the acute phase following the attack. These three patterns of behavior, or reaction, are known as (1) the behavioral stage, (2) the symptomatic stage, and (3) the psychological stage. In the behavioral stage, the victim's behavior may either be "expressed"--i.e., characterized by hysteria, crying, shaking and weeping,--or "controlled"--i.e., characterized by calmness and collectedness. The symptomatic stage produces physical reactions such as great pain, burning and itching during urination. Headaches, nervous tension, tight stomach and jumpiness are also noted in this stage. Finally, the psychological stage is characterized by specific fears which are focused on the offender coming back and hurting the victim or the victim's family if the incident or offender is reported.

The expert's testimony was limited to the acute phase. She also noted that the time immediately after a person has been through a life-threatening situation may not be the best time to collect information since the victim's thinking may be disorganized and the victim's anxiety may interfere with her recall abilities.

The defendant contends that the admission into evidence of this testimony on rape trauma syndrome was improper. He argues that such testimony did no more than impermissibly bolster the victim's testimony, and that as a result, the expert invaded the province of the jury by lending credence to the victim's testimony that sh...

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  • People v. Hall, 1-89-1841
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 2 de setembro de 1992
    ...was not in bad faith nor grossly negligent and witnesses testified that the recording was inculpatory in nature); People v. Taylor (1988), 142 A.D.2d 410, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825 (destruction of a tape of attempted rape victim where it was not clear whether the prosecution was culpable in bringing......
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    ...the rape. Both trial courts admitted the testimony and the Appellate Division affirmed in both cases. We now affirm in People v. Taylor, 142 A.D.2d 410, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825, and reverse in People v. Banks, 145 A.D.2d 944, 536 N.Y.S.2d 316. While we recognize that the unchecked admission of exp......
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