People v. Grandadam

• Citation: 44 N.E.3d 611
• Decision Date: 02 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3–15–0111.,3–15–0111.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Nathan GRANDADAM, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

44 N.E.3d 611

The PEOPLE of the State Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Nathan GRANDADAM, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 3–15–0111.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 2, 2015.

44 N.E.3d 612

George Mueller, Karen Donnelly, Mueller, Anderson & Associates, Ottawa, for appellant.

Brian Towne, State's Attorney, Ottawa (Robert M. Hansen, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Nathan Grandadam, was convicted of four violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/1–100 et seq. (West 2014)). Defendant appeals that judgment, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating a motor vehicle, a necessary element of the charged offense. We agree, and reverse three of defendant's four convictions outright.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The State charged defendant with driving while license revoked (count I) (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2014)), operating an uninsured motor vehicle (count II) (625 ILCS 5/7–601(a) (West 2014)), no valid

44 N.E.3d 613

registration (count III) (625 ILCS 5/3–401(a) (West 2014)), and disobeying a traffic control device (count IV) (625 ILCS 5/11–305 (West 2014) ). Defendant's bench trial commenced on December 18, 2014.

¶ 4 At trial, Detective Matthew Devries of the Ottawa police department testified that he was on patrol the morning of July 12, 2014. Devries observed defendant riding a “motor-powered bike” on the roadway and noticed that defendant was not pedaling. Devries was able to hear the motor running and could see exhaust coming from the motor. He observed defendant fail to stop at a posted stop sign, then turn left at an intersection at which only right turns were allowed. Devries pulled defendant over.

¶ 5 Once stopped, defendant told Devries that the vehicle could travel between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Later, defendant told Devries' supervisor, Officer Jeff Bangert, that he had once gotten the vehicle to travel at 41 miles per hour, though it was unknown if that speed was reached while going down a hill. Devries estimated that defendant weighed approximately 190 pounds. The State introduced into evidence a copy of defendant's driving abstract, which showed his license was revoked on the day of the incident.

¶ 6 On cross-examination, Devries estimated that defendant was traveling at approximately 15 miles per hour when Devries observed him. Devries did not use a radar gun, and did not pace defendant, but estimated the speed based on past observations and experience with the radar gun. Neither he nor any other officer at the scene tested the vehicle.

¶ 7 Defendant testified that the motor on his bicycle provided three-quarter horsepower. He testified that one must pedal the bicycle up to 8 or 10 miles per hour before activating the motor. He clarified that when pedaling in conjunction with the motor, the bicycle can travel between 25 and 30 miles per hour. However, with “just the engine itself, it won't go more than 17 [miles per hour].” Defendant also explained that on the occasion that he reached 41 miles per hour, as he described to Officer Bangert, the motor was not yet attached to the bicycle. Defendant testified that he weighed 180 or 190 pounds.

¶ 8 On cross-examination, defendant admitted that his license was revoked, that his bicycle was uninsured, and that he did not fully stop at the stop sign. The prosecutor then inquired further into the speeds that defendant's bicycle was capable of reaching:

“[Prosecutor]: When you get the vehicle up to 25, 30, 28 miles an hour, you're using the motor, correct?

[Defendant]: I'm using both. I'm not solely using the motor. The motor itself won't go that fast. It just won't.

[Prosecutor]: But with you on the bike, it can go that fast, correct, with your pedals?

[Defendant]: If you pedal it.”

¶ 9 In closing arguments, the State argued that defendant's bicycle was a motor vehicle under the Code: “It has a motor. It's pedal assist. But it does reach speeds in excess of 20 miles an hour, Judge. It takes it outside of the statute for the low-speed, gas bicycle.”

¶ 10 The court found that defendant's bicycle was a motor vehicle, explaining: “Your statement at the scene that that vehicle—or that bicycle can go 25 to 28 miles an hour * * * is over 20 miles an hour.” The court entered convictions on all four counts and sentenced defendant to 240 hours of community service and a fine of $515.

44 N.E.3d 614

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating a motor vehicle as defined in the Code. Specifically, defendant contends that his bicycle falls under the “low-speed gas bicycle” exception in the Code. 625 ILCS 5/1–140.15 (West 2014). We agree that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's motorized bicycle was a motor vehicle under the Code. Thus, we reverse defendant's convictions on counts I, II, and III, as each of those convictions required the operation of a “motor vehicle” as an element. We affirm defendant's conviction on count IV, as the offense of disobeying a traffic control device applied to defendant even if he was not operating a “motor vehicle.”

¶ 13 When a challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we review to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found...