People v. Grant

• Decision Date: 18 May 2010
• Citation: 899 N.Y.S.2d 906,73 A.D.3d 1079
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Robert GRANT, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

899 N.Y.S.2d 906

73 A.D.3d 1079

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Robert GRANT, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 18, 2010.

Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (David Crow and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz [Grant R. Mainland], of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman, and Jill Oziemblewski of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), rendered May 21, 2008, convicting him of attempted assault in the second degree as a hate crime (two counts) and menacing in the second degree as a hate crime, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of attempted assault in the second degree as a hate crime under count two of the indictment, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

As the defendant contends, and the People correctly concede, the crime of attempted assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05(3) is "a legal impossibility" ( People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 607, 535 N.Y.S.2d 580, 532 N.E.2d 86; see People v. Wyrich, 259 A.D.2d 718, 686 N.Y.S.2d 853; People v. Daniels, 237 A.D.2d 298, 654 N.Y.S.2d 799). Therefore, the defendant's conviction of attempted assault in the second degree as a hate crime, under count two of the indictment, must be vacated, and that count of the indictment must be dismissed.

We reject the defendant's contention that the evidence of his intent to injure the victim was legally insufficient and that the jury finding of such intent was against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's intent to injure the victim beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the jury's finding that the defendant intended to injure the victim is not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The defendant's contention that the prosecutor violated the...