People v. Grassi

• Decision Date: 18 February 1999
• Citation: 708 N.E.2d 976,685 N.Y.S.2d 903,92 N.Y.2d 695
• Parties: , 708 N.E.2d 976, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 1451 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher GRASSI, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 903

685 N.Y.S.2d 903

92 N.Y.2d 695, 708 N.E.2d 976, 1999

N.Y. Slip Op. 1451

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher GRASSI, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 18, 1999.

Bruce R. Bryan, Syracuse, for appellant.

Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney of Broome County, Binghamton (Joann Rose Parry of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WESLEY, J.

Defendant and three co-defendants were indicted for the crime of arson in the second degree upon a theory of accessorial liability, arising from a fire in the early morning hours of October 16, 1994 that damaged a nightclub co-owned by defendant and located in the Village of Endicott, Broome County, New York. After a lengthy trial, involving the testimony of 57 witnesses and 152 exhibits, the jury convicted defendant of arson in the second degree, but acquitted his three co-defendants. County Court (Smith, J.) granted defendant's motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 290.10, stating that the evidence established that defendant was not physically present in Broome County when the fire occurred. According to the court, this could not be reconciled with the People's contention that defendant "importuned, commanded [or] solicited the other three defendants to commit the crime of arson."

The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and reinstated the verdict, noting that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict (250 A.D.2d 944, 673 N.Y.S.2d 753). The Court further found that County Court apparently considered the acquittal of the co-defendants in granting defendant's CPL 290.10 motion. The dissenting Justices argued that the inference that defendant solicited or intentionally aided the arsonist was conjectural "as there [was] no proof that he had contact with the unknown arsonist or that he took any steps to assist the arsonist in the preparation or perpetration of the arson" (250 A.D.2d 944, 945-946, 673 N.Y.S.2d 753, supra). Defendant appeals, pursuant to permission granted by one of the dissenting Justices, and we now affirm.

A person is guilty of arson in the second degree on a theory of accessorial liability if he acts with the requisite mens rea required for the commission of the crime ^* and "solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids" the principal actor in the commission of the arson (Penal Law § 20.00). The standard of appellate review in determining whether the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the same for circumstantial and non-circumstantial cases--whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 420, 626 N.Y.S.2d 20, 649 N.E.2d 1164; People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925, 620 N.Y.S.2d 811, 644 N.E.2d 1367; People v. Rossey, 89 N.Y.2d 970, 971, 655 N.Y.S.2d 861, 678 N.E.2d 473).

There was evidence adduced at trial that defendant was a 50% owner of the nightclub when it opened for business in July 1993. He invested $40,000 of his own money into the club for business improvements. Although business was good initially, the club experienced serious financial difficulties during the months prior to the fire. Additionally, defendant was faced with a number of complaints from the State Liquor Authority and was in danger of losing his liquor license, Moreover, the Endicott Police Department received approximately 121 complaints directly involving the club between July 1993 and October 1994.

In August 1994 defendant closed a safe deposit box in a local bank where he usually deposited proceeds from the club. He and his partner also put the club up for sale during August. However, after receiving no offers defendant took the property off the market two weeks before the fire.

In September 1994, approximately three weeks prior to the fire, defendant purchased an insurance policy covering the business and contents. Additionally, during the days prior to the fire, furniture and equipment were removed from the premises during odd hours of the evening. The liquor stock was depleted and only a handful of chairs and tables were in the building at the time of the fire, despite the fact that a banquet with approximately 100 people in attendance was held the evening before the fire.

The building was locked with no apparent evidence of a break-in at the time of the fire. Investigators established that the fire was intentionally set with the use of an accelerant in the area behind the bar, where a plastic bag containing linens was placed. According to testimony, the linens were never placed there...