People v. Curran

• Decision Date: 25 May 2016
• Docket Number: 2014-03339, Ind. No. 1/13.
• Citation: 33 N.Y.S.3d 334,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04071,139 A.D.3d 1085
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Justin CURRAN, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

139 A.D.3d 1085

33 N.Y.S.3d 334

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04071

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Justin CURRAN, appellant.

2014-03339, Ind. No. 1/13.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 25, 2016.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y., for appellant.

William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J., at trial; Berry, J., at sentence), rendered March 12, 2014, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and murder in the second degree (three counts), burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree (three counts), burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the defendant's contention, “[t]he standard of appellate review in determining whether the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the same for circumstantial and non-circumstantial cases” (People v. Grassi, 92 N.Y.2d 695, 697, 685 N.Y.S.2d 903, 708 N.E.2d 976 ). Here, the circumstantial evidence adduced was sufficient to show, inter alia, that the defendant intended to kill the victim (see People v. Guzman, 116 A.D.3d 790, 791, 982 N.Y.S.2d 908 ; People v. Bergman, 70 A.D.3d 1494, 1494–1495, 894 N.Y.S.2d 635 ; People v. Gilmore, 199 A.D.2d 410, 411, 605 N.Y.S.2d 109 ). Furthermore, despite the defendant's contentions to the contrary, the circumstantial evidence sufficiently established that he used force to deprive the victim of her property, namely, an automobile. In addition, with respect to the burglary conviction, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, inter alia, that the defendant entered the victim's home unlawfully (see People v. Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 429 N.Y.S.2d 178, 406 N.E.2d 1071 ; People v. Bergman, 70 A.D.3d 1494, 894 N.Y.S.2d 635 ; People v. Gilmore, 199 A.D.2d at 411, 605 N.Y.S.2d 109 ; People v. Lide, 192 A.D.2d 557, 558, 596 N.Y.S.2d 103 ; People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573, 562 N.Y.S.2d 788 ; People v. Caraballo, 138 A.D.2d 725, 526 N.Y.S.2d 538 ), including DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime (see People v. Jones, 105 A.D.3d 1059, 1060, 963 N.Y.S.2d 399 ; People v. Dolan, 2 A.D.3d 745, 746, 768 N.Y.S.2d 654 ; People v. Rush, 242 A.D.2d 108, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362 ).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to those crimes was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). Specifically, contrary to the defendant's arguments, based on the weight of the circumstantial evidence, the jury was justified in inferring that the defendant unlawfully entered the victim's home, stabbed her to death, and then stole her motor vehicle, establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (cf. People v. Wiley, 119 A.D.3d 821, 822, 989 N.Y.S.2d 324 ).

The defendant's contention that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that he threw a “dream light” at his former paramour, striking her in the eye, as part of the sequence of events that precipitated the murder of the victim, is unpreserved for appellate review because he did not object to the court's curative instruction as given and did not request any additional curative instructions (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Singletary, 132 A.D.3d 914, 914, 17 N.Y.S.3d 889 ; People v. Flanagan, 132 A.D.3d 693, 694, 17 N.Y.S.3d 178, lv. granted 26 N.Y.3d 1039, 22 N.Y.S.3d 169, 43 N.E.3d 379 ). In any event, the determination of whether to admit such evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d 588, 595, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160 ; People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 ; People v. James, 132 A.D.3d 905, 18 N.Y.S.3d 157 ). The trial court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence, since it was probative with respect to completing the narrative of the events leading up to the murder of the victim and was not unduly prejudicial (see People v. Tosca, 98 N.Y.2d 660, 746 N.Y.S.2d 276, 773 N.E.2d 1014 ; People v. Johnson, 137 A.D.3d 811, 26 N.Y.S.3d 356 ; People v. Hardy, 134 A.D.3d 955, 956, 22 N.Y.S.3d 128 ; People v. Harris, 117 A.D.3d 847, 985 N.Y.S.2d 643, affd. 26 N.Y.3d 1, 18 N.Y.S.3d 583, 40 N.E.3d 560 ; People v. Gordon, 308 A.D.2d 461, 764 N.Y.S.2d 115 ; People v. Jones, 221 A.D.2d 661, 634 N.Y.S.2d 214 ). Moreover, the court gave a sufficient limiting instruction regarding the use the jury could make of the evidence, which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v. Maitland, 136 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 26...