People v. Gray

• Decision Date: 11 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96CA0556,96CA0556
• Citation: 975 P.2d 1124
• Parties: 97 CJ C.A.R. 3176 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shannon R. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 1124

975 P.2d 1124

97 CJ C.A.R. 3176

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shannon R. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96CA0556.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

Dec. 11, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1998.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Matthew S. Holman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kaufman Law Firm, P.C., Shaun C. Kaufman, Colorado Springs, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, Shannon R. Gray, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of child abuse causing serious injury. We remand the cause with directions.

The prosecution's evidence showed that, while his wife slept, defendant shook his infant daughter with such force that she suffered massive brain injuries, causing her to lapse into a persistent vegetative state.

Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements and writings he had made. At a hearing on that motion, evidence established that the day following the incident, defendant's wife took the infant to the hospital, explaining that defendant had told her the infant had "head-butted" him. However, a physician told police that this type of contact could not have caused the injuries. The physician opined that shaking was the cause of the infant's injuries.

Defendant agreed to a police interview. The interviewing detective advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and defendant signed a written waiver. During the advisement, defendant volunteered that his daughter "head-butted the hell out of me the day before."

At times during the interview, defendant complained of stomach pains and lightheadedness. A second detective, who was also a paramedic, evaluated defendant, and concluded that he could participate in the interrogation process. The detectives offered medical attention, but defendant declined it.

During the interview, defendant initially offered three different stories about how the infant might have been injured: (1) head-butting; (2) defendant rolling over onto the infant in his sleep; and (3) defendant jerking the infant upward in an effort to rescue her from a fall. The detectives informed defendant that these explanations were not consistent with the infant's injuries.

At this point, defendant stood up, told the detectives that he was "tired of you fucking with me," and walked around one detective toward the door. The other detective intercepted defendant by grabbing his arm before he reached the door. Defendant slapped at the detective's arm in an effort to free himself from the grip but the detective grabbed defendant under the chin and forced him against the wall. The intercepting detective then warned defendant not to strike him and told him to calm down. Defendant calmed down and returned to his seat.

Neither detective reiterated the Miranda advisement and the interrogation continued. After fifteen to twenty minutes, defendant confessed to shaking the baby. He said that he had shaken the baby for 30 seconds or more with such force that her clothes had fallen off. She then urinated on him and he shook her harder.

The detectives then suggested that defendant write letters to his wife and the judge who would preside in the case to explain what had happened. Defendant complied and wrote two letters in which he again admitted harming the baby.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the conviction at issue followed.

I.

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the incriminating statements made to detectives and the letters he wrote at the conclusion of the interrogation for the following reasons: his Miranda waiver was involuntary; his oral and written statements were involuntary; and the confessions occurred after he had unequivocally invoked his right to stop the interrogation. We disagree with the first two contentions, but conclude that a remand is required as to the third issue.

When reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, we must determine whether the trial court's factual findings are adequately supported by competent evidence in the record. If so, we will not disturb them. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo.1991). We must also determine whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard to the facts of the case. People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010 (Colo.1995).

A.

In determining the validity of a Miranda waiver, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation. People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981 (Colo.1993).

In order for a waiver of Miranda rights to be valid, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. A waiver is voluntary if it is the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. People v. Pease, 934 P.2d 1374 (Colo.1997); see also Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). Thus, the test focuses on whether police conduct was coercive. See People v. May, 859 P.2d 879 (Colo.1993).

The failure of the police to tell a suspect of the existence of an arrest warrant before questioning is not coercion or trickery, nor are police required to tell a suspect all the facts and circumstances that might affect the suspect's decision whether to waive his or her rights. Rather, Miranda prevents the police from coercing a suspect and requires them to ensure that a suspect is aware of and understands his or her constitutional rights. People v. Pease, supra.

The Pease holding is dispositive of defendant's assertion that his waiver was involuntary because the detectives did not reveal to him the strength of their evidence when the interrogation commenced.

We also reject defendant's contention that, because he was ill during the interview, his Miranda waiver was involuntary.

The trial court concluded that, although defendant exhibited signs of discomfort including upset stomach, tingling fingers, and lightheadedness, he was not debilitated. He was able to participate in an interview that lasted several hours and refused medical assistance when it was offered. He was also evaluated by a detective who was a certified paramedic.

The trial court employed the correct legal standard and its findings are adequately supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, we will not disturb its ruling. See People v. Gennings, supra.

B.

Defendant also contends that his oral and written confessions to shaking the infant were involuntary. We disagree.

A suspect's confession is admissible in evidence only if it is voluntary. People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo.1982). A suspect's statement must be the product of his or her free and unconstrained choice, see People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792 (Colo.1990), and it must not be the result of official coercion, intimidation, or deception. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). See People v. May, supra.

Official coercion includes any sort of threats, or any direct or implied promises or improper influences, however slight. People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo.1990); People v. Lytle, 704 P.2d 331 (Colo.App.1985).

A statement by a police officer instructing a suspect not to lie may constitute a threat. See People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo.1992). And, coercive police conduct may include even subtle forms of psychological coercion. See People v. Gennings, supra.

The determination whether governmental conduct is actually coercive and induces a challenged statement can only be made by assessing the totality of the circumstances under which the statement is made, including factors such as:

Whether the defendant was in custody or free to leave and was aware of his situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational background, employment status, and prior experience with the law enforcement and criminal justice system.

People v. Gennings, supra, 808 P.2d at 844; see also People v. Dracon, 884 P.2d 712 (Colo.1994).

Defendant first argues that, when the detectives told him it "could help" to explain in letter form to the judge and to his wife what had happened, this was a promise of leniency which rendered his statements involuntary. The trial court found that the suggestion to write the letters occurred after the oral confession and, therefore, had no effect on that statement. The court also found that the record did not support a finding that defendant was actually promised leniency in return for writing the letters.

The trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record and it employed the proper legal standard. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention. See People v. Gennings, supra.

Next, defendant argues that the physical confrontation between himself and the detective, coupled with the admonition that he could be charged with assaulting an officer if he did not calm down, rendered his subsequent confessions involuntary.

The trial court stated that it was an intimidating experience for defendant to be interrogated by two police officers who suspected him of committing a crime, but it also noted that an arrest at gunpoint after a...