People v. Green
Decision Date | 24 May 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 102751.,102751. |
Citation | 870 N.E.2d 394,225 Ill.2d 612 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ewatha J. GREEN, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Paula A. Logli, State's Attorney, Rockford (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Leah C. Meyers, Assistant Attorneys General, Julie Ann Shea, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten and Martin P. Moltz, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.
Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.
Defendant, Ewatha Green, was charged in the circuit court of Winnebago County with one count of robbery. 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a), (b) (West 2004). The single-count indictment stated:
"EWATHA GREEN committed the offense of ROBBERY, in that the defendant knowingly took property, being a purse, from the person of Carol Mortonson, a person 60 years of age or over, by the use of force, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (Class 1 Felony)."
At the trial's conclusion, the State submitted both the jury instructions and the verdict forms. Defendant did not object to any of the State's submissions, which were read aloud and tendered to the jury. Following its deliberation, the jury returned the verdict form stating, "We the jury, find the defendant, Ewatha Green, guilty of Robbery." Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion raised six issues, none of which addressed either the jury instructions or the verdict forms. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison.
Defendant appealed, raising only one argument: that the elements instruction used in this case, Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.04 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th), contained a serious defect that deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. As given in this case, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 stated:
"To sustain the charge of robbery of a victim 60 years of age or over, the State must prove the following propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant knowingly took property from the person or presence of Carol Mortonson; and
Second Proposition: That the defendant did so by the use of force; and
Third Proposition: That the person from whom the defendant took property was 60 years of age or over."
Defendant argued that this instruction was deficient because it failed to include the following two paragraphs, which are standard in all criminal elements instructions and which were mistakenly omitted from the most recently published edition of IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04:
According to defendant, the absence of these two paragraphs, which explain how the reasonable doubt standard is applied to the elements of the charged offense, denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial.1
In response, the State argued that defendant waived any alleged deficiencies in IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 by failing to object to the instruction as given, failing to tender any alternative instructions, and failing to raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. Moreover, the State insisted that invocation of the plain error exception to the waiver rule (see 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) was unwarranted because (1) as given, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 accurately sets forth the elements of Class 1 robbery; (2) the jury received IPI Criminal 4th No. 2.03, which expressly sets forth both the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence; (3) the trial court read the omitted portion of IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 to the jury on at least two occasions.
Defendant filed a reply brief, and shortly thereafter the appellate court entered the following order, on its own motion:
(Emphasis added.)
In response to the appellate court's order, defendant filed a supplemental brief citing this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995). In Mack, this court reversed and remanded for a new death sentencing hearing because, while the eligibility instruction form contained all of the necessary elements, the eligibility verdict form that the jury signed omitted one of those elements. In reversing and remanding, this court explained:
Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 538, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437.
According to defendant's supplemental brief, the verdict form in this case is like that in Mack because "it failed to set forth an essential component of the charged offense of robbery of a person 60 or over— the enhancing element of the victim's age." Defendant continued, The State then filed a supplemental response, arguing that there was no conflict between the elements instruction and the verdict form and that, even if there were, defendant waived any objection to that conflict by failing to raise it below.
Supplemental briefing complete, the appellate court filed its decision. The appellate court began by addressing defendant's original argument—namely, that the omission of the two standard paragraphs from IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 compromised defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The appellate court disagreed with defendant on this point, explaining that the jury in this case was repeatedly instructed on both the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, and that these instructions were sufficient to ensure that the jury understood its obligations. 364 Ill.App.3d 923, 927-28, 302 Ill.Dec. 168, 848 N.E.2d 168.
The appellate court then addressed the "conflict" between the elements instructions and the verdict form. In doing so, however, the appellate court nowhere addressed or even acknowledged any of the arguments raised in the supplemental briefs, which were custom ordered by the appellate court and which extended the briefing phase of this case by almost four months. Instead, the appellate court simply declared sua sponte that the "conflict" between the instructions and the verdict form violated the principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). According to the appellate court, Apprendi "dealt directly with the requirement of a verdict form that demonstrates a jury's determination of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each element of an offense." 364 Ill.App.3d at 929, 302 Ill.Dec. 168, 848 N.E.2d 168. With this as its premise, the appellate court then reasoned as follows:
364 Ill.App.3d at 929, 302 Ill. Dec. 168, 848 N.E.2d 168.
As a result of this analysis, the appellate court reduced defendant's conviction from Class 1 "robbery of a person 60 years of age or over" to Class 2 "robbery." 364 Ill.App.3d at 929, 302 Ill.Dec. 168, 848 N.E.2d 168.
The State filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a). Before this court, the State argues that the appellate court's Apprendi analysis is fundamentally flawed and that, in any event, there is no conflict between the elements instruction and the signed verdict form. By way of response, defendant essentially concedes that this case has little, if anything, to do with Apprendi. Instead defendant argues, "it is really Illinois case law regarding verdict forms that controls the resolution of the instant case." In other words, rather than defend the appellate court's Apprendi analysis, defendant reasserts the Mack argument advanced in his supplemental appellate court brief. At the same time, defendant seeks cross relief on the basis of his original appellate court argument—that the omission of the two standard paragraphs from IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.04 compromised his constitutional right to a fair trial.
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