People v. Grove
| Decision Date | 29 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | 103521,Nos. 9-10,Docket Nos. 103004,s. 9-10 |
| Citation | 566 N.W.2d 547,455 Mich. 439 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard William GROVE, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David AUSTIN, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Thomas L. Smithson, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles D. Hackney and Steven Flancher, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, for the People in Grove.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Mary Beth Kur, Prosecuting Attorney, and William A. Molner, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, for the People in Austin.
Lester O. Pollak, Jackson, for Defendant-Appellee in Grove.
State Appellate Defender by Valerie R. Newman, for Defendant-Appellant in Austin.
Norris J. Thomas, Jr., Detroit, amici curiae, for Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
Michael D. Thomas, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Grand Rapids, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
We granted leave in People v. Grove to address whether a trial court has discretion under MCR 6.302(C)(3) to reject the plea underlying a plea agreement that includes a prosecutorial sentence recommendation. We granted leave in People v. Austin to address (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to entertain the defendant's guilty plea, which was part of a plea agreement reached after the trial court's "plea cutoff" date, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial on the ground of juror misconduct, and (3) whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for correction of the presentence report.
In Grove, we hold that the court had the authority under MCR 6.302(C)(3) to exercise its discretion in rejecting defendant's guilty plea. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's conviction. In Austin, consistent with our reasoning herein, we find the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement was not an abuse of discretion. We also hold that defendant was not prejudiced by the alleged juror misconduct, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue. We order that the letters from Sergeant Harris dated June 27 and 28, 1991, be deleted from the presentence report. 1
I. Facts and Proceedings
The Michigan State Police arrested defendant Grove on March 1, 1991, in connection with allegations of criminal sexual conduct. Defendant was charged in Delta County with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, 2 a felony offense carrying a maximum sentence of life or any term of years, 3 and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, 4 a felony offense carrying a maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. 5 The complainant was the defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter, who was under the age of thirteen at the time of the acts for which defendant was charged. 6
On August 2, 1991, the prosecutor, defendant, and defendant's counsel appeared before acting circuit Judge Robert E. Goebel for a pretrial conference. 7 The parties informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement whereby the defendant would plead guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, 8 a misdemeanor offense carrying a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and a $500 fine, 9 and the prosecutor would move to dismiss the other charges and recommend a sentence in the county jail not to exceed one year. Judge Goebel examined the defendant in accordance with MCR 6.302 to ensure that the plea was understanding, voluntary, and accurate. 10 The judge took the plea under advisement to review the presentence investigation report and to schedule sentencing.
On the date set for sentencing, October 8, 1991, Judge Goebel rejected the defendant's bargained guilty plea:
The Court has had the benefit of reading the presentence report, and I've had a conference with counsel and Mr. Ayotte of the corrections department in chambers. I noted to them that I had read the Defendant's version of the incident, as well as the victim's version ... of what had happened.... I noted the victim recommended prison time and the cap as recommended by the prosecutor would not allow for prison time. I indicated that I thought I had the discretion, having taken the plea under advisement, and needed to first rule on whether or not I would accept the guilty plea.... I do not feel it would be in the interest of justice. I feel that there is such a wide disparity between what the victim claims had happened, as opposed to what the Defendant claimed had happened, and the victim's desire of a prison term that it would not be fair and in the interest of justice to accept this matter plea bargained to fourth degree. If, in fact ... the first degree criminal sexual conduct had happened in the course of time as the victim claims, I feel the matter should go to trial on the original charge. And the Defendant, if found guilty, should be sentenced appropriately under the charge he was found guilty on or pled guilty to as the case may be. If indeed this was only a relatively minor fourth degree incident, and there was no prior first degree criminal sexual conduct, or if indeed there was no factual basis for the sexual conduct at all, then the Defendant would be more fairly found not guilty. The prosecutor in chambers urged me to accept the plea, one of the reasons being that he felt the victim had recanted her story and she would be subject to possible impeachment.... [T]he difficulty in proving this case ... was one of the principal reasons he wished to have this plea bargain accepted at the fourth degree level.
Defendant's counsel objected to the judge's refusal to accept the plea, and implied that the judge had attempted to coerce the defendant in chambers into agreeing not to contest the scoring of the penetration issue. After a brief hearing, 11 the judge stated on the record that he had neither engaged in such coercion nor penalized the defendant in any way for failing to admit anything. 12 The prosecutor, while indicating it was his intent to go forward with the plea bargain, stated that "it would be both appropriate and ethical to try the case at the level originally charged." The judge restated his ruling, and his belief that it was a "valid exercise of the Court's discretion...." However, the judge specifically declined to preclude the parties from taking the plea agreement to Judge Shipman to seek his acceptance. The prosecutor did not submit the plea to Judge Shipman.
On December 10 through December 12, 1992, the defendant was tried before a jury on the original charges and convicted of one count of CSC II. Judge Shipman sentenced the defendant to forty months to fifteen years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded with instructions for the "trial court to permit defendant to plead guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for the terms of the parties' previous plea agreement." 208 Mich.App. 574, 580, 528 N.W.2d 796 (1995). We granted leave to appeal, 13 and we now reverse for the reasons stated below.
The Boyne City Police arrested defendant David Austin on January 31, 1991, in connection with allegations of criminal sexual conduct involving two victims. Defendant Austin was charged in Charlevoix County under separate warrants with two counts of CSC I. The information cited use of force or coercion as the aggravating factor making the offenses CSC I. 14 Defendant was twenty-nine years old. Both victims were thirteen-year-old girls. 15 Defendant denied that these incidents occurred.
A third felony warrant was issued on February 20, 1991, charging defendant with one count of CSC IV. The victim was a fourteen-year-old girl. 16 Defendant admitted to grabbing one of the victims named in the February 20, 1991, warrant.
On March 11, 1991, the parties appeared before Judge Richard M. Pajtas for a scheduling conference. The parties estimated the trial would take three days, and they agreed to schedule the trial for June 25, 1991. They also agreed that May 13, 1991, would serve as the date on which any and all motions would be heard and as the date beyond which "no reduced pleas pursuant to a plea agreement between defense and prosecution" would be accepted.
The day before the scheduled trial date, the parties appeared before the trial court and informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement. Under the agreement, defendant agreed to plead guilty of two counts of CSC III 17 in relation to the incidents that occurred in 1988, and one count of CSC IV in relation to the incident that occurred in 1990. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to drop the original charges and agreed not to pursue an habitual offender charge or second offense charges.
The trial judge refused to accept the plea agreement because it was presented after the plea cutoff date:
As you know, the Court does not participate in your plea bargaining, but I do now set a date beyond which I will accept no negotiated pleas.... I set the matter for a scheduling conference on March 11, 1991, the next available motion day [after arraignment].... And at that scheduling conference both Counsel appeared, the needs of the case were discussed and a jury trial date ... was set.
Also, we set [May 13] to hear any and all motions ..., if there were to be any. And also at that scheduling conference, after discussion, we set May 13, 1991, as the date that no reduced pleas, pursuant to a plea agreement ... would be accepted. And so Counsel has had two and one half months from the date of the arraignment to plea bargain this case.
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