People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 17 May 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 285532.
• Citation: 292 Mich.App. 583,808 N.W.2d 541
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JACKSON.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

292 Mich.App. 583

808 N.W.2d 541

PEOPLE

v.JACKSON.

Docket No. 285532.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 3, 2011, at Detroit.Decided May 17, 2011, at 9:10 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Thomas M. Chambers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Malita Barrett, Eastpointe, for defendant.

Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and O'CONNELL and WILDER, JJ.

Wilder, J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157a, assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to life in prison for the first-degree murder and conspiracy convictions and 225 months to 40 years' imprisonment for the assault conviction, with those sentences to be served concurrently but consecutively to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.¹

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arose from the fatal shooting of Bennie Peterson and the nonfatal shooting of Donteau Dennis on the east side of Detroit during the early morning hours of September 28, 2007. According to the prosecution's evidence, codefendant Quonshay Douglas–Ricardo Mason persuaded Peterson and Dennis to leave Peterson's house under the pretext that they were going to rob a drug addict who was carrying a large amount of cash to purchase drugs. Mason drove Peterson and Dennis, in Peterson's minivan, to a house on Malcolm Street and told Dennis to purchase drugs in the house to use as bait in the robbery. Defendant and codefendant Kainte Hickey had followed Mason in defendant's Jeep. After Dennis left Peterson's minivan to purchase the drugs, Mason and defendant parked their vehicles so that the minivan was blocked in and could not be driven away. Mason then got out of the minivan and defendant got out of his Jeep, and the two of them went to the side of the minivan and began firing guns at Peterson, who was still inside. At the same time, Hickey emerged from defendant's Jeep and fired several shots at Dennis as he crossed the street. Peterson was killed.

Officer Frank Senter arrived and found Dennis lying wounded in a backyard. Dennis remarked that he did not believe that he would survive and told Officer Senter that Hickey had shot him over a drug debt. Although Officer Senter did not recall hearing Dennis say anything about Peterson, defendant, or Mason, he stated that Dennis made additional statements that Officer Senter could not understand because of Dennis's condition. Later, while Dennis was hospitalized, he gave a statement implicating defendant and Mason in the shooting attack on Peterson. At trial, Dennis again identified defendant and Mason as the persons who shot at Peterson inside the minivan.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court considers whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would warrant a reasonable juror in finding that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 399, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000); People v. Sexton, 250 Mich.App. 211, 222, 646 N.W.2d 875 (2002). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” Nowack, 462 Mich. at 400, 614 N.W.2d 78 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded to evidence are questions for the jury, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the prosecutor's favor.” People v. Harrison, 283 Mich.App. 374, 378, 768 N.W.2d 98 (2009).

A conviction of first-degree premeditated murder requires evidence that “the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate.” People v. Kelly, 231 Mich.App. 627, 642, 588 N.W.2d 480 (1998). Premeditation and deliberation require “sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look.” People v. Anderson, 209 Mich.App. 527, 537, 531 N.W.2d 780 (1995).

A criminal conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes, under which two or more individuals voluntarily agree to effectuate the commission of a criminal offense. People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 345, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997). The individuals must specifically intend to combine to pursue the criminal objective, and the offense is complete upon the formation of the agreement. Id. at 345–346, 562 N.W.2d 652. The intent, including knowledge of the intent, must be shared by the individuals. Id. at 346, 562 N.W.2d 652. Thus, there must be proof showing that “the parties specifically intended to further, promote, advance, or pursue an unlawful objective.” Id. at 347, 562 N.W.2d 652. Direct proof of a conspiracy is not required; rather, “proof may be derived from the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties.” Id.

The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v. Davis, 216 Mich.App. 47, 53, 549 N.W.2d 1 (1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The intent to kill may be proved by inference from any facts in evidence. People v. Lawton, 196 Mich.App. 341, 350, 492 N.W.2d 810 (1992). A person is guilty of felony-firearm if the person possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b.

A person who aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted as if he or she directly committed the crime. People v. Izarraras–Placante, 246 Mich.App. 490, 495, 633 N.W.2d 18 (2001).

“To support a finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the prosecution must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement.” [ Id. at 495–496, 633 N.W.2d 18, quoting People v. Turner, 213 Mich.App. 558, 568, 540 N.W.2d 728 (1995).]

Aiding and abetting describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator, including any words or deeds that may support, encourage, or incite the commission of a crime. People v. Youngblood, 165 Mich.App. 381, 386, 418 N.W.2d 472 (1988).

In this case, Dennis testified that before they departed Peterson's house, defendant was waiting in a Jeep on the street, positioning himself in a manner that prevented Dennis from seeing whether someone else was inside, and defendant then followed the minivan to Malcolm Street where Mason took Dennis and Peterson. At Malcolm Street, defendant and Mason aligned their respective vehicles so that the minivan was blocked in and could not be driven away. Hickey, whose presence in the Jeep had been concealed by defendant, got out of the Jeep and pursued Dennis with a gun while defendant and Mason both began shooting toward the minivan at Peterson. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence supports an inference that defendant, Mason, and Hickey were acting in concert according to a premeditated plan to kill Peterson and Dennis. Their plan involved enticing Peterson and Dennis to leave Peterson's home under the pretext that they were going to commit a robbery. When they reached the intended location, they acted together to separate Dennis and Peterson so that Mason and defendant could shoot Peterson and Hickey could make a surprise attack on Dennis. This evidence supports defendant's convictions for the first-degree murder of Peterson, conspiracy to commit murder, and aiding and abetting Hickey's assault with intent to murder Dennis. In addition, the evidence that defendant was armed with a gun during these offenses supports his felony-firearm conviction.

Although defendant argues that Dennis was not a credible witness and gave inconsistent statements concerning defendant's involvement, the credibility of his testimony was for the jury to resolve. It was within the jury's province to determine that Dennis's testimony was truthful, notwithstanding some discrepancies in his prior statements. Harrison, 283 Mich.App. at 378, 768 N.W.2d 98.

III. DISCOVERY VIOLATION

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor's failure to disclose a transcript of Dennis's prior statements given pursuant to an investigative subpoena violated his constitutional right to discovery. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo a defendant's claim of a constitutional due-process violation. People v. Schumacher, 276 Mich.App. 165, 176, 740 N.W.2d 534 (2007). “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case....” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); see also People v. Banks, 249 Mich.App. 247, 254, 642 N.W.2d 351 (2002). However, due process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence in its possession that is exculpatory and material, regardless of whether the defendant requests the evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Schumacher, 276 Mich.App. at 176, 740 N.W.2d 534. In addition, MCR 6.201(A)(2) requires that a party in a criminal action, upon request, disclose “any written or recorded statement, including electronically recorded statements, pertaining to the case by a lay witness whom the party may call at trial....” The prosecution concedes that the omission from the discovery materials of the transcript of Dennis's statements given pursuant to the investigative subpoena...