People v. Guilford

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Citation: 945 N.Y.S.2d 825,96 A.D.3d 1375,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04475
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James E. GUILFORD, Defendant–Appellant.

96 A.D.3d 1375

945 N.Y.S.2d 825

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04475

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.James E. GUILFORD, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 8, 2012.

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] ) based on the charge that he killed the victim on or around February 6, 2007. The victim was the ex-girlfriend of defendant who lived with him in Syracuse and was the mother of his children. Within days after the victim's disappearance, defendant took the children to Georgia to stay with his mother. Detectives from the Syracuse Police Department (SPD) traveled to Georgia and interviewed defendant there on February 20, 2007. Defendant returned to Syracuse on March 20, 2007, and was interrogated by SPD detectives over a period of 49 hours. Near the end of the interrogation, defendant told the detectives that he wanted an attorney and that he wanted to speak with the Assistant District Attorney. An attorney was appointed for defendant and, after meeting with his attorney as well as a break in the interrogation, defendant made statements to the detectives in the presence of his attorney on March 23, 2007.

We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the statements that he made to SPD detectives in Georgia on February 20, 2007. According to the decision of the suppression court, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant was in custody, the court determined that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before speaking with the detectives. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports that determination ( see People v. Sands, 81 A.D.3d 1263, 1263, 916 N.Y.S.2d 550,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 800, 929 N.Y.S.2d 108, 952 N.E.2d 1103). We further agree with the court that defendant's statement, “[w]hen I asked them if I needed to speak to an attorney, they just made it seem like I couldn't get one at that time” was not an unequivocal request for counsel ( see generally People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969, 970, 516 N.Y.S.2d 648, 509 N.E.2d 343,rearg. denied70 N.Y.2d 796, 522 N.Y.S.2d 113, 516 N.E.2d 1226).

We reject defendant's further contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress the statements that he made to SPD detectives in Syracuse on March 23, 2007. The court suppressed the statements that defendant made during the preceding 49–hour interrogation. The court held that, although defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, under the totality of the circumstances the People did not meet their burden of proving that defendant's statements made during “this unprecedented and lengthy period were voluntary” beyond a reasonable doubt. We concur with the court that the length of the interrogation was unparalleled and should in no way be condoned. With respect to the March 23, 2007 statements, however, the court determined that they were admissible because there was an eight-hour “definite, pronounced break” between the 49–hour interrogation and those statements. The court explained that any taint from the prior interrogation was dissipated by the break in the interrogation, by the assignment of an attorney and opportunities to consult with that attorney before the March 23, 2007 statements were made, by defendant's removal from the interrogation room and his opportunity to sleep the remainder of the night before being arraigned, and by defendant's having made the statements in question while speaking with the detectives the following morning in the presence of his attorney. We agree. In particular, we note that, once an attorney was appointed for defendant and defendant had the opportunity to consult with the attorney before again speaking with the detectives, in the presence of his attorney, it cannot be said that the statements were involuntary or the “product of compulsion” ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct ( see People v. Milton, 90 A.D.3d 1636, 1637, 934 N.Y.S.2d 921) and, in any event, that contention is without merit. Any alleged misconduct was not so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial ( see People v. Pringle, 71 A.D.3d 1450, 1450–1451, 896 N.Y.S.2d 772,lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 777, 907 N.Y.S.2d 465, 933 N.E.2d 1058;People v. Foster, 59 A.D.3d 1008, 1009, 872 N.Y.S.2d 310,lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 816, 881 N.Y.S.2d 23, 908 N.E.2d 931). Defendant further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney should not have allowed him to give a statement to the detectives. Defense counsel was not ineffective, however, for making a “strategic decision to encourage defendant to cooperate in order to receive favorable treatment” ( People v. Carncross, 14 N.Y.3d 319, 332, 901 N.Y.S.2d 112, 927 N.E.2d 532). Indeed, the evidence at the suppression hearing established that defendant wanted to “cut a deal” and was in fact offered a sentence cap if he cooperated. We have reviewed the remaining instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel raised by defendant and nevertheless conclude that he received meaningful representation ( see People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).

CENTRA and SCONIERS, JJ., concur; SCUDDER, P.J., concurs in the following Memorandum:

I agree with the majority that County Court properly refused to suppress defendant's inculpatory statements made in the presence of counsel. I write separately, however, to clarify that, in my view, those statementsare voluntary not only because they were sufficiently attenuated from statements determined to be involuntary ( see generally People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239;People v. Bethea, 67 N.Y.2d 364, 502 N.Y.S.2d 713, 493 N.E.2d 937;People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 378 N.Y.S.2d 682, 341 N.E.2d 243), but also, independently of the attenuation, because they were made following consultation with his counsel and in the presence of his counsel.

I am mindful of People v. Concepcion, 17 N.Y.3d 192, 929 N.Y.S.2d 541, 953 N.E.2d 779 and note that my analysis does not improperly recommend that we affirm the court's suppression ruling on a ground rejected by the suppression court, or on a ground upon which it ruled in defendant's favor ( cf. id. at 196, 929 N.Y.S.2d 541, 953 N.E.2d 779;see generally People v. LaFontaine, 92 N.Y.2d 470, 474, 682 N.Y.S.2d 671, 705 N.E.2d 663). Indeed, Concepcion and LaFontaine are “only implicated when an appellate court affirms a case on a ground that was not decided adversely to the [defendant] at the trial level” ( Concepcion, 17 N.Y.3d at 197, 929 N.Y.S.2d 541, 953 N.E.2d 779). Here, the court explicitly addressed defendant's opportunities to consult with counsel prior to making the statements and noted that the statements were made with the benefit of the assistance of counsel. Thus, I submit that, as part and parcel of its decision that the statement was voluntary, the court implicitly determined that the assistance of counsel rendered the statement voluntary, and thus decided that issue adversely to defendant.

Although defendant was required to endure 49 hours of interrogation, he nevertheless eventually invoked his right to counsel, whereupon the police ceased the interrogation. Defendant conferred with his assigned attorney for a period of two hours that evening and for approximately 15 minutes the following morning before again speaking to the police. With his counsel present, defendant told the police, “I killed her” and that he had placed the victim's body in a dumpster.

More than 50 years ago, the Supreme Court reiterated that “basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution [are] that ‘No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ and that ‘the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel’ ” ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). The Court established “procedural safeguards ... to secure the privilege against self-incrimination” ( id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602), in order to ensure that the right “to remain silent ... or to speak without intimidation, blatant or subtle,” ( id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602) is not “put in jeopardy ... through official overbearing” ( id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602). The Miranda Court was clear: “[t]he presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination]. His [or her] presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion” ( id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602). “The presence of counsel confers no undue advantage to the accused. Rather, the attorney's presence serves to equalize the positions of the accused and sovereign, mitigating the coercive influence of the State and rendering it less overwhelming” ( People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 397 N.E.2d 709). Here, defendant exercised his right to counsel and thereby safeguarded his right to remain silent or to speak without intimidation ( see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602), and thus the court properly determined that defendant's statements were voluntary.

LINDLEY and MARTOCHE, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse in accordance with the following Memorandum:

We respectfully dissent. We agree with the majority that County Court properly refused to suppress the statements by defendant in Georgia to detectives from the Syracuse Police...