People v. Hall
| Decision Date | 25 March 1981 |
| Citation | 108 Misc.2d 507,437 N.Y.S.2d 606 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Jeffrey R. HALL, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Justice Court |
Pursuant to a Simplified Traffic Information issued on September 28, 1980, defendant was charged with driving at a speed of 48 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone on Stormytown Road in the Town of Ossining, in violation of § 1180(d) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
Defendant brings a pre-trial motion to dismiss the information pursuant to C.P.L. § 170.30 1(f).
The affidavits submitted and oral arguments made on behalf of defendant and the People concur as to the following facts:
Defendant's vehicle was proceeding in an easterly direction on Stormytown Road, having entered the roadway from the direction of Cedar Lane. There was no speed limit sign posted on the side of Stormytown Road upon which the defendant was driving. It was possible to drive from the Cedar Lane exit on Route 9A to the point where defendant's vehicle was spotted by radar without passing a speed limit sign other than a 24 X 30 sign on the southerly side of Cedar Lane opposite the Route 9A exit ramp. That sign read "SPEED LIMIT 30" and was smaller than the dimensions prescribed by § 208.8 of the State Regulations. Because the sign did not read "TOWN SPEED LIMIT 30" or "AREA SPEED LIMIT 30", it was a "linear" rather than an "area" sign, as defined by § 208.2 of the Regulations.
By reason of these stipulated facts, it necessarily follows that a motorist proceeding along the above hypothetical route to the place of occurrence would not have been notified by a posted sign that the required speed on Stormytown Road is less than the statutory statewide speed limit of 55 m.p.h. On the other hand, if the defendant's vehicle had entered Stormytown Road from the opposite direction on Cedar Lane, he would have been placed on notice by a properly posted "area" speed limit sign, that all streets in the Town were subject to a 30 m.p.h. speed limit.
The People have conceded on oral argument that they shall be unable at trial to establish from which direction on Cedar Lane the defendant entered Stormytown Road, except through the defendant's own testimony. Since this is a quasi-criminal proceeding governed by the Criminal Procedure Law, the defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and the People must prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination mandate that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself. His attorney has stated in open Court that the defendant does not intend to waive that privilege. The Court is not at liberty to override the "Rule of Law" in its desire to ferret out the truth. If it were allowed to do so the "search for truth" would be perverted by the use of an unlawful means to arrive at an apparently proper end. Our system of justice would be undermined thereby. See e. g. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Under these circumstances, the Court is bound, as a matter of law, to treat the facts of this case as though the defendant's vehicle was traversing the unposted route.
A juxtaposition of §§ 1110(b) and 1683(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides, in effect, that a local ordinance which purports to establish speed limits other than the 55 m.p.h. statutory speed limit may not be enforced unless proper signs giving notice are posted in conformity with the Department of Transportation official Regulations. The People concede that the posted sign along the hypothetical route is smaller in size than what is required by Department of Transportation Regulations § 208.8 and that it is not a "Town" or "Area" speed limit sign as defined in § 208.2 of the Regulations. Nevertheless, the People contend that the sign in issue does give fair notice of an area speed limit of 30 m.p.h. The Court disagrees...
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People v. Praete
...of the court. Defendant relies on People v. Stone, 138 Misc.2d 520, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Kensington Justice Ct.1988), and People v. Hall, 108 Misc.2d 507, 437 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Ossining Justice Ct.1981). Neither case is instructive in the present circumstances, however. In Stone, the posted sign ......
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People v. Heyman
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