People v. Hall

• Decision Date: 22 June 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 44535
• Citation: 204 Cal.Rptr. 42,157 Cal.App.3d 538
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles HALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 42

204 Cal.Rptr. 42

157 Cal.App.3d 538

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles HALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 44535.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

June 22, 1984.

Hearing Granted and Retransferred

to the Court of Appeal,

Sept. 27, 1984.

Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., John R. Gorey and Lisa B. Lench, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Someone killed Adolph Clarke. The 88 year-old-man was found lying on his stomach in his bedroom. His head was wrapped in a sheet. His hands were tied behind his back. A cloth was tied to one ankle. His larnyx was broken. His back was broken. He did not commit suicide.

The defendant admitted to police that he and two other men, Dixon and Taylor, had forced their way into Clarke's apartment to rob him. Dixon knocked Clarke down and began to tie his hands and beat him. At the same time defendant tied the old man's feet. Defendant and the others then took money and other property belonging to Clarke and left.

Following a preliminary hearing, a three-count information was filed against defendant charging him with murder, robbery and burglary. The murder count alleged as a special circumstance that the killing occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery and burglary. (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)

Subsequently defendant was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and committed to Camarillo State Hospital until such time as he should regain mental competency. While at Camarillo defendant "walked away" from the grounds. He remained at large for about five months. His recapture was somewhat dramatic. Over defendant's objection, the events were described to the jury. About 20 police officers surrounded the house where defendant was staying. Using a public address system, one of the officers ordered defendant to come out of the house. When defendant did not come out, tear gas canisters were shot into the house. When defendant still did not come out several officers entered the house. Eventually defendant was found hiding in the attic under some insulation. Largely because of this escape from custody the trial court required defendant to wear leg chains throughout the trial.

In addition to his admissions to the police, the jury heard testimony from two witnesses about statements defendant made to them regarding the robbery of Mr. Clarke. Beverly Armstrong testified that the night after Mr. Clarke was killed defendant told her he had to leave town because he and Paris Dixon had killed Mr. Clarke. Sarah Franklin testified that on the night of the robbery and murder defendant, Dixon and Taylor came to her house with a television, phonograph and other items. (The phonograph and some of the other property were later identified as having belonged to Mr. Clarke.) Ms Franklin saw blood on Dixon's clothing. She heard defendant say to Dixon, "Why did you stomp him? I already f...d him up." On cross-examination, Ms. Franklin contradicted her earlier statements in court and to the police and asserted for the first time defendant had confessed to her that he had personally murdered Mr. Clarke. Defense counsel asked why she waited so long to mention this confession and Ms. Franklin replied she hated defendant and wished to see him dead.

Defendant was convicted on all three counts and the special circumstance allegation was found true.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in requiring defendant to wear leg chains throughout the trial?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing testimony describing defendant's recapture following his escape from Camarillo?

3. Was Sarah Franklin an incompetent witness?

4. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on the question of intent for purpose of the special circumstances allegation?

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Requiring Defendant to Wear Chains During the Trial.

Our Supreme Court has held no person charged with an offense can be subject to physical restraints, including leg irons or chains, unless there is a showing of "manifest need" for such restraints. (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) While we believe the showing of a need to restrain the defendant in this case was marginal, we do not find that the restraint constituted a "manifest abuse of discretion". (Id. at p. 293, fn. 12, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.)

The considerations supporting the restraint were that defendant had escaped from Camarillo State Hospital while these charges were pending against him, People v. Burnett (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 651, 654, 655, 59 Cal.Rptr. 652; People v. Stabler (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 862, 863-864, 21 Cal.Rptr. 120; People v. Pitcock (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 795, 800-801, 184 Cal.Rptr. 772; the escape was fairly recent, People v. Pitcock, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at page 800, 184 Cal.Rptr. 772; defendant had escaped from custody once before at some unspecified time, Pitcock, supra, at page 800, 184 Cal.Rptr. 772 and defendant was charged with crimes of violence--murder and robbery. (People v. Frausto (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 129, 134-137, 147-148, 185 Cal.Rptr. 314.)

The considerations opposing restraint were that defendant had not committed any act of violence in his escape from Camarillo--he had simply walked away (cf. Pitcock, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, 184 Cal.Rptr. 772); he had not indicated any ambulant or violent propensities during pretrial proceedings (cf. People v. Kimball (1936) 5 Cal.2d 608, 611, 55 P.2d 483; People v. Jacla (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 878, 884, 144 Cal.Rptr. 23); it has been held that the mere fact the defendant is charged with a violent crime is insufficient reason to impose restraints, Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 293, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. Burnett (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 661, 668, 168 Cal.Rptr. 833 and there were less restrictive alternatives available such as bringing in a second bailiff. (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291, fn. 8, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.)

The record reflects some potential jurors saw the defendant in leg chains on one occasion, briefly, when he was brought into the courtroom at the beginning of voir dire. A comment by defense counsel indicates only one or two of the jurors finally selected for the panel saw the incident. Such brief observations have been generally held not prejudicial. (Duran, supra, p. 287, fn. 2, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) Although the trial court denied the request to remove the leg chains the court acceded to the request that defendant be brought into the courtroom before the jury entered and allowed to leave after the jury had departed. Thereafter, the trial was conducted with defendant seated during the times in which the jury was present. Thus, the court employed the least visible restraints and there is nothing in the record to indicate jurors were aware, after the first encounter, that defendant was under restraint. (See Duran, supra, p. 291, fn. 9, 292, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. Zatko (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 534, 551, 145 Cal.Rptr. 643.) Given these factors and the considerations supporting the restraint of the defendant, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Evidence of the Circumstances Surrounding Defendant's Recapture After His Escape From Camarillo.

Defendant concedes evidence of his recapture is relevant to his consciousness of guilt. But, he contends, allowing testimony as to the details of his recapture, (see p. 3, ante ) was highly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352.

We have found no California case directly on point. However, several cases have upheld the admission of evidence of the defendant's conduct in avoiding arrest as relevant circumstantial evidence tending to show guilt. (People v. Wong (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 812, 831, 111 Cal.Rptr. 314; People v. Cartwright (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 402, 418, 166 Cal.Rptr. 37 and see People v. Ellis (1922) 188 Cal. 682, 693, 206 P. 753; " 'It was never doubted that the conduct of a suspected party when charged with a crime may be put in evidence against him when it is such as an innocent man would not be likely to resort to.' " quoting People v. Arnold (1880) 43 Mich. 303, 5 N.W. 385, 387.)

We have found two sister state opinions in which the circumstances of the defendants' capture were admitted to show guilty knowledge. (See Erickson v. State (Ind.1982) 439 N.E.2d 579, 581; People v. Hooker (1981) 96 Ill.App.3d 127, 51 Ill.Dec. 793, 799, 421 N.E.2d 301, 307.) In both cases, as in the case at bench, the defendant hid from the police in an attempt to avoid capture. Hooker is most similar to the case at bench because Hooker like the defendant here escaped from custody while the instant charges were pending against him. The Hooker court reasoned "it was necessary to explain the circumstances of defendant's recapture to negate any inference that he may have turned himself in to the police ...." (51 Ill.Dec. at p. 799, 421 N.E.2d at p. 307.)

While it is true the circumstances surrounding the capture of the defendants in Erickson and Hooker were not as dramatic as those in the case at bench, it is also true the prosecutor here handled this evidence in a low-key fashion. He did not play to the jury on this matter. There was no reference to a SWAT Team exercise or any other attempt to sensationalize the event. His reference to the incident in his closing argument was brief and matter-of-fact referring only to the link between escape, recapture and knowledge of guilt. The details of the capture were not mentioned.

We find the admission of this evidence not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.

C. The Record...