People v. Hall

• Decision Date: 22 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. H002889,H002889
• Citation: 199 Cal.App.3d 914,245 Cal.Rptr. 458
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steve HALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 458

245 Cal.Rptr. 458

199 Cal.App.3d 914

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steve HALL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H002889.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

March 22, 1988.

Conflicts Admin. Program, Michael Kresser, Acting Conflicts Adm'r, Charles Robinson, Interim Conflicts Adm'r, Santa Clara, and Marisa Nayfach, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant (under appointment by the Court of Appeal).

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Atty. Gen., Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

ZECHER, Associate Justice. ^*

Defendant Steve Hall appeals from a judgment after jury trial. The jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and found true the allegation that he personally used a wok as a dangerous and deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 1192.7). He was acquitted of the charge of dissuading a witness (Pen.Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)). A mistrial was declared as to the burglary charge (Pen.Code, §§ 459/460, subd. 1) because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. That count was subsequently dismissed. Hall was We find no merit in Hall's claim that the trial court erred (1) in admitting evidence that he had initially refused to give his name to an arresting officer, and (2) in sentencing him to the aggravated term.

sentenced to state prison for a term of four years.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On September 11, 1986, Ronald Lee and his wife Nancy were asleep in their locked apartment. Between 3:30 and 4 a.m., Nancy Lee awoke to find a man in their room standing over her husband's side of the bed with an object in his hands. Ronald Lee then awoke, saw the man, and tried to push him out of the room. The man whom both Lees later identified as appellant Hall began hitting Ronald Lee with the flashlight he had in his gloved hand.

Nancy made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the police emergency 911 line. The men continued struggling in the bedroom. Hall tried to choke Ronald Lee and hit him with his fists. Hall then grabbed a wok which was on the patio and struck Ronald Lee on the head with it several times.

During the struggle, Nancy Lee returned with their gun. She pointed it at Hall and told him to get off her husband. When Hall tried to grab the gun, Nancy Lee screamed. A neighbor, Philip Vezinaw, awakened by the noise, saw Hall "beating on" Ronald Lee and came to his aid. Vezinaw hit Hall with a half-inch dowel until it broke.

Hall eventually knocked Ronald Lee down and fled from the apartment. Hall jumped a fence and ran into a parking lot. Ronald Lee grabbed the gun and pursued Hall. Vezinaw, with another stick, joined the chase.

Hall ran behind a car. He was stopped by Vezinaw who struck Hall with the stick. Hall insisted, "I am not the guy." He jumped back, however, when Ronald Lee arrived and fired a warning shot. Both men then held Hall until the police arrived.

San Jose Police Officer Mike Smith arrived at approximately 4:20 a.m. and placed Hall under arrest. Hall did not seem to be injured. When asked his name, Hall "did not [respond] at first."

At the time of his arrest, Hall was not carrying a wallet or any identification. He was carrying $929. The bills were folded and tied with a rubber band. There were no $10 bills. Ronald Lee later discovered that between $175 and $200 were missing from his wallet left on his desk. He told one of the officers who reported to the scene that the money taken was in $10 and $20 bills.

The Lees found pry marks on the living room sliding glass door and indications of tampering with its lock. They discovered Hall's flashlight on the living room floor and a pair of gloves on the bedroom patio.

The defense case was based upon the testimony of Hall and that of his friend Clifford Scott, a maintenance oil worker in Pittsburg.

Hall testified that on the evening of September 10th, he and Scott were having coffee at a restaurant near Concord when he asked for a ride in Scott's truck. In his back pocket, Hall had a wallet containing $2,000 in $100 bills; in his front pocket he had almost $1,000 wrapped in a rubber band. The money represented savings as well as the proceeds from the sale of a car. Hall drove Scott's truck. He brought a flashlight from his own car in case Scott's was not operable.

The men drove to San Jose so Hall could purchase about $1,000 worth of cocaine. About a week earlier, Hall had been given the name and address of a dealer and directions to his apartment. They arrived at that location at about 3 a.m. Hall went to knock on the sliding glass door. Scott, wanting "no part" of the deal, stayed behind.

According to Hall, Ronald Lee answered the door. He had been expecting Hall. ¹ Ronald Lee invited him inside. They went to the bedroom where Ronald Lee displayed Hall testified that Ronald Lee and Vezinaw chased him, that he sustained more than 50 blows from both of them, and that he had been almost unconscious. ² He claimed that during the beating, Ronald Lee stole his wallet and his money. The piece of paper with the Lees' address on it was in the stolen wallet. Hall denied threatening the Lees at the time of his arrest.

a plastic bag containing white powder. Hall tasted it, discovered it was not cocaine, and accused Ronald Lee of trying to cheat him. The men fought on the adjoining patio. When Ronald Lee told his wife to get a gun, Hall grabbed him by the throat. Hall then pushed Ronald Lee and the gun. At trial, Hall denied hitting Ronald Lee with his flashlight or with a wok and claimed that no one on the patio struck him with a stick.

Scott testified that he did not know until they arrived in San Jose that Hall intended to purchase cocaine. Scott, who had stayed behind when Hall went to the apartment, heard someone scream and then saw Hall come "busting out" of the apartment followed by a man with a gun who fired it once.

On rebuttal, Ronald Lee denied having had any cocaine inside his apartment and denied any prearrangement to sell Hall cocaine.

DISCUSSION

I.

Hall first contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he initially refused to give his name to an arresting officer.

Defense counsel made an in limine motion asking the trial court to order the prosecutor and her witnesses not to comment on his client's invocation of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694)

The prosecutor agreed not to mention Hall's invocation of his Miranda rights. However, she argued that an arresting officer's comment that Hall was uncooperative and initially refused to give his name was admissible.

After concluding it was irrelevant whether Hall refused to give his name to the officer before or after being advised of his Miranda rights, the trial court ruled that the officer could testify that when asked his name, Hall refused to give it.

Consequently, over defense objection, the prosecutor ended her direct examination of Officer Smith with the following interchange: "Q. Did you ask the defendant what his name was? [p] A. Yes, I did. [p] Q. And what was his--did he give you his name? [p] A. No, he did not at first."

Hall's argument that the above testimony was inadmissible is based primarily upon the holding in People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843. That case recognized the legitimate need for police personnel to obtain basic, neutral information such as name and address from an arrestee in their custody. It found that advisement of Miranda rights was unnecessary prior to eliciting this type of basic information having nothing to do with the circumstances surrounding any offense with which the defendant has been charged. The court in Rucker concluded that the need to obtain such information "can be accommodated by permitting the state to obtain from an arrestee the basic, neutral information that is necessary for proper jail administration, but forbidding the state from using the arrestee's responses in any manner in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Therefore, Miranda warnings need not be given at a booking interrogation, since the information acquired cannot be put to any incriminatory uses." (Id. at p. 389, 162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843.)

By analogy, Hall argues that the state cannot put his refusal to provide such basic information to any incriminatory use. This argument is predicated upon his claim that Rucker was unaffected by the enactment of article I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution (otherwise known as Proposition 8). ³ In support of this claim, Hall argues that Evidence Code section 940 is the type of "existing statutory rule relating to privilege" protected by the savings clause in article I, section 28(d), of the Constitution, and that the rule in Rucker falls within section 940. ⁴

Although the trial court's admission of Hall's refusal to provide his name to the arresting officer may well violate the proscription announced in Rucker, we agree with respondent that article I, section 28(d), abrogates the Rucker exclusionary rule.

Our conclusion that Rucker does not survive Proposition 8 is based primarily upon the Supreme Court's recent analysis of a similar issue in People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307.

The court in May held that Proposition 8 abrogated the rule of People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272, which forbade for impeachment purposes the use of a defendant's extrajudicial statements elicited in violation of Miranda. The rule in Disbrow was contrary to the federal rule under the United States Constitution as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1.

The court in May reasoned that its holding in In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744, that "[...