People v. Hallman

• Decision Date: 21 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. D009402,D009402
• Citation: 264 Cal.Rptr. 215,215 Cal.App.3d 1330
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Samuel HALLMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 215

264 Cal.Rptr. 215

215 Cal.App.3d 1330

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Samuel HALLMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D009402.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 21, 1989.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 15, 1989.

Review Denied March 15, 1990.

[215 Cal.App.3d 1332] Gordon M. Jackson, Jr., San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Harley D. Mayfield, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert M. Foster, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Carl H. Horst, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

After denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 ¹ and exhaustion of his pretrial remedies of review of that denial, Robert Hallman pleaded guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages (Veh.Code, § 23152(b)). He then unsuccessfully appealed to the appellate department of the San Diego Superior Court arguing his pretrial motion was erroneously denied on procedural grounds and asked that court to reconsider its earlier ruling and to reverse itself. That appellate body unanimously affirmed the judgment of the municipal court, finding Hallman was precluded from raising the identical issue again post conviction on the basis of the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, or alternatively, the law of the case. The appellate department certified the matter to this court to resolve as a question of first impression in California "whether post conviction review of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel where there has been an interim appeal on the identical issue pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5(j)."

After certification and oral argument, we asked the Attorney General to file a letter brief on the matter and to include a discussion of the applicability and persuasiveness of Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 154 Cal.Rptr. 494 as it concerns suppression motions alleging a warrantless search and seizure. ² Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the available legislative history, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to preclude post conviction review of the denial of a defendant's section 1538.5 motion. Having so decided, we address the issue raised by Hallman on his post conviction appeal and further conclude, contrary to the procedure adopted in Wilder v. Superior Court, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 154 Cal.Rptr. 494, a trial court can, by local rule, require the moving party in section 1538.5 motions to set forth with specificity the grounds and theories to support the motion to suppress evidence. In so doing, we hold the decision in Wilder has no support in either section 1538.5 or in the constitutional burden of proof and hold the pleading procedure contained in El Cajon Municipal Court Rules, rule 604 (rule 604) is valid and may be imposed in motions brought under section 1538.5. Accordingly, we affirm the municipal court's judgment of conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Charged with a misdemeanor, ³ Hallman moved to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. At the beginning of the hearing on the motion, Hallman, relying upon the procedure in Wilder v. Superior Court, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 96-97, 154 Cal.Rptr. 494, offered to call the arresting police officer as a witness to establish a prima facie case his stop and the subsequent taking of body fluids, tests, statements, and evidence was without an arrest or search warrant, and argued the suppression motion must then be granted as the People had failed to justify a warrantless search in its opposing motion papers.

The People, however, objected to the court even entertaining the motion on grounds Hallman had failed to comply with rule 604, which requires a specific statement of the theories relied upon by the moving party in a motion to suppress. The court denied his motion for failing to comply with rule 604.

Hallman immediately pursued his right to pretrial review of the denial pursuant to section 1538.5(j). ⁴ The appellate department of the superior court affirmed the municipal court's order on grounds Hallman's moving papers lacked specificity. Hallman then unsuccessfully petitioned that appellate department for rehearing and certification. Finally, Hallman petitioned this court for a writ of mandate. We summarily denied his petition "without prejudice to the defendant raising the issue on appeal should he be convicted."

Having exhausted his pretrial remedies, Hallman pleaded guilty to driving under

the influence. Thereafter, he filed a second appeal in the appellate [215 Cal.App.3d 1335] department of superior court urging as grounds for reversal the identical issue previously raised. In a written opinion that court concluded Hallman was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating the issue. However, recognizing that the issue presented involved an important question of law, it certified this case to us for further review. Hallman now demands a post conviction review of his motion to suppress pursuant to section 1538.5(m).

DISCUSSION

I

Post Conviction Review of a Section 1538.5 Motion

Section 1538.5(m) provides in relevant part:

"(m) ... A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that such judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty." (Italics added.)

In People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 99 Cal.Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d 686, the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not forego his right to seek further review on appeal from a judgment of conviction where he sought pretrial writ review of the denial of his section 1538.5 motion. The defendant in Medina moved to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of a warrantless search. The superior court denied the motion. Medina then unsuccessfully petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition to review the superior court's decision and the Supreme Court denied his later petition for hearing. At the ensuing trial, Medina was convicted of the charged offense and subsequently sought an appeal from that judgment. He once again urged that the warrantless search was unreasonable. The Court of Appeal held its denial of the writ precluded Medina from raising the issue on appeal in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata. Before the Supreme Court, Medina argued that res judicata should not apply because the writ petition had been summarily denied. In its decision, however, the Supreme Court made clear it was basing reversal on the broader ground that res judicata was inapplicable any time the denial of a defendant's section 1538.5 motion--summary or otherwise--was involved.

"In view of the express language of section 1538.5, application of the doctrine of res judicata to give conclusive effect on appeal from a judgment of conviction to an appellate court's earlier decision denying defendant's application for a pretrial writ would be inappropriate even when the denial of the writ is by an opinion demonstrating adjudication of the merits. The statute permits the defendant to seek further review of the validity of the challenged search on appeal from a judgment of conviction, a concept totally at variance with application of the doctrine of res judicata." (People v. Medina, supra, 6 Cal.3d 484, 492, 99 Cal.Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d 686, italics added.)

We recognize that Medina involved interlocutory writ relief whereas this case, arising in the municipal court, concerns an interlocutory appellate remedy. Nonetheless, we view the res judicata principles at issue in both cases to be identical.

The available legislative history supports both the Supreme Court's reasoning in Medina and the conclusion we reach here. Before the adoption of section 1538.5, the Assembly Interim Committee Report on Search and Seizure anticipated the very situation before us and rejected the notion that interim appeals would have preclusive affect upon a defendant seeking post conviction review of his or her section 1538.5 motion. (22 Assem. Interim Com.Rep. (1965-1967) No. 12, pp. 9, 21, 2 Appen. to Assem.J. (1967 Reg.Sess.).) The committee, stating that "[c]onsideration should also be given to the question of whether a defendant should be bound by an adverse ruling on a preliminary appeal....", noted that the various proposals before them specifically provided that a preliminary appeal would not be binding and that a defendant There is nothing in the language or history of section 1538.5 which suggests that the Legislature intended any pretrial determination of a motion to suppress evidence would be binding on a defendant following a conviction. Further, the Supreme Court in Medina concluded that an interim appeal will not preclude a defendant from seeking post conviction review of his section 1538.5 motion. Thus, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata ⁶ does not apply here and Hallman is not barred from "further review" of his section 1538.5 motion following his judgment of conviction.

                could raise an identical issue again following a judgment of conviction.  (Id. at p. 21.) 5  The report explained, " ... a second appeal would enable the appellate court to consider the search and seizure issue in the context of the entire case and ensure the defendant of maximum protection for his constitutional rights."  (Ibid.)
                

Accordingly, we turn to Hallman's major issue raised on his post-conviction appeal: whether the trial court properly followed rule 604 in denying his section 1538.5 motion instead of following the procedures set out in Wilder v. Superior Court, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 96-97, 154 Cal.Rptr. 494.

II The "Wilder" Motion

In reviewing the merits of Hallman's section 1538.5 motion, we find he relied on Wilder v. Superior Court, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 90, 96, ...