People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. S063512,S063512
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 20 Cal.4th 439A, 973 P.2d 52, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2254, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2940 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John David WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant

Page 275

83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275

20 Cal.4th 119, 20 Cal.4th 439A, 973 P.2d 52,

99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2254,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2940

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John David WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S063512.

Supreme Court of California

March 29, 1999.

As Modified May 12, 1999.

Review Denied May 12, 1999.

[20 Cal.4th 122] [973 P.2d 55] Laura G. Schaefer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Diego, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Shirley A. Nelson, Michael J. Weinberger and Harry Joseph Colombo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, we consider the specificity required in a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 (section 1538.5). We conclude that a defendant must state the grounds for the motion with sufficient particularity to give notice to the prosecution of the sort of evidence it will need to present in response. In this case, we find that defendant's moving papers were sufficient to provide this notice to the prosecution, and that he did not narrow the scope of his motion at the hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 3, 1996, about 8:30 a.m., Tuolumne County Sheriff's Deputy Robin Hunt began surveilling a brown Chevrolet pickup truck that he saw parked outside a home where he suspected "drug activity." He called Deputy John F. Oliver for assistance. About 15 minutes later, Hunt saw the truck make a right turn at an intersection without signaling. He stopped the truck, and defendant, who was the driver, produced an identification card, but no driver's license. Hunt ran a check on the status of defendant's driver's license and learned that it had expired.

Because defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant and his license had expired, department policy required Hunt to tow the vehicle and fill out a "CHP 180," which is a standard California Highway Patrol form. Department policy also required Hunt to take an inventory of the vehicle's contents. The purpose of the CHP 180 form and the inventory is, among other things, to preserve a record of the physical condition of the vehicle and its contents when police took possession of it. When Deputy Oliver arrived to assist, Hunt asked him to fill out the CHP 180 form while Hunt took the inventory.

In taking the inventory, Hunt saw three leather bags on the front bench seat of the truck right next to the driver's seat. He opened the bags and found methamphetamine. At this point, Oliver stopped filling out the CHP 180 form and watched defendant while Hunt continued to take the inventory. Hunt also called for narcotics officers to take over the investigation. Before they arrived, however, Hunt arrested defendant for possession of methamphetamine, handcuffed him, and put him in the patrol car. The officers never completed the CHP 180 form or the inventory list.

By information dated May 9, 1996, the Tuolumne County District Attorney charged defendant with transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378), and possession of an opiate (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The information further alleged with respect to each count that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (Pen.Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), that he had served four prior prison terms (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and that he was ineligible for probation (Pen.Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)).

On June 24, 1996, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, including the methamphetamine police found in his truck. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a).) In his moving papers and at the subsequent hearing, defendant tried to show that the traffic stop was a "ruse" or a "pretext" for searching the truck. He argued that the police lacked probable cause to stop him, because the right turn that he had made without signaling was part of the "natural flow of traffic," and therefore a turn signal was not necessary. He also pointed out that Deputy Hunt called for Deputy Oliver's assistance before making the traffic stop, arguing that Hunt would not have needed Oliver's assistance for an ordinary traffic stop. He asserted that the police had never actually intended to inventory the contents of the truck; rather, the inventory was an after-the-fact justification for a search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) In this regard, he emphasized that the police had never completed the inventory. Finally, he asserted that the police had no policy governing inventory searches.

The court denied the motion to suppress without stating its reasons, and, later the same day, defendant pleaded guilty to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted three of the prior prison term allegations. Defendant waived his right to appeal, but he expressly reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. The prosecution then moved to dismiss the other charges and allegations, and the court granted the motion. On July 22, 1996, the court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, representing the middle term of three years for transportation of methamphetamine, plus three consecutive one-year enhancements for the three prior prison terms. The court also ordered defendant to pay a $1,200 restitution fine (Pen.Code, § 2085.5) and a $50 laboratory fee (Health & Saf.Code, § 11372.5).

On August 22, 1996, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing that the court should have granted his suppression motion, and, on August 28, 1996, the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause for appeal, though one was not necessary. (See § 1538.5, subd. (m).) On appeal, defendant argued the police were not following a preexisting policy and therefore violated his right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" when they opened the leather bags containing the methamphetamine. (U.S. const., 4th amend.; see also florida v. wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (Wells ).) He asserted that, though the police may have had a policy requiring them to take an inventory of the contents of a vehicle before towing it, they had no policy governing the opening of closed containers during the course of this inventory.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Following the reasoning of People v. Auer (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1664, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 (Auer ), the court held that defendant did not preserve the closed-container issue for appeal because he did not raise it adequately in the trial court. According to the court, allowing defendant to raise this theory on appeal "would be unfair both to the People and to the trial court." The court added, "We have no way of knowing what evidence the prosecutor might have adduced on the merits of this issue." Because the court concluded that defendant's motion was not sufficiently specific to put the prosecution on notice, it did not address the merits of his appeal.

We granted defendant's petition for review in order to consider the specificity required in a motion to suppress evidence.

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which is enforceable against the states as a component of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of due process of law (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 643-660, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (Mapp )), provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring state and federal courts to exclude evidence that government officials obtained in violation of the amendment's protections. (Mapp, supra, 367 U.S. at p. 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684.)

One of those protections is that a government official must obtain a warrant from a judicial officer before conducting a search or seizure. "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable [people] draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.... [Therefore,] [w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." (Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, fn. omitted.) Nevertheless, "[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with." (Id. at pp. 14-15, 68 S.Ct. 367.)

For example, in Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (Bertine ), the high court recognized that police have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents of a vehicle, including closed containers inside that vehicle, before towing it. This inventory serves "to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger." (Id. at p. 372, 107 S.Ct. 738.) The court stated that "inventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." (Id. at p. 371, 107 S.Ct. 738.) Nevertheless, the court also recognized the risk that police might use an inventory of this kind as a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or other...