People v. Hamilton, Docket No. 118615.

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 638 N.W.2d 92,465 Mich. 526
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald Andrew HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 23 January 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 118615.

638 N.W.2d 92
465 Mich. 526

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Donald Andrew HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellee

Docket No. 118615.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

January 23, 2002.

638 N.W.2d 93

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General,

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David L. Morse, Prosecuting Attorney, and William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Howell, MI, for the people

Raymond W. Szmagaj II, Union Lake, MI, for the defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The circuit court dismissed a drunk driving charge against the defendant because the arrest was made by a police officer acting outside his jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the fact that the arrest was made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not require exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest or dismissal of the charge. We reverse and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I

During the early morning hours of November 21, 1999, city of Howell Police Officer Darren Lockhart observed the defendant driving on M-59 in Howell Township.¹ The officer observed that the vehicle did not have operating taillights and left the pavement and briefly touched the shoulder of the roadway. He stopped the vehicle on suspicion that the driver was operating under the influence of liquor and because the vehicle was being driven without operating taillights. The officer performed sobriety tests and arrested the defendant for OUIL. It was later determined that the defendant had two prior OUIL convictions and that his license had been suspended. This led to his being charged with felony OUIL, third offense, M.C.L. § 257.625(10)(c), and operating a vehicle on a suspended license, M.C.L. § 257.904(3).

The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the arrest by the officer outside his jurisdiction was illegal. The district judge disagreed and bound the defendant over to the circuit court. However, the circuit court granted the defendant's motion to quash and dismissed the case.

The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.² The Court noted that the prosecutor conceded the officer was not acting in conjunction with the other law enforcement agencies and was not in hot pursuit of the defendant at the time of the stop. It rejected the prosecutor's arguments that the arrest could be justified under M.C.L. § 762.3(3)(a),³ which relates only to venue and not to the authority of officers to act outside their jurisdictions. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the arrest could be justified on a theory that officers acting outside their jurisdictions have the same authority as private citizens to make arrests for felonies committed in their presence or with probable cause. M.C.L. 764.16. In this case, the Court said that principle was not applicable because the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a felony. It then turned to the question whether suppression of evidence and dismissal was appropriate as a remedy for the statutory violation. It concluded that suppression of the evidence and dismissal was required.

II

Ordinarily, this Court reviews a trial court's ruling regarding a motion to

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suppress for clear error. People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 448, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983).⁴ However, the ruling in the present case turns not on factual determinations, but on a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Sierb, 456 Mich. 519, 522, 581 N.W.2d 219 (1998); People v. Denio, 454 Mich. 691, 698, 564 N.W.2d 13 (1997). As is explained later, the question before us is one of statutory interpretation-whether the Legislature intended that a violation of M.C.L. § 764.2a should result in exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. People v. Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich. 687, 694, 625 N.W.2d 764 (2001). Such questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 631, 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999)

III

It is undisputed that, at the time of the stop and arrest, Officer Lockhart was acting outside his jurisdiction. M.C.L. 764.2a,⁵ captioned authority of peace officers outside their own bailiwicks, provides that police officers may exercise their authority in jurisdictions other than their own if they are working in conjunction with authorities of that other jurisdiction. In this case, the officer was not acting in conjunction with law enforcement officers having jurisdiction in Howell Township, and thus his actions were not within M.C.L. § 764.2a. It is also undisputed that the officer did not have a warrant to arrest the defendant or to search his personal property, and that the officer was not in "hot pursuit" of the defendant within the meaning of M.C.L. § 117.34.⁶

The officer was acting outside his jurisdiction, without a warrant, not in hot pursuit, and not in conjunction with law enforcement officers having jurisdiction. Thus, as the Court of Appeals recognized, he had no greater authority than a private person. "As a general rule, peace officers who make a warrantless arrest outside their territorial jurisdiction are treated as private persons, and, as such, have all the powers of arrest possessed by such private persons." People v. Meyer, 424 Mich. 143, 154, 379 N.W.2d 59 (1985). Under M.C.L. § 764.16,⁷ a private person has the authority to make a felony arrest, but lacks the authority to make a misdemeanor arrest except in nonapplicable circumstances.

"`No one without a warrant has any right to make an arrest in the absence of actual belief, based on actual facts creating probable cause of guilt.'" People v. Panknin, 4 Mich.App. 19, 27, 143 N.W.2d 806 (1966), quoting People v. Bressler, 223 Mich. 597, 600-601, 194 N.W. 559 (1923), paraphrasing People v. Burt., 51

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Mich. 199, 202, 16 N.W. 378 (1883). Here, the officer only had probable cause to make an arrest for a misdemeanor, i.e., OUIL. The fact that defendant may have committed a felony, i.e., OUIL, third offense, was only discovered after the arrest.⁸ Accordingly, the officer lacked the statutory authority to make the arrest under M.C.L. § 764.16

The Court of Appeals concluded that because the arrest was illegal, it warranted exclusion of evidence as the remedy.⁹ We disagree. That the officer...