People v. Hamilton
| Citation | 40 Cal.App.4th 1137,47 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 |
| Decision Date | 30 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. E015214,E015214 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9323, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,183 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alonzo HAMILTON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Defendant and appellant Alonzo Hamilton appeals from his conviction of two counts of carjacking in violation of Penal Code section 215. 1 His appeal presents the simple question of whether or not he was validly convicted of two offenses based on his taking of a vehicle at gunpoint from a husband and wife, one the driver and one the passenger. We hold that he was, and further find that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.
Due to the nature of defendant's contentions, we need not consider his defense of mistaken identity. Instead, we focus on the evidence describing the offense.
Dennis Miller was the owner of a 1989 Mercedes. While preparing to leave the car at a shopping center parking lot, he heard his wife say "Let's get out of here," or words to that effect. Both were out of the car at that time and both were standing near the rear of the car. Mr. Miller then saw defendant approaching with a gun, and his wife backed away. Defendant demanded Mr. Miller's keys, which the latter gave up. Defendant then told Mrs. Miller, who was standing behind her husband, to give him her purse. She refused, threw her purse under a car, and kicked defendant as he knelt to retrieve it, but he eventually made away with the purse and the car.
Defendant asserts that there was only one offense of carjacking committed. Section 215 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Obviously the statute, as written, allows a defendant to be convicted of carjacking if he either takes the vehicle from the possessor, or takes it when it is occupied only by a "mere" passenger. The question before us is whether multiple convictions are proper when the vehicle is taken from the possessor and a passenger is also present. 2 Put another way, is the clause relating to the passenger intended only to clarify that the crime of carjacking is committed even if the taking is from a person with no legal right of possession, or is it intended to describe other potential victims in multiple-occupant cases?
To begin with, we find ourselves unable to apply the authorities cited by respondent, which hold to the effect that "when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it." (E.g. People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288.) In our view, the statute is not entirely clear and, as described above, is subject to more than one interpretation. Furthermore, the clues to legislative intent are not particularly illuminating.
Both sides rely on the same legislative history. Both agree that the intent behind the enactment of the carjacking statute was to ensure severe punishment for offenders, and to close a potential loophole.
On the first point, the members of the Legislature were urged that "we need stiff new laws to crack down on this latest criminal fad." (Assem.Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem.Bill No. 60 [1993-1994 Reg.Sess.], as proposed to be amended on February 9, 1993). Accordingly, the crime carries a triad of punishments of three, five, or nine years, as compared with no more than three, four, or six years even for first-degree robbery. 3
The Legislature was also apprised of the belief of an author of the bill that prosecutions for robbery ran an undue risk of failure. It was theorized that in some carjackings the primary intent appeared to be the thrill of the heist, and at trial it was not always easy to prove that the defendant intended to deprive the owner permanently of his property. The latter is, of course, an element of the crime of robbery. (People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 126, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559.) Thus, the Legislature was advised that " ... many carjackings cannot be charged as robbery because it is difficult to prove the intent required of a robbery offense...." (Sen.Com. on Ways and Means, 3d Reading Analysis of Sen.Bill No. 60 [1993-1994 Reg.Sess.] as amended on September 8, 1993.) As enacted, section 215 does not require any intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
So far, the parties agree; however, they differ on the conclusions to be drawn from these expressions of legislative intent. Respondent argues that there is a clear intent to punish carjacking as severely as possible. Defendant asserts that the Legislature cannot possibly have intended that he be subject to a sentence of eighteen years in prison for taking a car from the driver and a passenger. 4
For guidance, we turn to cases involving other crimes of violence. Cases involving robbery are the closest and most instructive.
In People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 880-881, 135 Cal.Rptr. 654, 558 P.2d 552, the court found that both a clerk and a security guard could be designated as victims of a store robbery. Similarly, in People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908, (reversal on other grounds in California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 994, 1014, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3450, 3460, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171) the court held explicitly that "if force or fear is applied to two victims in joint possession of property, two convictions of robbery are proper." (Accord, People v. Gordon (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 519, 529, 186 Cal.Rptr. 373.) As a general rule, multiple convictions and punishments are proper for each act of violence committed against a separate victim. 5 (People v. Phan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 364.)
Because carjacking is very closely related to robbery, the cases dealing with robberies are significant in directing our interpretation of section 215. In enacting new legislation, of course, the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with relevant California judicial constructions. (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 318, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58.) Thus, in drafting and enacting section 215, the legislators were presumably familiar with the the cases involving a show of force directed to two or more joint possessors of property. If defendant had taken money at gunpoint from the presence of two store clerks, he would have been subject to two convictions of robbery and could have properly been punished for both. (People v. Ramos, supra, 30 Cal.3d 553.) Defendant's argument that the Legislature could not have meant him to be subject to double punishment is therefore unpersuasive. If a robber may be doubly convicted and double punished for a single taking with two victims, there is certainly no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to treat carjackers more leniently.
However, this leads to the question of whether the passenger should be considered a second victim. Once again, we find the case law relating to robbery to be instructive.
As a rule, robbery may be committed against a person who is not the owner of property--indeed, it may be committed against a thief. (People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 668, 670, 84 Cal.Rptr. 771.) There is no requirement that the victim have an absolute right to possession of the property. Thus, store clerks and even janitorial employees are routinely held to be proper victims of a robbery in which their employer's goods are taken. (E.g. People v. Miller, supra, and cases cited therein.) For the purposes of robbery, it is enough that the person presently has some loose custody over the property, is currently exercising dominion over it, or at least may be said to represent or stand in the shoes of the true owner. Thus, in People v. Gordon, supra, two parents were held to be joint victims of a robbery in which the robber took only property belonging to their son, who did, however, live in their home; analogizing to cases involving janitors, clerks, and barmaids, the court took the position that the parents had some vague responsibility for the property and were thus...
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...adopt a construction in which all parts are given meaning and no part is made useless or surplusage (People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 Cal. App.4th 1137, 1144, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 343.) Finally, when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one statute but excluded it from a related statute, ......
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