People v. Hao Quan Ye
| Decision Date | 02 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015QN063074.,2015QN063074. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. HAO QUAN YE, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Armienti, DeBellis, Guglielmo & Rhoden LLP., New York (Thomas J. Reape, Jr., of counsel), for the Defendant.
Richard Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, (Matthew Luongo and Sharon Brodt, of counsel), for the People.
Zachary Carter, New York City Law Department (Nicholas R. Ciappetta, of counsel), for the City of New York.
In an accusatory instrument filed on January 29, 2016 the defendant, Hao Quan Ye, is charged with violating Administrative Code of the City of New York § 19–190 (hereinafter "AC § 19–190"), Right of Way law. Relying on this Court's decision in People v. Sanson, 52 Misc.3d 980 [Crim Ct., Queens County 2016], as well as People v. Salamon, 54 Misc.3d 960 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2016], the defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument filed against him on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. In determining the instant motion, this Court has considered the defendant's moving papers dated August 23, 2016, January 19, 2017, and February 28, 2017; the People's amended response dated February 16, 2017; the New York City Office of the Corporation Counsel's (hereinafter "the City") opposition papers dated December 27, 2016, the People's brief on appeal in People v. Sanson, and papers on file with the Court.
Consistent with this Court's decision in People v. Sanson, this Court finds that AC § 19–190 is unconstitutional on its face since the statute improperly utilizes a civil tort liability standard of ordinary negligence in a criminal statute instead of a culpable mens rea. However, in order to clarify some issues presented since the Sanson decision was rendered, the court will now expand on its findings in Sanson.
At the outset, it appears that there is some confusion as to whether or not AC § 19–190 is intended to be a strict liability statute. Based upon the concessions made by the City and the Queens County District Attorney's office, it is clear that the statute is not a strict liability statute. Indeed, this issue was precisely the reason the Court held oral arguments in Sanson. More specifically, during this oral argument, the following colloquy with the City's attorney, Mr. Ciapetta, occurred:
(See Transcript of Sanson Oral Argument held on June 20, 2016 at 2–3 [hereinafter "Tr"], annexed hereto as Exhibit A [emphasis supplied] ). This is consistent with the City's position in the federal court case involving the statute in which the City specifically held that the statute was not one of strict liability and that "failure to exercise due care" is a necessary element of the crime. (see Stipulated Order of Settlement, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, et al. v. Bill De Blasio, et al., No. 15cv2225–BMC, at 3 [August 28, 2015], annexed hereto as Exhibit B).
Moreover, although it appears that the People, in their brief to the Appellate Term, Second Department, attempt to confuse the matter by indirectly referring to the statute as one of strict liability, it is clear that the People are bound by both the City's concessions, as well as their own concessions in both the instant case and in the Sanson case (see Exhibits A and B). More specifically, like the City, during oral arguments in Sanson, Assistant District Attorney Sharon Brodt conceded that the statute is not a strict liability statute, and further conceded that the statute utilizes the civil tort liability standard of ordinary negligence:
See Tr. at 13–14 (emphasis supplied).
As such, the City and the People's reliance on decisions from Judges of concurrent jurisdictions in which the statute was found to be constitutional because it was a strict liability statute is clearly flawed, since it is undisputed that the statute was never intended to be a strict liability statute. Notably, while each of these cases summarily found the statute constitutional because strict liability statutes are permissible, not one of those cases attempted to conduct the analysis required to determine the statute's constitutionality. (See People v. Gallagher, 50 Misc.3d 317, 18 N.Y.S.3d 280 [Crim Ct, BX County 2015] ; People v. Hossain, 50 Misc.3d 610, 23 N.Y.S.3d 802 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 2015] ; People v. Green, 52 Misc.3d 1214(A)[Crim Ct, Queens County 2016] ; People v. Urena, 54 Misc.3d 978 [Crim Co, Queens County 2016] ). While such an analysis is necessary to determine the constitutionality of a strict liability statute, this court declines to conduct such analysis since the parties agree that the statute is not one of strict liability.
In People v. Sanson, this Court held that AC § 19–190, Right of way law is unconstitutional on its face since it utilizes a civil tort liability standard of ordinary negligence in lieu of a culpable criminal mens rea as required under both the State and Federal constitutions, and codified in PL § 15.05 ( Sanson, 52 Misc.3d 980 ). As was set forth in Sanson:
The very fabric of our criminal justice system is that an accused person stands before a court innocent until proven guilty, and is entitled to significant constitutional protections separate and distinct from a civil case ( People v. Nelson, NY3d, 27 N.Y.3d 361, 33 N.Y.S.3d 814, 53 N.E.3d 691, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op 02554 [April 5, 2016] ().
(Sanson, 52 Misc.3d at 986, 37 N.Y.S.3d 816). More specifically, utilizing a civil tort liability standard of ordinary negligence in a criminal case violates a defendant's rights to due process and his right to be presumed innocent by criminalizing conduct based upon what a "reasonable person" may think or do, irrespective of the subjective intent ("guilty mind") of the person being charged. (see Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. –––– at ––––, 135 S Ct 2011 [2015 ] ). Moreover, ordinary negligence, which has its roots in civil law, requires a defendant to become a witness against himself, and improperly shifts the burden to the defendant to explain how his conduct was not negligent. (see e.g Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 114–115 [1941] (); NY Pattern Civil Jury Instructions 2:36 Comparative Fault ("The burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff (decedent) was negligent and that (his/her) negligence contributed to causing the event").
Indeed, as was more fully set forth in Sanson, because of these very constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court has seemingly rejected the idea of using a civil tort standard of ordinary negligence in a criminal case, holding that mens rea, or a guilty mind, was required to prove a crime under the federal statute at issue:
Elonis's conviction, however, was premised solely on his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a "reasonable person" standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with "the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing." Staples, 511 U.S., at 606–607, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed. 608 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943) ; emphasis added). Having a liability turn on whether a "reasonable person" regards the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks—"reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence," Jeffries, 692 F.3d, at 484 (Sutton, J., dubitante...
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