People v. Hardy
| Decision Date | 10 August 2010 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Joseph A. HARDY, appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
77 A.D.3d 133
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Joseph A. HARDY, appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Aug. 10, 2010.
John F. McGlynn, Rockville Centre, N.Y., for appellant.
Francis D. Phillips II, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Robert H. Middlemiss and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, ARIEL E. BELEN, and CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JJ.
CHAMBERS, J.
On this appeal, the primary issue before us is whether a hotel guest, who was in arrears on the rent, retains a reasonable expectation of privacy where the hotel management did not take affirmative steps to repossess the room until after a hotel
I.
At a suppression hearing, the prosecution called Kelly Gillespie, an employee of the Middletown Hampton Inn, New York State Trooper Joseph Rivera, and New York State Police Investigator Jan Golding. According to the People's evidence, on February 13, 2007, the defendant checked in to Room 303 of the Hampton Inn in Middletown, New York. Hotel records revealed that at check-in he paid the sum of $139.48 in cash, which covered the use of the room until the following morning at the 11:00 A.M. checkout time. The following morning, the defendant did not pay for the 14th, but was nevertheless permitted to stay in his room. On February 15, the defendant paid the sum of $313.57 in cash, the room charge for the previous night and the night of the 15th.
On February 16, the defendant again failed to pay the room charge by check-out time. Hampton Inn personnel called him throughout the day asking for payment. Although the official hotel policy is that guests must prepay their room charge by 11:00 A.M. for the following day, Gillespie related that the hotel manager would let nonpayment "slide" the first time "with some guests," but a second occurrence would cause him to "take further action."
Throughout the defendant's stay, the hotel had received complaints from other guests regarding loud noises coming from his room, including the sound of his door opening and closing. On February 17 at approximately 5:15 A.M., while she was conducting security rounds on the third floor, Gillespie heard a loud noise and smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the defendant's room. Based on the noise complaints, the marijuana odor coming from his room and the defendant's failure to pay the room charge for the night, and, after discussion with her coworker, Gillespie determined that she would evict the defendant. She then called the police to ask for their assistance with the eviction.
Responding to the hotel, the state troopers were met by Gillespie, who asked them to accompany her to the defendant's room. When they entered the third-floor hallway from the elevator, the troopers detected the odor of "burnt marijuana." The
From inside the doorway, Trooper Rivera noticed, on top of an opened suitcase, a black digital scale, on top of which was a white powder. He asked the defendant about the marijuana odor, and the defendant admitted to having smoked marijuana in his room. Trooper Rivera, after taking a closer look at the suitcase and seeing three bundles of money, asked the defendant about the money and scale, and, in response, the defendant said that the money came from his employment and the scale might have been left there by two women who were in his room earlier. The police officers entered the defendant's room and seized a bag containing 85 pills of methylenemethamphetamine (MDMA or Ecstasy) and a bag of cocaine, both found in a Kleenex holder in the bathroom, a small bag of marijuana, found in a pocket of a pair of pants on the floor, and burnt marijuana cigarettes in an ashtray.
At 10:00 A.M., the defendant was taken to the police barracks where, after being advised of his Miranda rights ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) for the first time, he agreed to speak with the police without the presence of an attorney. He claimed no knowledge about how the scale came to be in his room and indicated the money came from his employment at a bar.
Following the People's case, in his own defense, the defendant testified that, as Gillespie indicated, when he registered at the hotel on February 13, he paid for the night and occupied Room 303 and that daily checkout was at 11:00 A.M. He paid the rental charge for the second and third night on February 15. He did not pay for the night of February 16 on that day. However, it was his understanding that he could pay for the 16th on the following day, as he had previously done, and that he could occupy the room until 11:00 A.M. on the 17th. His guest folio also disclosed that the defendant paid the sum of $51.67 in cash on February 16 for accumulated phone charges and showed an unpaid balance in the sum of $139.48, representing the room
II.
At the conclusion of all the hearing testimony, the County Court entertained oral argument on the issue of standing. The defendant argued, just as he does now on appeal, that he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room because the rental period had not expired at the time of the search. While the defendant had not paid for the night of the 16th, the hotel had previously allowed him to stay beyond the checkout time, and he could pay for the previous night on the following morning. As further evidence that the hotel did not strictly enforce its 11:00 A.M. checkout time, the defendant argued that he only paid for his telephone charges on the 16th, and his keycard was never deactivated. The defendant, therefore, contended that he had standing to challenge the warrantless search of his room which was not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement and, consequently, the evidence recovered had to be suppressed.
The People contended, and reiterate on appeal, that once the defendant failed to pay for the night of the 16th, the rental period ended and he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room. In addition to the defendant not paying for the night, the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the defendant's room...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Gibian
...experience as a court officer had no bearing on any of the material issues in the case, and her alleged misconduct essentially907 N.Y.S.2d 244consists of having identified the instruction the jury was given when deadlocked as an " Allen charge," and having expressed her opinion that bringin......
-
People v. Tavares–nunez
...“what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the defendant's position” ( People v. Hardy, 77 A.D.3d 133, 141, 907 N.Y.S.2d 244; see People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 ......
-
People v. McCullum
...525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421 ; see People v. Hardy, 77 A.D.3d 133, 138, 907 N.Y.S.2d 244 ). To successfully suppress evidence, a defendant must establish standing by demonstrating a legitimate expectation of ......
- Commonwealth v. Molina