People v. Harlan
| Decision Date | 20 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 62956 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Edward HARLAN, Defendant-Appellant. 129 Mich.App. 769, 344 N.W.2d 300 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[129 MICHAPP 770] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., David H. Sawyer, Pros. Atty., and Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., for the People.
[129 MICHAPP 771] George S. Buth, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and SHEPHERD and QUINNELL, * JJ.
Defendant was convicted of uttering and publishing a forged check, M.C.L. Sec. 750.249; M.S.A. Sec. 28.446. He was sentenced to a term of from 5 to 14 years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with a federal sentence defendant was already serving. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first claims that the 120-day rule of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, M.C.L. Sec. 780.601; M.S.A. Sec. 4.147(1), was violated because defendant's trial commenced eight months after he arrived in Michigan. Article IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers provides that, where a prisoner is transferred from imprisonment in one jurisdiction to detention in another jurisdiction pursuant to the act, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state. Failure to do so requires the trial court to dismiss any charges brought under the act. The 120-day period may be tolled or otherwise exceeded, however, for three reasons: (1) to allow the trial court to grant any necessary and reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court with the defendant or his counsel present; (2) for as long as the defendant is unable to stand trial; or (3) for any period of delay caused by the defendant's request or in order to accommodate the defendant. People v. Meyers (On Remand ), 124 Mich.App. 148, 335 N.W.2d 189 (1983); People v. Cook, 95 Mich.App. 645, 652-653, 291 N.W.2d 152 (1980), lv. den. 412 Mich. 882 (1981).
The offense involved in the instant case occurred [129 MICHAPP 772] in Kent County on April 14, 1980, and a warrant was issued on May 7, 1980. On May 11, 1980, defendant turned himself in to Chicago authorities as a federal parole violator. Shortly thereafter, he was placed in a medical facility after suffering a mental breakdown. Kent County officials learned of defendant's whereabouts in September, 1980, but were told that defendant was in no condition to travel. In December, 1980, or January 1981, defendant was transferred to a federal prison in Milan, Michigan, and on January 27, 1981, the Kent County Prosecutor filed a detainer request with Milan prison officials. On March 10, 1981, defendant was turned over to Michigan state authorities, and his trial was conducted on November 9, 1981. In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the delay in trying defendant did not violate the 120-day rule contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. This, defendant claims, was error. We cannot agree.
The following chronological chart depicts the events which followed defendant's return to Michigan:
DATE EVENT
-------- -------------------------------------------------------
3/10/81 Defendant turned over to state authorities
3/17/81 Motion for postponement of preliminary examination at
defendant's request
6/24/81 Forensic Center's report issued
7/13/81 Forensic Center's report filed in 63rd District Court
8/07/81 District Court order determining defendant competent to
stand trial; preliminary examination
10/28/81 Trial originally scheduled; prosecutor's motion
to postpone
11/09/81 Trial commenced
[129 MICHAPP 773] The 120-day limit began to run when defendant was turned over to Michigan authorities on March 10, 1981. The seven days which elapsed before defendant's preliminary examination was held on March 18, 1981 were not attributable to any of the three acceptable reasons for tolling which were listed previously. These seven days, therefore, are properly charged against the 120 days.
On March 17, 1981, defendant moved for a postponement of his trial so that he might undergo psychiatric evaluation. The parties stipulated to, and the court ordered, an adjournment "until completion of the psychiatric exam". Although no Michigan cases directly address the issue of how time spent obtaining a psychiatric examination should be charged in relation to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, we agree with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled in Commonwealth v. Scott, 219 Pa.Super. 470, 281 A.2d 754 (1971), that a delay attributable to mental health proceedings initiated by defendant was for "good cause" and was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and therefore prevented the 120-day limitation period from running. We also note that the delay caused while a psychiatric examination was performed was in order to accommodate defendant who wished not only to challenge his competency to [129 MICHAPP 774] stand trial but, if appropriate, to raise an insanity defense. See, Cook, supra, 95 Mich.App. at 653, 654, 291 N.W.2d 152.
Under M.C.L. Sec. 330.2028; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(1028), when a defendant is ordered to undergo a competency examination pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 330.2026; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(1026), as was the case here, the examination is to be performed and a written report submitted within 60 days. An examination related solely to a claim of insanity, M.C.L. Sec. 768.20a(2); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1043(1)(2), is to be completed within 30 days. Clearly, then, at least 60 of the 100 days between March 17, 1981, when defendant requested the examination, and the issuance of the report on June 24, 1981, can be attributed to a delay caused by defendant's own request for a psychiatric evaluation. The remaining 40 days are also attributable to defendant's request: the first 7 days are attributable to preparation and entry of an order providing for the requested evaluation; the remaining 33 days are also attributable to defendant's request since the forensic examiner indicated that extra time was required in order to obtain defendant's past psychiatric and mental records, without which the final competency report could not be written.
The next delay occurred between June 24, 1981, when the forensic report was issued, and July 13, 1981, the date it was received by the trial court. This delay was apparently due to misaddressing the report to the 61st District Court rather than the 63rd District Court. We are of the opinion that this delay was not the fault of the prosecutor or the court and constituted a reasonable delay for good cause; the 120-day limit was therefore tolled for this 19-day period. Further, this period may arguably be included within the general delay of trial occasioned by defendant's request for an evaluation[129 MICHAPP 775] since it was a clerical error on the part of those conducting the examination and not on the part of the court or the prosecutor. 1
The 25-day delay between the filing of the report on July 13, 1981, and the determination of competency on August 7, 1981, was not totally reasonable, however, and a portion of that time is charged against the 120 days. M.C.L. Sec. 330.2030; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(1030) requires the trial court to hold a competency hearing within 5 days of receipt of the written report from the forensic center unless a reasonable delay is requested by either party for good cause. No such request or reason for the additional 20-day delay appears on the record. We therefore find that the amount of time (i.e., 20 days) exceeding the 5 days allowed by statute for a competency hearing is charged against the 120 days.
The 82-day period between August 7, 1981, the date of entry of the order determining defendant competent to stand trial, and October 28, 1981, the date originally scheduled for defendant's trial, was properly charged against the 120 days.
The final delay was the 12-day gap between October 28, 1981, the scheduled date of trial, and [129 MICHAPP 776] November 9, 1981, the date trial actually began. The parties had originally entered into a plea bargain and had agreed that a plea would be taken on October 28, 1981. The agreement broke down on that day, however, for reasons which are disputed. Since the prosecutor, in reliance on the plea bargain, had not subpoenaed any witnesses, the trial was adjourned until November 9, 1981.
An adjournment granted to a prosecutor in open court based upon unavailability of police witnesses has been held to be a "good cause continuance". Foran v. Metz, 463 F.Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff'd without opinion, 603 F.2d 212 (CA2, 1979). Where a defendant was brought to trial beyond another state's 180-day requirement of its Interstate Agreement on Detainers as a result of an adjournment occasioned by the defendant's change of mind about pleading guilty, it has been held that the act was not violated. People v. Cranmer, 55 App.Div.2d 786, 389 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (1976); Commonwealth v. Martin, 445 Pa. 49, 53, 282 A.2d 241, 243-244 (1971). In the instant case, the prosecution witnesses were unavailable because the anticipated agreement fell through. No bad faith has been shown on the part of the prosecutor. We find that the 9-day delay was reasonable and granted for good cause and the 120-day period is therefore tolled during that time.
The amount of time charged to the 120-day limit totals 109 days and may be broken down as follows: 7 days between March 10, 1981, and March 17, 1981; 20 of the 25 days between July 13, 1981, and August 7, 1981; 82 days between August 7, 1981, and October 28, 1981. Since the 120-day limit was tolled during the remaining periods of time between March 10, 1981, and November 9, 1981, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was not [129...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Carr
...in the trial court, the burden is on the defendant to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Harlan, 129 Mich.App. 769, 344 N.W.2d 300 (1983). A defendant's trial counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance to the defendant. To overcome this presum......
-
People v. Barnett
...of counsel according to the applicable standard. The decision to call witnesses is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Harlan, 129 Mich.App. 769, 779, 344 N.W.2d 300 (1983). It is well established that this Court will not second-guess trial counsel in matters of trial strategy. People v. ......
-
State ex rel. Clark v. Long
...plea bargaining; Commonwealth v. Martin, 445 Pa. 49, 282 A.2d 241 (1971), involved "extensive plea bargaining"; and People v. Harlan, 129 Mich.App. 769, 344 N.W.2d 300 (1983), involved plea bargaining which had progressed to the point that a date to accept the plea had been set when the agr......
-
People v. Simmons
...have held that selection of defense witnesses, if any, is a strategic consideration left to the trial attorney. People v. Harlan, 129 Mich.App. 769, 779, 344 N.W.2d 300 (1983); People v. Grant, 102 Mich.App. 368, 374, 301 N.W.2d 536 (1980). We agree with the majority of courts which have ad......