State ex rel. Clark v. Long
Decision Date | 23 February 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 18942,18942 |
Citation | 870 S.W.2d 932 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri ex rel. Vance Roy CLARK, Relator-Appellant, v. Honorable Douglas E. LONG, Jr., Circuit Judge, Division I, 25th Judicial Circuit, Pulaski County, Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert Wolfrum, St. Louis, for relator-appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Kenny C. Hulshof, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION
PRELIMINARY WRIT MADE ABSOLUTE
This court issued its preliminary writ prohibiting Respondent from proceeding to try Relator (Defendant) on a two-count information charging first degree murder and armed criminal action. The issue is whether the court lost jurisdiction to try Defendant because the State did not bring Defendant to trial within 180 days following receipt of his request for compliance with the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law (UMDDL), §§ 217.450 to 217.485. 1
On February 28, 1990, Defendant was charged in St. Francois County with first degree murder and armed criminal action. As the result of a change of venue the pending case was transferred to Pulaski County on January 7, 1992.
On January 12, 1992, Defendant, who was then serving an unrelated 37-year sentence in the Jefferson City correctional center, wrote the Records Officer of the penitentiary concerning the UMDDL asking if he could "file through the department of corrections on a pending charge but to which there is no detainer?" The Records Officer returned the letter to Defendant with a note written on the bottom saying "No! because we cannot offer temporary custody of you to somewhere, with no knowledge of the charges or complaint."
Thereafter, on June 1, 1992, Defendant sent a letter to the Pulaski County Circuit Clerk, the Prosecuting Attorney of St. Francois County, and the Assistant Attorney General assigned to prosecute the case requesting that he be tried on the pending charges within 180 days pursuant to the UMDDL. 2 The Assistant Attorney General stipulated that he received the letter on June 2 and the court file indicates that it was received by the court on June 3, 1992.
The docket sheet contains no entries following receipt of the letter until Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on December 7, 1992 (the 187th day following receipt of his demand for speedy trial by the court) alleging that the court no longer had jurisdiction and requesting that "all felony complaints, informations, and indictments presently filed against the movant in Pulaski County" be dismissed with prejudice "due to expiration of the time limitation prescribed by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law (Sections 217.450-217.475 RSMo 1989)." 3 Pursuant to the Prosecutor's request on January 8, 1993, the case was scheduled for trial in September 1993. On March 29, 1993, a hearing was conducted on Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was overruled by the Respondent on April 2, by way of a docket entry, with no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Our preliminary writ was issued July 26, 1993.
OPINIONThe initial issue, which is apparently one of first impression in this State, is whether a prisoner confined in a Missouri correctional facility is entitled to invoke the provisions of the UMDDL if no detainer 4 is filed with that institution. Defendant argues that § 217.450.1 authorizes a request by a Missouri prisoner for final disposition of charges pending in this state whether or not a detainer has been filed. The State 5 on the other hand urges us to interpret the UMDDL as being inapplicable unless a detainer is filed.
In interpreting a statute, we are mindful that, insofar as possible, legislative intent is to be determined from the language of the statute itself. State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Mo. banc 1985). In doing so, words used in statutes are considered in their plain and ordinary meaning. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992); State ex rel. Metro. St. Louis v. Sanders, 807 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. banc 1991). The legislature is presumed to have intended what the statute says, and if the language used is clear and unambiguous there is no room for construction. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d at 517; Brownstein v. Rhomberg-Haglin & Associates, 824 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo. banc 1992); Brown v. Melahn, 824 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo.App.1992). Stated another way:
"The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning." Blue Springs Bowl v. Spralding [sic], 551 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Mo. banc 1977). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. Id. This Court must be guided by what the legislature said, not by what the Court thinks it meant to say....
Metro Auto Auction v. Director of Revenue, 707 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. banc 1986).
The language of § 217.450.1 is quite clear and direct. It permits "[a]ny person confined in a department correctional facility" to request a final disposition "of any untried indictment, information or complaint pending in this state against him" without other qualification or condition. Our courts have held that where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, "application ... of the statute, rather than construction, is all that is required." Russell v. State, 597 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.App.1980). This applies to the plain and unambiguous language of § 217.450. Any attempt on our part, no matter how inviting, to impose the filing of a detainer as a condition through statutory construction would be result oriented and the equivalent of our attempt to inject what we might think the legislature meant to say. This, we are unable to do.
The Colorado Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in construing the UMDDL. See People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302, 306 (Colo.1987), where the court noted that their equivalent of our UMDDL contains no requirement that a detainer be filed, the scope of each provision of the statute is apparent from its face, and courts are required to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature.
Even though we do not believe § 217.450.1 is ambiguous and therefore a candidate for judicial construction, we will respond to some of the arguments made by the State urging that result.
The statutes which are now §§ 217.450-.485 (UMDDL) were originally adopted in 1959. 6 In 1971, the legislature adopted present §§ 217.490-.520 7 which approved the "Agreement on Detainers" which is designed to be a compact with other states adopting it (the "Interstate Agreement" or "Agreement"). The Agreement applies to interstate prisoners and the UMDDL applies to intrastate prisoners. Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo.App.1989). The Interstate Agreement specifically refers to detainers by permitting a prisoner in another state against whom "a detainer has been lodged" to request that the pending, untried charges in Missouri be tried within 180 days. § 217.490. 8 It has been held that because the Interstate Agreement contains an express provision concerning detainers, it applies only in the event one is filed. See State v. Buckles, 636 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Howell, 818 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Mo.App.1991); Hicks v. State, 719 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Soloway, 603 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo.App.1980).
The State argues that because a detainer is required under the Interstate Agreement we should construe the UMDDL as requiring the same thing. It points out that the UMDDL and the Agreement are in pari materia, Id., and are to be construed in harmony with each other. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Mo.App.1985). See also State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d at 359. We do not believe that this principle, however, provides justification for judicial construction so as to create a condition which does not appear in the clear language of § 217.450.1, especially considering the history of these statutes.
The same session of the 1971 legislature which adopted what is now §§ 217.490-.520 ( ) also amended the predecessor to § 217.450.1. The amendment made the statute (UMDDL) applicable to pending complaints as well as indictments and informations but did not incorporate the requirement of a detainer which the same legislature adopted in the Interstate Agreement. At least one other legislature has seen fit to incorporate in its version of the UMDDL a specific requirement that a detainer be filed. Kentucky Revised Statutes, § 500.110. Additionally, §§ 217.450-.520 were all re-adopted in 1982 with minor changes, and were again amended in 1989, but .450.1 still contains no requirement that a detainer be filed against Missouri prisoners before they are entitled to invoke the UMDDL as to pending charges.
Even if § 217.450.1 were ambiguous and uncertain, thereby authorizing judicial construction of the statute, it would be necessary to construe it bearing in mind the objective or purpose of the legislature and the evils it intended to cure by adopting the statute. State ex rel. Rowland Group v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo. banc 1992); Lederer v. State, Dept. of Social Services, 825 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Mo.App.1992); Osage Outdoor Advertising v. Missouri Highway & Transportation, 680 S.W.2d 164, 169 (Mo.App.1984).
Some guidance as to the legislature's purpose in adopting the UMDDL can be gleaned, by dictum, from State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, supra. In that case, a detainer was filed against the defendant while he was incarcerated in the Missouri State Penitentiary. His request for disposition of the charges under UMDDL, however, occurred while the felony complaint was pending. The issue was whether the UMDDL required that only the...
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