People v. Harlan
| Decision Date | 28 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03SA173.,03SA173. |
| Citation | 109 P.3d 616 |
| Parties | In re: Plaintiff-Appellant: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, v. Defendant-Appellee: Robert Eliot HARLAN. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 18, 2005.1
Don Quick, District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District, Michael J. Milne, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Bradley V. Varmo, Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, Steven L. Bernard, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Nineteenth, Judicial District, Acting as Special Deputy District Attorney, for the Seventeenth Judicial District, Greeley, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Kathleen A. Lord, Chief Appellate Deputy Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellee.
Burns, Figa & Will, P.C., Michael J. Norton, Englewood, for Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, we review the prosecution's challenge to the trial court's judgment vacating a jury verdict imposing the death penalty on Robert Eliot Harlan and imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We uphold the trial court's order and judgment, and discharge the rule.
Previously, we affirmed Harlan's death sentence. People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo.2000). In 1995, a jury found Harlan guilty of raping and murdering Rhonda Maloney and shooting Jaquie Creazzo, who tried to rescue Maloney when she escaped from Harlan's car. In pursuit, Harlan shot Creazzo and left her paralyzed for life. He then seized Maloney from Creazzo's car, drove away with her, and proceeded to savagely beat and ultimately kill her. We upheld Harlan's conviction and death sentence on appeal. Id. at 501.
In that opinion, we expressed particular concern about the voir dire that resulted in the jury's selection. Several of the jurors who were seated had expressed views favoring the death penalty for all persons convicted of first degree murder. However, they all answered in response to follow-up questions that they would listen to the evidence, follow the court's legal instructions in the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, apply the four-step process for the penalty phase as the trial court would instruct, and not automatically vote for the death penalty. While we were "deeply troubled by the number of times the trial court failed to resolve contradictory or equivocal statements by jurors," id. at 465, and characterized the voir dire as "inherently problematic," id. at 468, we concluded that the trial court's voir dire rulings were supported by the evidence and were constitutionally sufficient. Id.
After considering Harlan's numerous legal contentions, accepting some but rejecting most, we found no legal basis on which to set aside the jury's death penalty verdict. We then proceeded with our duty to independently review the verdict under former section 16-11-103(6)(a) and (b), 8A C.R.S. (Cum.Supp.1994).2 Id. at 498-501. This two-part inquiry requires us to find that the death penalty is appropriate under the circumstances of the case and that the jury did not impose it under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
As to this first inquiry, we upheld the propriety of the death sentence based upon the evidence of Harlan's heinous acts:
In light of the duration during which the defendant terrorized his victim and her would-be rescuer; the degree of violence he inflicted on Maloney before her death; and the extent to which she suffered, we conclude that the nature of the defendant's offense is comparable to cases in which we have upheld the propriety of the death sentence.
Id. at 498 (internal citations omitted).
As to the second inquiry, whether passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor influenced the death penalty verdict, we examined Harlan's contention that racial bias may have been a factor in the imposition of the death sentence. We determined that the record as a whole supported the finding that "racial prejudice did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial." Id. at 499.
Accordingly, we upheld the jury's death penalty verdict and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 501. Subsequently, the trial court took up Harlan's motion to vacate his death sentence due to jury misconduct. Harlan alleged that the jury introduced one or more Bibles into the jury room during deliberations and used the texts to demonstrate an authoritative passage commanding imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder, all without authorization by the trial court. The evidence adduced at the trial court's hearing shows that: (1) one or more jurors brought a Bible, a Bible index, and hand-written notes containing the location of biblical passages into the jury room to share with another juror during deliberations in the penalty phase of defendant's trial; (2) these extraneous materials contained a passage commanding the death penalty for murderers and another instructing obedience to civil authorities; and (3) these passages were pointed out by at least one juror to another juror before the jury reached its unanimous verdict imposing the death sentence. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable possiblity that use of the Bible in the jury room to demonstrate a requirement of the death penalty for the crime of murder would have influenced a typical juror to reject a life sentence for Harlan. Therefore, the trial court found that Colorado's legal standards require reversal of the jury's death sentence verdict in this case.3
Because competent evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings of fact and the court's legal conclusions are correct, under CRE 606(b) and applicable case law, we uphold the trial court's order vacating Harlan's death sentence and imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
In light of the trial court's findings, and exercising our independent responsibility to review the death sentence under former section 16-11-103(6)(b), we can no longer say that Harlan's death sentence was not influenced by passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor. See Harlan, 8 P.3d at 499-501.
In 1995, defendant Robert Harlan was tried for the 1994 kidnapping, rape, and murder of Rhonda Maloney and the shooting of Jaquie Creazzo. The prosecution elected to pursue the death penalty. After the trial had commenced, a news broadcast aired the statement of a witness suggesting that Harlan had been involved in another uncharged crime. The court ordered sequestration of the jury.
Presentation of evidence concluded, and the jury found Harlan guilty of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of second degree kidnapping, and one count of assault.
On Friday June 30, 1995, the sequestered jury began its penalty phase deliberations. During the course of the trial, the court admonished the jury several times to focus only on the evidence and law presented at the trial and to avoid any outside discussion or information about the case.
During preliminary jury voir dire, the judge instructed the prospective jurors that sentencing phase deliberations, if needed, must focus solely on the evidence presented at trial and that the jury would be required to carefully follow the trial court's instructions:
(emphasis added).
Before opening statements began, the court admonished the jury that only the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court were appropriate for consideration, even if the jurors disagreed with or did not understand the rules of law:
(emphasis added).
At the end of the first day of trial, the trial court told the jury not to go looking for facts outside the courtroom:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Hughes
... ... He also admitted that he gets "fired up" when people lay hands on him. In explaining why Knight deserved the beating that he had inflicted on her, he stated, "you know, you just take nothing from ... Harlan , 109 P.3d 616, 62526 (Colo.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 928, 126 S. Ct. 399, 163 L. Ed. 2d 277 (2005) ; and (3) the " Mayhue " test; see Mayhue v ... ...
-
People v. Robles
... ... from one place to another. Any lingering confusion could be dispelled by reading the original instructions. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's answer properly instructed the jury on the law and was not erroneous. See People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 477 (Colo.2000) ([T]he asportation element of second degree kidnapping is the movement by the defendant of the victim from one place to another.), overruled on other grounds by Miller, 113 P.3d at 748; Rogers, 220 P.3d at 936 (holding that the district court's supplemental ... ...
-
Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis
... ... In both attacks, the shooters used large-capacity ammunition magazines. Collectively, the shooters killed over two dozen people and wounded scores more. 2 In response to these shootings, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 13-1224 ("HB 1224"), which limits the ... We will not second-guess that determination. People v. Harlan , 109 P.3d 616, 62728 (Colo. 2005) ("[W]e cannot second-guess determinations of the trial court regarding witness credibility."). 15 Although we ... ...
-
People v. Pena-Rodriguez
... ... To abuse its discretion, a court's decision must be "manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous view of the law." Id. A court has not abused its discretion if the record provides some support for its action. Cf. People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 464 (Colo.2000) (finding that, despite voir dire irregularities, because the record provided support for the trial court's rulings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion), overruled on other grounds by People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo.2005). B. Law 14 The United ... ...
-
ICEBERG AHEAD: WHY COURTS SHOULD PRESUME BIAS IN CASES OF EXTRANEOUS JUROR CONTACTS.
...modified on reh'g denial (June 30, 1999), cited with approval in In re Cowan, 419 P.3d 535, 544 (Cal. 2018). (274.) People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 624 (Colo. 2005) ("[Fjirst, a court makes a determination that extraneous information was improperly before the jury; and second, ... makes a d......