People v. Harris, Motion No. 153.

• Decision Date: 06 March 1934
• Docket Number: Motion No. 153.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HARRIS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

266 Mich. 317

253 N.W. 312

PEOPLE

v.HARRIS.

Motion No. 153.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 6, 1934.

Proceeding between the People of the State and Frank E. Harris.

Writ of habeas corpus dismissed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

FEAD, Justice.

This is habeas corpus, with ancillary writ of certiorari, to inquire into the legality of the confinement of defendant in the state prison at Jackson. Defendant contends:

(1) That the court refused to appoint proper counsel for him.

The appointment of counsel is discretionary with the court, and one who pleads guilty is not entitled to such appointment. People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N. W. 818.

(2) That the crime was not established on the examination before the magistrate.

A plea of guilty is a waiver of examination, People v. Sanford, 233 Mich. 112, 206 N. W. 370, and, in any event, the point cannot be raised on habeas corpus, In re Ellis, 79 Mich. 322, 44 N. W. 616.

(3) That the court failed to make the statutory examination to determine whether defendant's plea of guilty was free, voluntary, without undue influence, and with full knowledge of the accusation. C. L. 1929, § 17328.

The court records show that October 20, 1930, defendant was arraigned on a charge of forgery and uttering a forged check; that he stood mute and a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf; that on November 5th he came voluntarily into court, withdrew his plea of not guilty, entered a plea of guilty to the information, and sentence was deferred to November 8th; that on November 8th he was sentenced to a term of five to fourteen years to the state prison at Jackson, the judgment entry reciting, in the usual language: ‘* * * The court before pronouncing sentence upon such plea, being satisfied after such investigation as was deemed necessary for that purpose, respecting the nature of the case and the circumstances of such plea, that the same was made freely and with full knowledge of the nature of said accusation and without any undue influence; and having been by the prosecuting attorney brought to the bar for sentence and having there been asked by the court if he had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced against him and having said what he had to say. * * *’

Both jurisdiction and regularity of procedure appear on the records.

The stenographer's minutes of the proceedings of November 5th show that respondent was accompanied in court by two attorneys, one of whom announced that defendant was charged with forgery and uttering a forged check; that defendant waived the reading of the information and entered a plea of guilty; the court questioned defendant briefly regarding his residence and family status and prior arrests, and the defendant stated he had just finished serving a term of two years when he was arrested for the instant offense and that his employers had made the check good. On November 8th the court examined defendant at greater length, stating that he had received letters and had interviews with persons regarding defendant, discussed prior arrests, and particularly the offense at bar. Defendant told the court of receiving four checks (one, the check at bar) from another person in 1928 and cashing all of them, two in Iowa, and ‘I entered a plea of guilty to that charge out there the same as I have here.’ The colloquy indicates that defendant is an intelligent man. He had had an examination at which he was represented by counsel and in which the details of the offense had been fully set out.

We need not enter into a discussion of the character and extent of an investigation in a plea of guilty which will satisfy the statute. Some of the early cases...