People v. Hartsfield

• Decision Date: 29 April 2022
• Docket Number: 220,KA 17-01695
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Curtis HARTSFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

204 A.D.3d 1502

167 N.Y.S.3d 692

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Curtis HARTSFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

220

KA 17-01695

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: April 29, 2022

THE SAGE LAW FIRM GROUP PLLC, BUFFALO (KATHRYN FRIEDMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon two jury verdicts, of rape in the first degree ( Penal Law § 130.35 [1] ), aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [a] [i] ), driving while ability impaired by drugs (§ 1192 [4]), and operation while registration is suspended (§ 512). Supreme Court severed the rape count from the remaining counts in the indictment and directed that separate trials be conducted on the counts involving defendant's operation of a motor vehicle (first trial) and the rape count (second trial).

Defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment with respect to counts at issue in the first trial due to the alleged insufficiency of the prosecutor's opening statement. We reject that contention. In her opening statement, the prosecutor "stated the nature of the charge[s] and the facts that [she] expected to prove in support of them[,] and thus [her] opening statement was adequate" ( People v. Nielsen , 67 A.D.3d 1440, 1441, 889 N.Y.S.2d 343 [4th Dept. 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally People v. Kurtz , 51 N.Y.2d 380, 384, 434 N.Y.S.2d 200, 414 N.E.2d 699 [1980], cert denied 451 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 1983, 68 L.Ed.2d 301 [1981] ; People v. Nuffer , 70 A.D.3d 1299, 1300, 894 N.Y.S.2d 698 [4th Dept. 2010] ). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's opening statement made reference to the fact that the underlying incident occurred on a public road in the City of Rochester—i.e., Monroe County—and therefore the opening statement was not jurisdictionally defective.

Defendant also contends that, at the first trial, the court improperly allowed three employees of the medical examiner's office to testify about the presence of cocaine in defendant's blood because their testimony was cumulative. To the extent that defendant's contention is preserved (see generally CPL 470.05 [2] ), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony from all three witnesses because evidence of the cocaine in defendant's blood was relevant to establish whether defendant was impaired by the substance beyond a reasonable doubt and "each examiner played a successive role in the analysis" ( People v. Hajratalli , 200 A.D.3d 1332, 1339, 158 N.Y.S.3d 405 [3d Dept. 2021] ; see generally People v. Davis , 43 N.Y.3d 17, 27, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 371 N.E.2d 456 [1977], cert denied 435 U.S. 998, 98 S.Ct. 1653, 56 L.Ed.2d 88 [1978] ).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court properly denied defendant's motion seeking substitution of counsel at the second trial and that the court did not err in denying the request without conducting an inquiry into defendant's objections with respect to defense counsel. Defendant "failed to proffer specific allegations of a ‘seemingly serious request’ that would require the court to engage in a minimal inquiry" ( People v. Porto , 16 N.Y.3d 93, 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283 [2010] ; see People v. Konovalchuk , 148 A.D.3d 1514, 1515-1516, 50 N.Y.S.3d 193 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1082, 64 N.Y.S.3d 172, 86 N.E.3d 259 [2017] ; People v. Adger , 83 A.D.3d 1590, 1591-1592, 921 N.Y.S.2d 436 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 857, 932 N.Y.S.2d 22, 956 N.E.2d 803 [2011] ). Instead, defendant essentially made only " ‘vague assertions that defense counsel was not in frequent contact with him and did not aid in his defense’ " ( People v. Jones , 149 A.D.3d 1576, 1577, 52 N.Y.S.3d 804 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1129, 64 N.Y.S.3d 679, 86 N.E.3d 571 [2017] ).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes , 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction of rape in the first degree at the second trial (see People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ) because there is "a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Carlson , 184 A.D.3d 1139, 1140, 125 N.Y.S.3d 803 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1064, 129 N.Y.S.3d 374, 152 N.E.3d 1176 [2020] ).

Defendant further contends that the court erred in permitting the People at the second trial to elicit testimony from the victim about her knowledge of defendant's prior incarceration. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in permitting the testimony (cf. People v. Croft , 176 A.D.2d 1225, 1225-1226, 576 N.Y.S.2d 719 [4th Dept. 1991], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 855, 580 N.Y.S.2d 727, 588 N.E.2d 762 [1992] ), we conclude that any such error is harmless (see generally People v. Mairena , 34 N.Y.3d 473, 484-485, 121 N.Y.S.3d 731, 144 N.E.3d 340 [2019] ; People v. Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ).

Here, there can be no dispute that the evidence adduced at trial, irrespective of the challenged testimony, overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt (see Mairena , 34 N.Y.3d at 484-485, 121 N.Y.S.3d 731, 144 N.E.3d 340 ; Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d at 241-242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ), i.e., that he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim by forcible compulsion (see Penal Law § 130.35 [1] ). It is uncontested that the rape occurred at the church where the victim had worked and worshiped for many years and that it was committed by someone the victim had known for almost two decades. Thus, there is plainly no issue with respect to the perpetrator's identity nor is there confusion about the circumstances under which the rape happened. Further, the victim consistently testified, in great detail, about how defendant forced himself onto her and vaginally penetrated her to the point that she felt as though she was being stabbed in her vagina with a knife. The trial testimony also overwhelmingly established that, after the rape, the victim's vaginal injuries were so severe that she continued to bleed overnight and had to go to the hospital the next day due to the continued pain. Although the victim briefly delayed disclosing the rape, her account thereof was extensively corroborated by the consistent trial testimony of others.

We further conclude that there is no "significant probability ... that the jury would have acquitted ... defendant had it not been for" the court's presumed error in admitting the challenged testimony ( Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d at 242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [emphasis added]; see Mairena , 34 N.Y.3d at 485, 121 N.Y.S.3d 731, 144 N.E.3d 340 ; People v. Hackett , 166 A.D.3d 1483, 1486, 87 N.Y.S.3d 413 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1204, 99 N.Y.S.3d 245, 122 N.E.3d 1158 [2019], reconsideration denied 33 N.Y.3d 949, 100 N.Y.S.3d 174, 123 N.E.3d 833 [2019] ). The victim's brief testimony about her knowledge of defendant's prior incarceration is the trial's only reference to that fact, which was not mentioned during either opening or closing statements. Additionally, during their brief deliberations, the jury did not ask for a read-back of the challenged testimony or any other trial testimony, and nothing in the record indicates that the jury focused on the challenged testimony or was in any way swayed by it.

The dissent's conclusion that the court's error in admitting the challenged testimony was not harmless because its final limiting instruction, issued during the jury charge, compounded that error is entirely separate from the issue actually before us—i.e., whether the admission of the challenged testimony requires reversal. Defendant never objected to the court's final limiting instruction and, therefore, any error occasioned by that instruction is unpreserved (see CPL 470.05 [2] ; People v. Dixon , 214 A.D.2d 1010, 1011, 626 N.Y.S.2d 900 [4th Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 900, 641 N.Y.S.2d 230, 663 N.E.2d 1260 [1995] ). Further, we note that defendant has not argued on appeal that the content of the court's final limiting instruction was erroneous; he merely argues that it did not cure the prejudice caused by the challenged testimony. Thus, we conclude that the propriety of the court's final limiting instruction is not before us.

All concur...