People v. Hayes
| Decision Date | 31 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA1001 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew James HAYES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meredith E. O'Harris, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
¶ 1 Defendant, Andrew James Hayes, appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. His only contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evidence found on his person during a booking search following a traffic stop.
¶ 2 As a matter of first impression, we hold that section 42-3-203(3)(d)(I), C.R.S. 2020, read in conjunction with section 42-3-202, C.R.S. 2020, requires affixing a vehicle's temporary plate1 in the same location as a permanent rear license plate. Because the car in which Hayes was riding did not have a temporary plate in the required location, the officer who stopped the car had reasonable suspicion to make and continue the stop. That holding requires us to reject Hayes's Fourth Amendment challenge and affirm his convictions.
¶ 3 A police officer stopped the car in which Hayes was a passenger. The initial basis for the stop was that the officer could not see either a license plate or temporary plate on the car. After he stopped the car, the officer saw a temporary plate in the rear window. The officer asked the driver and passengers for their names and other identifying information.2 A warrant check disclosed outstanding arrest warrants for Hayes.
¶ 4 The officer arrested Hayes on the warrants and took him to jail. During booking, another officer found, in Hayes's pocket, a plastic bag containing methamphetamine. As a result of this discovery, the prosecution charged Hayes with possession of a controlled substance.3
¶ 5 Hayes moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter after he saw the temporary plate on the car and that the drug evidence was fruit of the unlawful stop. According to Hayes, the moment the officer saw the temporary plate, the officer was required to discontinue the stop.
¶ 6 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the stop even after he saw the temporary plate in the rear window because the temporary plate was not in the location required by law. Alternatively, the court denied the suppression motion in reliance on the attenuation doctrine because of the outstanding arrest warrants.
¶ 7 Review of a trial court's suppression order is a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Tomaske , 2019 CO 35, ¶ 7, 440 P.3d 444. We defer to trial court findings of fact that are supported by competent evidence in the record and therefore are not clearly erroneous. People v. Carrion , 2015 CO 13, ¶ 8, 343 P.3d 972. We review questions of law de novo. Tomaske , ¶ 7.
¶ 8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
¶ 9 People v. Vaughn , 2014 CO 71, ¶ 10, 334 P.3d 226 (citations omitted).
¶ 10 However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. One exception is that an officer may make an investigative stop when there is reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; Stone v. People , 174 Colo. 504, 508, 485 P.2d 495, 497 (1971).
An investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, does not violate the Fourth Amendment's protections when there are specific, articulable facts that give rise to an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In the context of traffic stops, an officer need only have a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation — i.e., an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a driver has committed a traffic offense — in order to pull the driver over.
Vaughn , ¶ 11 (citations omitted).
¶ 11 Hayes contends that the stop was pretextual and that the officer made the stop because he thought the odds of finding an outstanding arrest warrant were high. However, an officer's subjective intent is not relevant to the determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists. People v. Cherry , 119 P.3d 1081, 1083 (Colo. 2005). Rather, reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the articulable facts known to the officer. Id.
¶ 12 The United States Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop constitutes a seizure of "everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver." Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). Hayes, a passenger in the car, was therefore seized when the officer stopped the car.
¶ 13 At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he stopped the car because he did not see a license plate or temporary plate on the car. The trial court credited this testimony and concluded that that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court also found, contrary to some of the officer's testimony, that after the stop was made, the officer could and did see a temporary plate that contained the statutorily required content. But the trial court concluded that the temporary plate was not affixed on the vehicle in the location required by law. Accordingly, the court ruled that the officer was justified in continuing the stop even after he saw a temporary plate. And once the officer discovered the outstanding arrest warrants, there was probable cause for Hayes's arrest. See People v. Gouker , 665 P.2d 113, 116 (Colo. 1983).
¶ 14 Relying on People v. Redinger , 906 P.2d 81, 84 (Colo. 1995), Hayes contends that the moment the officer saw the temporary plate any lawful stop ended and the continuing stop violated the Fourth Amendment. In a case similar to Redinger , the Tenth Circuit held that once the officer was able to read the temporary plate, any suspicion that the defendant had violated the license plate statute dissipated and the stop was no longer supported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Edgerton , 438 F.3d 1043, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006).
¶ 15 But in both Redinger and Edgerton , there was no issue regarding the location of the temporary plate. Indeed, after Redinger was decided, the General Assembly amended the temporary plate statute, addressing the required location of temporary plates.
¶ 16 The question presented here is whether the law in effect at the time of the stop required the temporary plate to be affixed in the same location required for a rear license plate. If, as the trial court concluded and the Attorney General contends, a temporary plate must be affixed in the same location as a rear license plate, the officer was justified in continuing the stop, and the later discovery of the arrest warrants and the drugs did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
¶ 17 Statutory interpretation is a legal question that we review de novo. Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc. , 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. 2010). When interpreting a statute, we first look at its plain language. Id. When the plain language is clear, our job ends, and we must apply the statute as written. Id.
¶ 18 One of the relevant statutes, section 42-3-203(3)(d)(I), provides:
By July 1, 2016, the department shall make temporary registration number plates or certificates so that each complies with the requirements of section 42-3-202, including being fastened, visible, and readable ; except that a temporary plate is affixed only to the rear of the vehicle. The department shall implement an electronic issuance system for temporary license plates. The department may promulgate rules to implement this system.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 19 This statute requires temporary plates to comply with the requirements of section 42-3-202. That statute contains specific requirements for the fastening of a rear license plate:
¶ 20 Hayes argued below and renews his argument here that the words "including being fastened, visible, and readable" in the temporary plate statute, section 42-3-203(3)(d)(I), implies the exclusion of all other requirements, such as the required location of the temporary plate. We reject this argument because the word "including" is ordinarily used as a word of enlargement rather than limitation. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Voelker by Voelker , 859 P.2d 805, 813 (Colo. 1993).
¶ 21 The express language of section 42-3-203(3)(d)(I) requires that temporary plates must "compl[y] with the requirements of section 42-3-202," id. , which specifies the location of a rear license plate. In our view, the only reasonable reading of these statutory provisions is that temporary plates must be fastened in the same location as the permanent rear license plate. This includes the requirements violated here — that the temporary plate be centered and within eighteen inches of the bumper. § 42-3-202(2)(a)(II)(D), (E).
¶ 22 While it is true, as the concurring opinion states, that the initial portion...
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