People v. Hernandez
Decision Date | 28 March 1988 |
Citation | 199 Cal.App.3d 1182,245 Cal.Rptr. 513 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose Isabel HERNANDEZ, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Crim. C001799. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Joel Carey and Robert R. Anderson, Deputy Attys. Gen. for plaintiff and respondent.
In this case police discovered evidence in one of several bedrooms in a house where each bedroom was occupied by a different person. The issue before us is whether a person who does not live in the bedroom in which the evidence was discovered, and who has never been given permission to enter the room, has a legitimate expectation of privacy in that room sufficient to challenge the introduction of the evidence on the ground it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude such a person has no privacy interest in a room from which he has been excluded and consequently may not challenge the introduction of evidence seized in that room.
Defendants Jose Isabel Hernandez (also known as Juan Garcia), Gabriel Rodriguez and Jose Antonio Paz appeal judgments of conviction arising out of their participation in the sale of heroin. Hernandez was convicted of sale of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352); Rodriguez was convicted of conspiracy to sell heroin (Pen.Code, § 182) and possession of heroin with intent to sell (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351) in an amount exceeding 14.25 grams (Pen.Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(1)) while being armed with a firearm. (Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (a).) Paz pled guilty to conspiracy and possession for sale counts and admitted allegations of being armed and possessing more than 14.25 grams.
Defendants contend the prosecutor committed misconduct. They also contend their motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) was erroneously denied because, they assert, the police unlawfully detained defendants Rodriquez and Paz while they were riding in an automobile. In an unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject these contentions.
In this published portion, we consider defendants Rodriguez's and Paz's contentions that their motion to suppress was erroneously denied with respect to heroin discovered in a bedroom in a house where they were living. 1
The trial court properly refused to suppress heroin discovered in the northeast bedroom at 149 Cathcart Street.
(People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123, 196 Cal.Rptr. 846, 672 P.2d 436.)
Defendants' motion to suppress in superior court (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) was submitted on evidence taken at the preliminary hearing, supplemented by live testimony. Viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling of the lower court (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135), the evidence showed the following:
Based upon information received from outside sources and confirmed by their own surveillance, Sacramento police suspected the residents of a house at 149 Cathcart Street were involved in narcotics activity and were using their cars to facilitate transactions. Acting on that suspicion, on June 25, 1986, officers stopped a car in which defendants Rodriguez and Paz were riding. After discovering that the occupants of the car were illegal aliens, the officers transported defendants to the police station for booking and then to jail.
Detective Thomas Backer spoke with Rodriguez at the jail shortly after he was arrested. Rodriguez said he was an illegal alien and he lived at 149 Cathcart Street. Backer asked Rodriguez for permission to search the house for heroin. Rodriguez said he could. Backer brought Schiele into the room and again requested permission to search for heroin. Rodriguez, who indicated he was in control of the house, said "yes, let's go."
The officers took Rodriguez with them back to 149 Cathcart Street. On the way, Rodriguez told Detective Backer that other people lived in the house. Backer learned that Rodriguez and his wife occupied one bedroom and Paz another.
When they entered the house, Officer Gary Bettenhausen assisted in a cursory preliminary search of the house to ensure the officers' safety. Officer Bettenhausen went into the northeast bedroom where he found and seized two guns. Before removing the guns, Bettenhausen spotted a piano bench he thought he could use as a platform for packaging seized evidence and writing notes about the evidence. He had no clue that the piano bench was associated with anything relating to narcotics, nor did he suspect it had an inner compartment. In fact, the piano bench did have an inner compartment that was revealed when Bettenhausen grasped the lid to pick it up. Contained within were a scale, a dinner plate, and individually packaged pieces of what he believed was tar heroin, which he confiscated.
Defendants argue that Rodriguez's consent to search the house at 149 Cathcart Street was involuntarily given because of his lack of education and his unawareness of his constitutional rights, and because he was not read his Miranda rights 3 nor told he could refuse his consent to the search. In addition, defendants argue Rodriguez was in a vulnerable state of mind because he "found himself in a foreign jail in the custody of foreign police." If this argument is correct, the police had no authority to enter the house and any evidence seized from within should have been excluded.
The prosecution has the burden to establish that the consent upon which a search is based was voluntarily given and was unaffected by duress or coercion. ( People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 106, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) The superior court's findings, either express or implied, will be upheld on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. ( Id., at p. 107, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) On appeal all presumptions favor the proper exercise of the trial court's power to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences. (People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665.)
In this case, the prosecution presented facts to show that Rodriguez, who spoke English and seemed to understand the officers' questions, unhesitatingly agreed to the request to permit a search of the residence. Although Rodriguez was in custody, "the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced ... consent to search." (United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 609.) The fact defendant is in custody must be weighed with all other relevant facts. ( People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 686-687, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665; People v. James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 109-110, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) There was no evidence to show the officers displayed their weapons or other signs of force (compare People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 782, 186 Cal.Rptr. 458), or that they made any improper inducements to obtain consent. The officers "did not claim the right to search without permission, nor act as if [they] intended to enter regardless of defendant's answer." ( James, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 113, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.)
Nor was Rodriguez's consent invalid because he had received no Miranda warnings. Such warnings are not required to validate a consent to search. (Id., at pp. 114-115, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135; followed in People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 686, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665.) Nor were the officers obligated to tell Rodriguez he could refuse to consent to the search. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 231-234, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2050-51, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 865-867.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Rodriguez lawfully consented to a search of the house. ( Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 687, 224 Cal.Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665.)
We now turn to the evidence discovered in the piano bench...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
19 Cal.4th 1231A, People v. Roybal
...he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises." ' " (People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189, 245 Cal.Rptr. 513.) In People v. Root (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 774, 779, 218 Cal.Rptr. 182, the Court of Appeal concluded that the def......
-
People v. Carter
...must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.' (People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189, 245 Cal.Rptr. 513, italics in original.)" (People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Th......
-
People v. McPeters
...must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge." (People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189, 245 Cal.Rptr. 513, italics in Because the historical facts concerning standing are established by uncontradicted evidence, we re......
-
Carter v. Chappell
...must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.' (People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189, 245 Cal.Rptr. 513, italics in original.)" (People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Th......
-
Chapter 5 - §3. Exceptions to warrant requirement
...considered a number of factors, including the following: • Whether the officer drew a weapon. See People v. Hernandez (3d Dist.1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1188; People v. Challoner (2d Dist.1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 782. Courts have refused to hold that this factor, standing alone, makes con......
-
Table of Cases null
...§20.4.2 People v. Hernandez, 30 Cal. App. 4th 919, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (2d Dist. 1994)—Ch. 5-A, §2.2.1(1)(b)[1] People v. Hernandez, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1182, 245 Cal. Rptr. 513 (3d Dist. 1988)—Ch. 5-A, §3.3.1(3)(a); §5.1.3(1)(a) People v. Herrera, 247 Cal. App. 4th 467, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187......
-
Chapter 5 - §5. Procedure for excluding evidence
...no evidence was discovered anywhere else in apartment, and D was present for entire search); cf. People v. Hernandez (3d Dist.1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189-90 & n.4 (when D had resided in bedroom for three days and claimed residence there, no standing to challenge search of other bedroom ......