People v. Hernandez
Decision Date | 04 November 2014 |
Docket Number | B249653 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOEL RENTERIA HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA097343)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Carl N. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________ Joel Hernandez was convicted of several sexual offenses against his stepdaughter. On appeal, he contends that the admissions he made during interrogation should have been suppressed and that there was no substantial evidence to support one of the convictions. We affirm.
Hernandez was charged with four sexual crimes against Brenda Doe:1 (1) continuous sexual abuse (Pen. Code,2 § 288.5, subd. (a)); (2) aggravated sexual assault on a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)); (3) forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); and (4) lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)).) Prior to trial, Hernandez unsuccessfully moved to suppress statements he made during interrogation on the grounds that the Miranda3 warning given to him was deficient and that his statements were involuntary.
Hernandez was convicted of continuous sexual abuse, a forcible lewd act on a child, and a lewd act on a child. The jury deadlocked on the aggravated sexual assault charge; the court declared a mistrial, then dismissed that count. Hernandez was sentenced to 26 years in prison. He appeals.
On appeal, Hernandez contends that the statements he made during questioning after his arrest should have been suppressed for two reasons: first, because Hernandez did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights; and second, because his statement was not voluntary, having been induced by deceptive and coercive tactics. Hernandezdid not argue in the trial court that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights: instead, he argued that the statements should be ruled inadmissible because the Miranda warning was improperly translated into Spanish and because the statement was involuntary due to implied threats. "[U]nless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police under Miranda, that ground is forfeited on appeal, even if the defendant asserted other arguments under the same decision." (People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 120-121, overruled on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) Hernandez therefore failed to preserve for appeal the question of whether he expressly or impliedly gave a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights when he failed to challenge the admission of his statements on this ground in the trial court.
We therefore consider the argument that was raised in the trial court and preserved for appeal: Hernandez's contention that his statement was involuntary because it was induced by deceptive and coercive law enforcement tactics. Due process "precludes the admission of any involuntary statement obtained from a criminal suspect through state compulsion." (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 34.) " (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347.)
In determining whether a confession was voluntary, the question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not essentially free because his or her will was overborne. (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1086.) Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) On review of thedenial of a suppression motion, "'"" ' (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)
Hernandez was interviewed by Detective Jimmie Pitts after his arrest, with Officer G. Cuevas serving as a Spanish translator. The interview took place late at night. Repeatedly during the questioning, Pitts impressed upon Hernandez that it was his job to find out the truth, that he wanted the truth, and that he would find out the truth. He began the questioning with questions about Hernandez's name, family, occupation, and a prior court matter that resulted in an outstanding warrant, weaving in Miranda advisements among the questions. Through Cuevas Pitts then told Hernandez that he had spoken to his family and that he thought that "something happened" in 2008 but that "it wasn't a big deal." He assured Hernandez that everyone makes mistakes, himself included, and that Cuevas translated Pitts's words as,
Pitts showed Hernandez a photo of Doe and asserted as translated by Cuevas, "Something happened between you and Brenda." Pitts continued that what happened was Cuevas translated Pitts's statement as, [¶] . . .
Pitts told Hernandez that Doe had said that Hernandez treated her family and herself very well, but that a few years ago Hernandez touched her in an inappropriate manner. Hernandez responded, "That's not true." Pitts told Hernandez that Doe said the touching happened a few times. He told Hernandez he understood, and asked if Doe had been flirting with him. He asked Hernandez to help him understand. Hernandez told Pitts that he had once spanked Doe while they were playing. Pitts said that they already knew about that, and it was not what they were talking about today. Pitts said that Doe alleged that Hernandez had touched her buttocks on the outside of her clothes, and that Hernandez's wife had confirmed that Doe reported this to her. Hernandez denied touching Doe.
Pitts talked with Hernandez about a 2008 police investigation into inappropriate contact with Doe, telling Hernandez that his wife had now admitted that she was lying when she said nothing had happened. Pitts told Hernandez that his wife was saying that he had touched Doe two or three times but that she had told Doe to lie to the police and social worker when they investigated. Pitts said, "Now, I understand and we all make mistakes," translated by Cuevas as, [¶] . . . Pitts asked if Doe had done something to provoke Hernandez. Hernandez denied provocation and said that the only time he touched her was when he spanked her buttocks. Pitts told Hernandez they were not talking about the spanking, they were talking about the time when he touched Doe sexually in 2007 or 2008. Hernandez again denied touching Doe.
Pitts told Hernandez it was strange that Doe would tell her mother about this, that her mother would confront him, that a second child in the house would report having heard the confrontation, and that they all would have the same story. Pitts asked again what happened. responded Hernandez. Pitts told Hernandez that he did not understand why everyone else would lie. Hernandez asked Cuevas, "What is it that I . . . he wants me to tell him?" Cuevas answered, without consulting Pitts, "The truth." "That I touched her?" asked Hernandez. Cuevas translatedto Pitts that Hernandez was asking "what do you want him to tell you," and Pitts responded, "Just the truth."
Pitts asked a series of questions tending to paint Doe as having been sexually attracted to Hernandez or attempting to seduce him. Pitts said, "[M]an to man," and He observed that Doe was pretty. Pitts suggested that perhaps Hernandez had been drinking or that he and his wife might have been arguing or not having sexual relations, and observed that there were many reasons that could have led Hernandez to do something like this. He suggested that Doe might have been attracted to him ...
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