People v. Holmes

• Citation: 32 Cal.4th 432,84 P.3d 366,9 Cal.Rptr.3d 678
• Decision Date: 19 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. S102965.,S102965.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Henry James HOLMES, Defendant and Appellant.

9 Cal.Rptr.3d 678

32 Cal.4th 432

84 P.3d 366

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Henry James HOLMES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S102965.

Supreme Court of California.

February 19, 2004.

Cindi B. Mishkin, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and James R. McGrath, Glendale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Robert M. Foster, Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck and Elizabeth A. Hartwig, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MORENO, J.

There are two types of guilty or no contest pleas in California: (1) a conditional plea, where the plea is conditioned upon receipt of a particular disposition; and (2) an unconditional or open plea. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1181, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 899 P.2d 896.) When taking a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere (hereafter no contest) to an accusatory pleading charging a felony, a trial court is required by Penal Code section 1192.5¹ to "cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea." We granted review in this case to consider whether the trial court established a sufficient factual basis for appellant's guilty plea as required by section 1192.5. In doing so, we provide guidelines for the trial courts regarding how to comply with their obligations under section 1192.5 and what constitutes a "factual basis for the plea."

We conclude that in order for a court to accept a conditional plea, it must garner information regarding the factual basis for the plea from either defendant or defense counsel to comply with section 1192.5. If the trial court inquires of the defendant regarding the factual basis, the court may develop the factual basis for the plea on the record through its own examination by having the defendant describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge (People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 179, 136 Cal.Rptr. 496 (Watts)), or question the defendant regarding the factual basis described in the complaint or written plea agreement. (See, e.g., United States v. Sias (5th Cir.2000) 227 F.3d 244, 245, fn. 1; United States v. Montoya-Camacho (5th Cir.1981) 644 F.2d 480, 487 (Montoya-Camacho).) If the trial court inquires of defense counsel regarding the factual basis, it should request that defense counsel stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or written plea agreement. (People v. Wilkerson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1576-1579, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 (Wilkerson).) Under either approach, a bare statement by the judge that a factual basis exists, without the above inquiry, is inadequate. (People v. Tigner (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 430, 434, 435, 184 Cal.Rptr. 61 (Tigner).)

In the present case, the trial court asked defendant whether he did what was charged in the complaint. Because the complaint adequately contains a factual basis for the plea, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the trial court complied with the section 1192.5 factual basis requirement.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2000, defendant Henry James Holmes was charged in a two-count complaint alleging assault with intent to commit rape (a felony under section 220) and sexual battery (a misdemeanor under section 243.4, subdivision (d)). The complaint lists the charged offenses, names of the defendant and victim, and date and location of the charged offenses, and briefly describes the factual basis for the charged offenses. Count 1 of the complaint states, "The above named defendant(s) committed a violation of Penal Code section 220, a felony, in that on or about March 24, 2000, in the County of Riverside, State of California, he did willfully and unlawfully assault Sandra R., with the intent to commit rape." Count 2 of the complaint states that "he did willfully and unlawfully direct and indirectly touch an intimate part of another person, to wit: Sandra R., for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, and sexual abuse, against the will of said person." Other than the complaint, the record contains no facts regarding the underlying offense.

On May 10, 2000, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. At his arraignment, a public defender was appointed to represent him. Following the arraignment, but prior to his plea, defendant sent two letters to the court. In the first letter, filed on May 22, 2000, defendant asked that his case be dismissed because the police report was incomplete and omitted the name of a witness whose testimony could exculpate him. The second letter, filed on May 30, 2000, claimed that the police report omitted key facts about his contact with the woman — the basis of the alleged sexual assault. The letter described the events preceding the arrest on March 24, 2000, and claimed that the victim had offered defendant sex for money and requested a ride. In response, defendant alleged he pushed the victim away, knocking her down.

On June 1, 2000, defendant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to count 1 in the complaint — assault with intent to commit rape. As part of the plea, count2 — the misdemeanor sexual battery charge — was dismissed and defendant was promised a sentence of two years in state prison. At the plea hearing, defendant acknowledged that he had read and signed the felony plea form. The plea form included a section, initialed by defendant, that stated without elaboration that "there is a factual basis for my plea." Both the prosecution and defense counsel signed the form.

The trial judge next attempted to ascertain the factual basis for the plea. The following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: After examining the defendant, [the] Court determines that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. He understands the charges against him and consequences of his plea. Mr. Holmes, did you get a copy of your Complaint, your felony Complaint?

"DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

"THE COURT: Did you do what it says you did in Count 1 on March 24th, 2000 in Riverside County?

"DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

"THE COURT: [The] Court finds there is a factual basis for the plea. The defendant has personally and orally entered his plea of guilty to the offenses in open court. The plea has been accepted in open court by the prosecuting attorney. The plea is free and voluntary and the plea bargain is approved."

Defendant then waived preparation of a probation report and the court imposed the two-year prison term referenced in the agreement.

Following sentencing, defendant filed a third letter with the court on June 15, 2000. In it, defendant professed his innocence, claiming that he did not sexually assault the victim and that his crime should be reduced to a misdemeanor. The letter also asked to withdraw the guilty plea. On June 17, 2000, defendant signed a notice of appeal, which was filed by trial counsel on July 28, 2000, attacking the validity of the plea. A request for a certificate of probable cause was granted on July 28, 2000. Defendant's trial counsel withdrew on July 24, 2000, and special counsel was appointed for the motion to withdraw the plea. The hearing was set for August 14, 2000, but the motion was withdrawn because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the motion.

Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea under section 1192.5. The Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the court had a duty under section 1192.5 but that the duty was fulfilled by the court's inquiry. We granted defendant's petition for review on February 13, 2002, limiting the issue to be argued to "whether the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea, as required by Penal Code section 1192.5."

II. THE SECTION 1192.5 STANDARD

Section 1192.5 provides that for a conditional plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court is required to "cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea." While there is no federal constitutional requirement for this factual basis inquiry, the statutory mandate of section 1192.5 helps ensure that the "constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met."² (People v. Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1182, fn. 11, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 899 P.2d 896.) We have not yet addressed what a trial court must do to comply with section 1192.5.

A. Statutory Language and Legislative History

We begin with the language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent behind the passage of section 1192.5. (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 987 P.2d 705.) Again, the relevant portion of the statute states: "The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea." (§ 1192.5.) The plain language requires that some inquiry be made of defendant, and that the court must satisfy itself (1) that the plea is freely and voluntarily made and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea. No additional language details what will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a factual basis for the plea, though the connection of clauses (1) and (2) implies that inquiring about the factual basis for the plea is closely related to the plea's being freely and voluntarily made.

Because the statutory language does not illuminate what is required to establish a factual basis for the plea, we next look to the legislative...