People v. Home Ins. Co., 27984

• Decision Date: 19 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 27984,27984
• Citation: 197 Colo. 260,591 P.2d 1036
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY and Home Indemnity Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1036

591 P.2d 1036

197 Colo. 260

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY and Home Indemnity Company Defendants-Appellees.

No. 27984.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 19, 1979.

Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief App. Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Holm & Dill, Professional Corp., Jon L. Holm, Denver, for defendants-appellees.

LEE, Justice.

The People appeal from the dismissal of theft and theft-related charges by the trial court at the close of the prosecution's case. The charges arose from the surreptitious procurement by agents of the insurance company defendants of confidential medical information concerning two patients of a Denver hospital. The trial court granted the dismissal because the medical information obtained was not a "thing of value" as defined in the pertinent statute and therefore was not subject to theft. We affirm.

The defendants hired an injury claims investigative service to obtain medical information reports on two claimants. Through the use of the telephone, an investigator for the service obtained a verbatim reading of the medical reports which he later transcribed and sent to the defendants. The actual medical records themselves never left the hospital file room; rather, only the medical information contained in the records was thus acquired.

The theft statute, section 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), reads in pertinent part:

"A person commits theft when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat or deception, and:

"(a) Intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value * * *."

Crucial to our determination of this case is the definition of "thing of value" contained in section 18-1-901(3)(r), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8):

" 'Thing of value' includes real property, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses in action, services, and any rights or use or enjoyment connected therewith."

The People argue that the confidentiality inherent in one's personal medical information is a "thing of value" within the meaning of the theft statute inasmuch as the confidentiality is intangible personal property. We do not agree with this expansive interpretation of the theft statute.

In determining the meaning of criminal statutes, we are guided by the principle that such statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and they cannot be extended either by implication or construction. People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013 (1969); Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967).

As far as we have been able to determine, and no cases have been cited by the People to the contrary, confidentiality has never been considered as intangible personal property. Rather, the term intangible personal property has been held to be property which is merely representative of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes, patents, copyrights, tradebrands and franchises. Black's Law Dictionary, (rev. 4th ed. 1968). We, therefore, would have to expand unduly the traditional concept of intangible property if we were to accept the People's contention.

Furthermore, the General Assembly has specifically addressed the violation of analogous privacy interests in the criminal code. Thus, it has authorized criminal sanctions for the theft of trade secrets, section 18-4-408, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), ¹ unauthorized wiretapping or telephone or telegraph communication, section 18-9-303, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); eavesdropping, section 18-9-304, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); and unauthorized reading, learning or disclosure of telephone, telegraph or mail messages, section 18-9-306, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The foregoing amply demonstrates that the General Assembly has the legislative competence, if inclined to do so, to make illegal the invasion of privacy or confidentiality. The legislature, however, has not chosen to apply criminal sanctions to the invasion of the confidentiality of medical information. We will not now do so by an unwarranted interpretation of the meaning of intangible personal property as it is used in the statutory definition of "thing of value."

In the civil context the legislature has considered the importance of confidentiality of medical...