People v. Hooper

• Decision Date: 30 September 2019
• Docket Number: A153313
• Citation: 40 Cal.App.5th 685,253 Cal.Rptr.3d 369
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff, v. Marcus Darnell HOOPER et al., Defendants and Respondents; State Department of State Hospitals, Objector and Appellant.

40 Cal.App.5th 685

253 Cal.Rptr.3d 369

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff,

v. Marcus Darnell HOOPER et al., Defendants and Respondents;State Department of State Hospitals, Objector and Appellant.

A153313

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed September 30, 2019

Robin Lipetzky, Public Defender, Stephanie Regular, Maya Nordberg, and Ian McGratten, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendants and Respondents.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez and Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorneys General, Susan M. Carson, Hadara R. Stanton, and Gregory D. Brown, Deputy Attorneys General, for Objector and Appellant.

BROWN, J.

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) oversees state hospitals that provide treatment for individuals found incompetent to stand trial (IST). A Standing Order in Contra Costa County mandates that IST defendants in the county be admitted to a state hospital no more than 60 days after the date the defendant is committed, provided DSH receives the defendant's records within five days of commitment. ( In re Loveton (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1036, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.)

In this case, a class of IST defendants sought sanctions against DSH pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, claiming they were not timely admitted to a state hospital.¹ The trial court found that DSH violated the Standing Order as to 11 of the defendants and imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,500 per defendant, for a total of $16,500. DSH appeals, contending that the trial court's sanctions orders were unauthorized under section 177.5. DSH further asserts that the orders constitute an abuse of discretion and a violation of DSH's right to due process. We reverse the sanctions order as to one defendant, but otherwise affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background

A court may not try or sentence a defendant in a criminal proceeding while the defendant is incompetent. ( Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) If a defendant is found IST, the court shall commit the defendant to DSH. (Id. , § 1370, subd. (a)(5).) Prior to the patient's admission, the court must provide DSH with a "1370 packet," which includes copies of the commitment order, criminal history information, psychiatric examination reports, and medical records. (Id. , § 1370, subd. (a)(3).) DSH is required to report the defendant's progress toward recovery to the court within 90 days of commitment. (Id. , § 1370, subd. (b)(1).) Until the court declares the defendant restored to competency, the underlying criminal proceeding is suspended. (Id. , § 1370, subd. (a)(1).)

In 2014, several IST defendants who were subject to prolonged detention while awaiting hospital admission in Contra Costa County filed habeas petitions seeking relief. ( Loveton, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028, 1035, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.) The court balanced petitioners' liberty interests against DSH's interests and ruled that DSH must admit IST defendants "within not more than 60 calendar days of the court's order of commitment provided the defendant's complete information packet has been received by the hospital within five court days of the commitment order." ( Id. at p. 1036, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.) The court reasoned that a 60-day limit satisfies defendants' due process rights while allowing time for DSH to place each defendant and to prepare the 90-day reports. ( Ibid. ) DSH appealed; Division Two of this Court affirmed the 60-day requirement in 2016.² ( Id. at pp. 1045, 1047, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.) Thus, although there is no statutory deadline for admission to DSH, the Loveton order is valid and applies to IST defendants committed to DSH in Contra Costa County. ( Id. at pp. 1033, 1046, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514.)

After the Loveton order became final, a class of 29 Contra Costa County defendants requested sanctions against DSH pursuant to section 177.5 for violating Loveton. The trial court in that case, People v. Czirban (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, 2017, No. 05-151662-4 (Czirban )), interpreted the 60-day period as "commencing from the date DSH received the defendants' information packets and not from the date of commitment." After multiple hearings involving extensive briefing and witness testimony, the court found that DSH violated the Loveton order without good cause or substantial justification in 18 of the 29 cases. In August 2017, the trial court in Czirban issued its final decision imposing sanctions against DSH in the amount of $17,400. DSH did not appeal.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

The present case involves 11 IST defendants: Hooper, Martha, Martinez, Malloy, Riley, Saechao, Schulting, Starr, Wadley, White, and Wise, all of whom had been committed to DSH between March and August 2017. In June 2017, Wadley, Saechao, and Riley filed a Request for Sanctions Pursuant to CCP § 177.5 against DSH, seeking sanctions of $198.08 for each day past the 60-day Loveton requirement in order to cover the daily cost of housing an individual at the detention facility. In November 2017, additional defendants filed a Supplement to Request for Sanctions, which included an exhibit with the dates of 1370 packet receipt, dates of admission, and number of days exceeding Loveton for several of the defendants.

For each defendant, the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Ordered (OSC) to DSH. The court conducted hearings on the OSC on June 26, September 18, October 26, October 30, November 13, and November 17.

On September 18 and October 26, the trial court affirmed that it would follow Czirban and calculate the admission delay based on the date DSH received the 1370 packet. After DSH asserted that the dates proffered by defense counsel were incorrect, the court requested that both parties prepare documents as to the relevant dates. DSH also repeatedly requested an evidentiary hearing to show good cause and substantial justification for its alleged violations. The trial court did not rule definitively on DSH's requests. At the end of October, the court sent a letter to DSH, attaching the exhibit from defendants' Request for Sanctions and asking whether DSH's records matched. DSH responded that defendants' dates were incorrect but did not provide any contrary evidence.

At 4:00 p.m. on the day before the final hearing, DSH submitted a document entitled "Response to Supplemental Request for Sanctions; Request for an Evidentiary Hearing." The court marked this document as "received" but not "filed" due to its untimeliness. On November 17, defendants provided seven exhibits showing the date of packet delivery, date of admittance, and number of days exceeding Loveton for each defendant; DSH presented no evidence. DSH argued that three of defendants' documents were not "competent" or not "properly authenticated." The trial court admitted all the defendants' exhibits, relying on them to find DSH in violation of the Loveton order. The court denied DSH's request for an additional hearing to present its own evidence.

The court issued 11 written sanctions orders in a total amount of $16,500. Each order included the date the court issued the OSC, a statement that the court "incorporated by reference" the Czirban decision, and a statement that the court imposed a fine of "$100 per day for every day past the 60th day admission requirement."

DSH appeals the sanctions orders.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Properly Imposed Sanctions Under Section 177.5.

As a threshold matter, we note that defendants sought sanctions due to DSH's alleged failure to comply with Loveton , which required an IST defendant to be admitted " ‘within not more than 60 calendar days of the court's order of commitment provided the defendant's complete information packet has been received by the hospital within five court days of the commitment order.’ " ( Loveton, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 ) The trial court in Czirban reinterpreted Loveton to require DSH to admit IST defendants within 60 days of its receipt of such defendants' 1370 packet—a modification that the trial court in this case adopted, apparently without challenge from either party.³ Because the sanctions requests were founded upon DSH's failure to comply with Loveton (and not Loveton as refashioned by the trial court in Czirban ), we review the record to determine whether the trial court erred in imposing sanctions based on Loveton.

1. Standard of Review

We review orders imposing sanctions for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ward (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1527, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 ( Ward ).) The trial court must exercise its discretion in a "reasonable manner with one of the statutorily authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing legal standards." ( Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 501, 256 Cal.Rptr. 296.) A mere difference of opinion between the appellate and trial courts is insufficient to warrant reversal. ( Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1482, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 910 ( Becerra ).) Questions of law, on the other hand, are subject to de novo review. ( Id. at p. 1481, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 910.) When a trial court relies on a statute as authority to award sanctions, we review the interpretation of the statute de novo. ( Ibid. )

2. Authority to Sanction a Non-Party

Section 177.5 authorizes the imposition of reasonable monetary sanctions up to $1,500, payable to the court, "for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification." ( Code of Civ. Proc., § 177.5.) The statute further provides: "For the purposes of this section, the term ‘person’ includes a witness, a party, a party's attorney, or both." (Ibid. ) DSH asserts that the trial court had no authority to impose sanctions under section 177.5 because DSH was not a witness, party, or attorney in the criminal case or the competency proceedings.⁴

DSH relies primarily on Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 178 ( Vidrio ) to argue that the court had no...