People v. Horton

• Citation: 221 N.E.2d 909,275 N.Y.S.2d 377,18 N.Y.2d 355
• Parties: , 221 N.E.2d 909 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles HORTON and Louis Alvarez, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 22 November 1966
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 377

275 N.Y.S.2d 377

18 N.Y.2d 355, 221 N.E.2d 909

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles HORTON and Louis Alvarez, Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 22, 1966.

Rolon W. Reed and Anthony F. Marra, New York City, for Charles Horton, appellant.

Patrick M. Wall, Seymour Ostrow, New York City, and Thomas W. Brown, Albany, for Louis Alvarez, appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Harold Roland Shapiro, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

As a result of a notorious juvenile gang conflict in July of 1957, Michael Farmer was stabbed to death on the grounds of Highbridge Park, in the Washington Heights area of northern Manhattan. In 1958 the two appellants were convicted therefor of murder in the second degree. After these convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division (19 A.D.2d 80, 241 N.Y.S.2d 224), the Court of Appeals remitted the case to the trial court for a Huntley inquiry into the voluntariness of defendants' confessions (15 N.Y.2d 722, 256 N.Y.S.2d 933, 205 N.E.2d 199). Horton and Alvarez now appeal both from the affirmance of their original convictions and from the affirmance of the finding of voluntariness in the subsequent Huntley hearing (25 A.D.2d 720, 269 N.Y.S.2d 675). We are presented with no convincing reasons to upset either of these determinations.

Without reiterating all the facts of this well-known crime, we dismiss as groundless Horton's contention that his conviction is not factually supported in the trial record. While there might not have been sufficient evidence to prove premeditation on the part of either defendant, an element which is unnecessary for second degree murder, there certainly was enough evidence for the jury to have found the requisite intent to kill, existence of which can be inferred from the totality of conduct of the accused. (McKenna v. People, 81 N.Y. 360 (1880).) The evidence that appears in the record of the stabbings by the two defendants is amply sufficient for the jury to have concluded that each of them took part in this fatal attack with the design to effect the death of their victim. (People v. Monaco, 14 N.Y.2d 43, 248 N.Y.S.2d 41, 197 N.E.2d 532 (1964).)

In claiming that he has been denied a fair and impartial trial, Alvarez contends that there was a deliberate and systematic exclusion of persons of Puerto Rican origin in the selection of the special jury panel. His claim is founded solely upon the showing that at the time of his trial some 13.4% Of the population of New York County was of Puerto Rican origin, and only one such person was on the panel from which the trial jury was selected. This does not, of itself, indicate a Prima facie denial of equal protection. Since there is no evidence of any deliberate, intentional or systematic exclusion of any particular race, appellant's position is untenable. (People v. Agron, 10 N.Y.2d 130, 140--141, 218 N.Y.S.2d 625, 632--633, 176 N.E.2d 556, 560--562 (1961).) Our ruling in Agron, equally applicable here, was that a mere showing of imbalance on one particular jury panel does not, without more, demonstrate a denial of a particular defendant's right to equal protection. Here there is neither direct evidence of exclusion of a particular racial group nor evidence of a long-continued pattern of exclusion which prompted the United States Supreme Court's determinations in Patton v. State of Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 S.Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed. 76 (1947) and Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935). (See Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961).)

As to the Huntley determination that the defendants' confessions were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, it is now suggested that, after the case has been pending in our courts for over eight years, it be again remitted for a second Huntley inquiry due to some offhand remarks published in a book co-authored by the Trial Judge and due to a technical error regarding the admissibility of evidence which in no way resulted in prejudice to the accused. Such a remission would constitute a needless protraction of a criminal proceeding already unduly delayed and in effect would thwart, rather than aid, the expedient administration of justice.

At the outset it must be noted that the presiding Judge at the Huntley hearing, the same Judge who had conducted the original trial, properly understood the function of such a hearing, a fact indicated by his determination: 'On all the facts presented on the trial, and on the supplementary (Huntley) hearing, the Court finds that the confessions of Horton and Alvarez were freely and voluntarily made. They were not the product of threats, beatings or coercion of any kind, either by the police or by the Assistant District Attorney.'

It is alleged, however, that a reversal is dictated for the reason that the Judge refused to consider evidence that the authorities failed to advise the defendants of their rights to counsel and to remain silent. That this ruling constituted error is unquestionable, since such facts are relevant to the issue of voluntariness. (See Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Davis v. State of North...