People v. Horvat
Decision Date | 23 September 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 25991,25991 |
Citation | 527 P.2d 47,186 Colo. 202 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert J. HORVAT, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. E. Losavio, Jr., Dist. Atty., Tenth Judicial District, Dennis E. Faulk, David E. Wade, Deputy Dist. Attys., Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellant.
William L. Lloyd, Pueblo, for defendant-appellee.
Pursuant to Colo.Sess.Laws 1972, ch. 44, 39--12--102, the district attorney brings this appeal from an order of the district court granting defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss an information which charged that while under the influence of intoxicating liquor he unlawfully and feloniously inflicted bodily injury upon one Sandra L. Dahl by operating and driving a motor vehicle in a reckless, negligent and careless manner. The district court determined that to try defendant under this information would place him in double jeopardy, inasmuch as he had been tried on charges of reckless driving and careless driving arising out of the same transaction, filed under the Municipal Traffic Code of the City of Pueblo. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.
The relevant facts as found by the court are that on November 23, 1971, defendant was involved in an automobile accident in Pueblo. As a consequence, he was charged on November 25, 1971, with reckless and careless driving in violation of sections 5--1 and 5--2 of the traffic code of the city of Pueblo. He was tried in the Pueblo municipal court on October 31, 1972, and was acquitted of reckless driving and convicted of careless driving.
On December 29, 1971, a complaint was filed in the county court, charging defendant with unlawfully and feloniously inflicting bodily injury upon one Sandra Dahl while under the influence of intoxicating liquor by operating and driving a motor vehicle in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, in violation of C.R.S.1963, 40--2--11. Admittedly, this charge was based on the same transaction upon which the ordinance violations were predicated.
A preliminary hearing was held and the court found probable cause to support the complaint. The defendant was bound over to the district court and on February 4, 1972, an information was then filed in the district court.
After trial in the municipal court, defendant moved for a dismissal of the felony information in the district court. This motion was granted and the district attorney has appealed from the order of dismissal.
The trial court entered written findings and conclusions of law. Among the conclusions the court stated:
The court held that the law of double jeopardy as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States precluded a trial of defendant-appellee on the felony information, in view of the earlier trial in the Pueblo municipal court on similar charges arising out of the same transaction.
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, the Supreme Court held the double jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was applicable to the states. It is accordingly clear that double jeopardy protection as defined and declared by the Supreme Court is binding upon the states and supersedes previous pronouncements of state courts if inconsistent therewith.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed. 469, the Court confirmed the doctrine that collateral estoppel is an integral part of the concept of double jeopardy. Simply stated, collateral estoppel bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial. The Court stated:
In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, the Court held that the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy precluded recognition of the doctrine of 'dual sovereignty' with respect to separate state and municipal prosecutions, such as we have in this case. The Court observed that the political subdivisions of states, whether counties or cities, never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities, but rather have been regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the state to assist in carrying out state governmental functions. Cf. County Comm. v. Love, 172 Colo. 122, 470 P.2d 861; Commissioners v. Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d 152; Colorado I. & R. Co. v. Drainage Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266 P. 501. In Waller the Court ruled:
Waller, supra, was held to be fully retroactive in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29.
The Waller pronouncement makes it evident that the accused in the instant case could not be tried in both the state and the municipal courts for charges based on the same acts arising out of...
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