People v. Hoskay, 02CA0394.
| Decision Date | 09 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02CA0394.,02CA0394. |
| Citation | 87 P.3d 194 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanton HOSKAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Anthony J. Navarro, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Keyonyu X O'Connell, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.
Defendant, Stanton Hoskay, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and public indecency. We affirm.
A counselor at a detoxification facility testified that he admitted defendant to the facility and directed him to the men's dormitory. Later that evening, the counselor conducted a bed check and looked into the dormitory room through a window in the hall. The counselor saw defendant, whose pants were pulled down, on top of a man (the victim) who appeared to be asleep. Although the counselor could not see defendant's genitals, it appeared to him that defendant was having anal intercourse with the victim. When the counselor entered the room, defendant was startled. However, the victim remained motionless.
The counselor escorted defendant to the main office and soon returned to the dormitory room. The counselor then woke the victim and asked him whether he knew what had just occurred. The victim said that he did not.
The victim testified that he was dreaming about analingus being performed on him when he awoke to the sound of the counselor yelling at a man to get back in his own bed. The victim fell back to sleep until the counselor woke him a second time and told him what had happened. The victim testified that he experienced soreness in his anus for a couple of days after the incident.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause to one of the prospective jurors. We are not persuaded.
A trial court's ruling denying a challenge for cause may only be reversed on appeal if the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Vecchiarelli-McLaughlin, 984 P.2d 72, 75-76 (Colo.1999).
Here, the challenged prospective juror initially stated that she had a religious objection to homosexuality and admitted that if she were in defendant's position, she would be concerned about having a person such as herself on the jury. The prospective juror also stated that she hoped she would not be selected because of the nature of the case. The prospective juror conceded that she did not know how her feelings about homosexuality would affect her judgment.
However, the prospective juror also stated that she thought she could judge the case based on the evidence and afford defendant the presumption of innocence irrespective of his sexual orientation. In addition, the prospective juror told the court that she would "hear the evidence and decide whether or not he had committed an illegal act rather than judge him upon his ... tendencies." The prospective juror made clear that she would "judge solely upon the evidence that's presented whether he committed the act or whether he has not committed the act" and "would never send someone [to prison] for something [she] did not feel ... they committed just based upon some feelings that [she had] about certain subjects."
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the prospective juror's assurances that she could be impartial and render a fair verdict. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the counselor to testify that the sexual encounter appeared to be nonconsensual. We disagree.
CRE 701 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness [and] (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue....
A lay witness may state an opinion about another person's motivation or intent if the witness had sufficient opportunity to observe the person and to draw a rational conclusion about the person's state of mind. Summary characterizations and impressions as to what transpired can be of significant assistance to a fact finder. People v. Jones, 907 P.2d 667, 669 (Colo.App.1995).
A reviewing court must not disturb a trial court's admission of evidence pursuant to CRE 701 absent an abuse of discretion. Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 384 (Colo. 1996).
Here, the trial court found that the counselor's opinion concerning whether the sexual encounter was consensual was controlled by CRE 701 and that his testimony was based on his own observations. Accordingly, the court overruled defendant's objection and permitted the counselor to testify to his opinion of the victim's unconscious state and what appeared to him to be a sexual assault.
We conclude the record supports the trial court's findings. See People v. Jones, supra
(). Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling.
To the extent defendant is also asserting that the counselor's testimony was improper because it included an opinion as to an ultimate issue, we reject this claim. See CRE 704 (); People v. Brewer, 720 P.2d 583, 587-88 (Colo. App.1985).
Nor do we agree with defendant's contention that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that in order to commit the offense of public indecency, a person must know that he is in a public place.
As relevant here, the offense of public indecency is defined as follows:
Section 18-7-301(1), C.R.S.2002.
"`Public place' means a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities." Section 18-1-901(3)(n), C.R.S.2002.
Defendant tendered an instruction that tracked the language of § 18-7-301(1), but also stated that he could not be found guilty unless the jury determined that he knew he was in a public place or a place where his conduct may reasonably have been expected to be viewed by members of the public. The trial court refused the instruction, instead submitting instructions limited to the language of § 18-7-301(1) and § 18-1-901(3)(n). In addition, the court instructed the jury that the offense of public indecency is a strict liability crime.
In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, which is vested with the power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability. Generally, to subject a person to criminal liability, there must be concurrence of the actus reus, an unlawful act, and the mens rea, a culpable mental state. Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo.2000).
Legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal statute is not to be construed as an indication that no culpable mental state is required. A requisite mental state may be inferred from the statute. Gorman v. People, supra, 19 P.3d at 665.
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.
Section 18-1-503(2), C.R.S.2002.
However, not all offenses have a culpable mental state:
The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability."
Examples of strict liability offenses are speeding and driving under the influence, People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034 (Colo.2000), and vehicular homicide or assault while intoxicated. People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989); People v. Lucero, 985 P.2d 87 (Colo. App.1999).
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...the potential juror never expressed reluctance or inability to follow the law or apply it as instructed. Id. at 91. Similarly, in People v. Hoskay, the district court denied a challenge for cause to a potential juror who had religious objections to homosexuality where the juror made clear s......
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ARTICLE 3
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