People v. Howell
Decision Date | 12 August 1993 |
Citation | 158 Misc.2d 653,601 N.Y.S.2d 778 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Howard HOWELL, Defendant. |
Court | New York City Court |
Robert Baum, Legal Aid Soc., New York City by Karen Smolar, Brooklyn, for defendant.
Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty. by Robert Gershon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the People.
Defendant is charged in a simplified traffic information with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(1)(a), a traffic infraction.
Defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that the supporting deposition does not sufficiently corroborate the simplified traffic information. 1
... when such person operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state or privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner.
In the case at hand, the simplified traffic information charging the defendant with driving with a suspended license consisted of a universal summons. The universal summons has been designated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in accordance with C.P.L. § 100.10(2)(a) as the appropriate accusatory instrument to be used for charges constituting traffic infractions.
In addition to the universal summons, the People filed a form supporting deposition which consists of an introductory portion for the date, time and place of the arrest and three paragraphs entitled: Observation, Suspension and Knowledge. Under the "Observation" section, the complainant police officer filled in the year, make and license plate number of the defendant's car in conjunction with the pre-written statement that the defendant was observed operating a motor vehicle on a public highway.
Under the "Suspension" section, the complainant police officer checked off the box indicating that the defendant's license has been suspended, as opposed to revoked, based on a computer check of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. The pre-written portion of this section also states that a copy of the teletype printout is enclosed with the deposition. The People failed, however, to attach a copy of the teletype printout.
Under the "Knowledge" section, the pre-written portion states that the defendant was unable to produce a valid license and that the Department of Motor Vehicles routinely sends notification of suspensions or revocations to a motorist at the most current address supplied. In addition, the complainant police officer checked off the box which states that
Defendant argues that in the absence of the teletype printout of the defendant's suspensions, the supporting deposition fails to properly corroborate the simplified traffic information, in that it fails to provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged.
For a misdemeanor information to be facially sufficient, it must conform to the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 100.15 and 100.40. The factual portion must allege facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges. C.P.L. § 100.15(3). Further, the allegations of the factual part must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged. C.P.L. § 100.40(1)(b). Lastly, non-hearsay allegations must establish, if true, every element of each offense charged as well as defendant's commission thereof. C.P.L. § 100.40(1)(c).
The requirements for commencing a prosecution of a traffic infraction by filing a simplified traffic information are less than those associated with a misdemeanor information. To begin with, by definition, a simplified traffic information is not required to contain factual allegations. C.P.L. § 100.10(2)(a). Furthermore, even if a supporting deposition is requested by the defendant, the factual allegations therein need only provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. Most significant, however, is the fact...
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