People v. Quarles

• Decision Date: 08 February 1996
• Citation: 168 Misc.2d 638,639 N.Y.S.2d 661
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Chauncey L. QUARLES, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 661

639 N.Y.S.2d 661

168 Misc.2d 638

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Chauncey L. QUARLES, Defendant.

City Court of Rochester.

Feb. 8, 1996.

[168 Misc.2d 639] Howard R. Relin, District Attorney of Monroe County, Rochester (Thomas M. Prato, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Thomas A. Corletta, Rochester, for defendant.

MARJORIE L. BYRNES, Judge.

On October 22, 1995, the above named defendant was charged by simplified informations with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree, Unlicensed Operator, Passing a Red Light, Speed Not Reasonable and Prudent and Failure to Reduce Speed, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law sections 511(1)(a), 509(1), 1111(d)(1), 1180(a) and 1180(e). The defendant was arraigned on October 23, 1995. Accompanying the simplified informations and filed with the Court was a supporting deposition signed by Rochester Police Officer S.D. Hamill and a teletype printout of the defendant's driving record and license status from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter, "DMV"). On November 9, 1995, the defendant requested an additional supporting deposition for all traffic infractions, which was ordered by the court clerk on November 13, 1995. The case was adjourned until December 12, 1995, and on that date the Court handed to the defendant a copy of the supporting deposition requested. The case was then adjourned for motions. On January 16, 1996, the People filed long form informations regarding the traffic infractions in an effort to supersede the simplified informations.

The defendant moves for dismissal of all of the accusatory instruments on the ground of facial insufficiency.

Specifically, the defendant moves for dismissal of the Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree charge on the grounds that the simplified information and supporting deposition accompanying it are insufficient to support the charge. The defendant contends that the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be determined by the standards announced in People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71. The defendant asserts that the standard of review found in CPL 100.40(2) is inapposite on the ground that CPL 100.40(2) is unconstitutional as applied to Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanors. Relying on Alejandro, the defendant argues that there are no non-hearsay factual allegations contained in the supporting deposition which establish that the defendant knew or had reason to know that his license was suspended, nor are there any non-hearsay allegations that his license was, in fact, suspended.

The defendant also moves for dismissal of the remaining Vehicle and Traffic Law infractions asserting that there are insufficient factual allegations to support those charges (CPL 100.40[2]. The defendant contends that the second deposition cannot be considered by the Court in determining facial sufficiency since it was not timely served (CPL 100.25[2]. The defendant further contends that the superseding long form information is not properly before the Court and cannot be considered either.

The People urge that the accusatory instruments are sufficient and oppose the defendant's motion.

AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CHARGE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Criminal Procedure Law specifies that a criminal action charging a Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanor can be commenced in a local criminal court by filing a simplified information (CPL 100.05[2]; 100.10[2]. This procedure is an alternative to charging a defendant by information (CPL 100.10[2][a]. Where a simplified information charging a Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanor is filed, the standard of review for facial sufficiency is set forth in CPL 100.40(2).

According to CPL 100.40(2),

"A simplified information is sufficient on its face when, as provided by subdivision one of section 100.25, it substantially conforms to the requirement therefor prescribed by or pursuant to law; provided that when the filing of a supporting deposition is ordered by the court pursuant to subdivision two of said section 100.25, a According to CPL 100.25, a supporting deposition must contain "allegations of fact, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged" (CPL 100.25[2] (emphasis added).

failure of the complainant police officer ... to comply with such order within the time prescribed ... renders the simplified information insufficient on its face."

In this case, the defendant was charged by simplified information with the Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanor of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree as permitted by CPL 100.10(2). Therefore, the standard of review for facial sufficiency is whether the simplified information and supplementing supporting deposition provide "reasonable cause" to believe the defendant committed the offense (People v. Gindi, 166 Misc.2d 672, 630 N.Y.S.2d 863; People v. Alicea, NYLJ, May 17, 1994, at 23, col 1; People v. Dabo, NYLJ, Dec. 20, 1993, at 30, col 1; People v. Vierno, 159 Misc.2d 770, 606 N.Y.S.2d 557 [At the time of this decision, Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree was an infraction, but the court noted that the principles and law would still apply when the charge was re-designated.]; People v. Howell, 158 Misc.2d 653, 601 N.Y.S.2d 778; CPL 100.25[2]; CPL 100.40[2] ).

The defendant argues that CPL 100.40(2) is unconstitutional when applied to defendants charged with traffic misdemeanors by simplified informations supplemented by supporting depositions. The defendant contends that an individual so charged should be entitled to the same procedural protection as a defendant charged with a crime under the Penal Law. The defendant contends that the lesser pleading standard for Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanors commenced by simplified informations is arbitrary and cites People v. Smith in support of his position (163 Misc.2d 353, 621 N.Y.S.2d 449).

In Smith, the defendant was charged with Driving While Intoxicated by a simplified information. Perinton Town Justice Gary W. Rood, noting that a defendant charged with a traffic related misdemeanor by a simplified information supplemented by a supporting deposition is afforded less procedural protection than a defendant charged with the same traffic misdemeanor by information, held that:

"[w]here a defendant is charged by a simplified information with one or more misdemeanor offenses and the defendant timely requests a supporting deposition, or one is voluntarily provided by the People before the defendant's time to request one has expired, the factual allegations of the supporting deposition or depositions must provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged and must contain non-hearsay allegations of fact which establish, if true, a prima facie case against the defendant."

(Id., at 363, 621 N.Y.S.2d 449). Justice Rood cited the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions in support of this result (Id.). ¹

This Court disagrees with the decision in Smith.

It is clear that the Criminal Procedure Law allows for a Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanor to be prosecuted by either an information or a simplified information (CPL 100.05). It is also clear that the standard of review is different depending upon how the misdemeanor is prosecuted (CPL 100.40[1]; [2].

Notwithstanding the alternative and differing pleading standards, the statute challenged here must be presumed to be constitutional (e.g., People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604, 607, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14, 563 N.E.2d 705; People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 585, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 350 N.E.2d 377). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, the unconstitutionality of the challenged statue (e.g., People v There is a rational basis for the statute establishing the "reasonable cause" standard of review when evaluating the facial sufficiency of simplified informations charging Vehicle and Traffic Law misdemeanors. As noted by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses for which it is principally used" (People v. Nuccio, 78 N.Y.2d 102, 104, 571 N.Y.S.2d 693, 575 N.E.2d 111). The Courts have also sanctioned the use of this procedure with traffic misdemeanors (see, People v. Nuccio, supra; People v. Hohmeyer, 70 N.Y.2d 41, 517 N.Y.S.2d 448, 510 N.E.2d 317; People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16, 379 N.E.2d 1147) and the same rationale applies. In 1995, three thousand two hundred and seventeen individuals were charged with traffic misdemeanors in Rochester City Court alone. ² The high volume of traffic misdemeanors supplies a rational basis justifying application of the standard of review authorized by the legislature. ³

                Scalza, supra, at 607, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14, 563 N.E.2d 705;  Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 209 N.E.2d 539).   Where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, the constitutionality of a statute will be upheld as long as there is a rational basis for the statute (e.g., Matter of Allen v. Howe, 84 N.Y.2d 665, 672, 621 N.Y.S.2d 287, 645 N.E.2d 720;  People v. Drayton, supra, at 585-586, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 350 N.E.2d 377)
                

Therefore, the statute here challenged is not violative of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or New York State Constitution.

If a police officer elects to file an information, that pleading is subjected to a higher standard of review (CPL 100.40[1]. However, an officer is not required to so elect. The officer may choose to file a simplified information and supporting deposition, in which case the pleading must only satisfy the requirements of CPL 100.40(2).

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