People v. Huddleston

• Decision Date: 27 April 2018
• Docket Number: 176,KA 15–00972
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tiyhise HUDDLESTON, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

160 A.D.3d 1359
76 N.Y.S.3d 294

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Tiyhise HUDDLESTON, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.

176
KA 15–00972

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: April 27, 2018

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (SARA A. GOLDFARB OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.

TIYHISE HUDDLESTON, JR., DEFENDANT–APPELLANT PRO SE.

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (NICOLE K. INTSCHERT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Memorandum:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree ( Penal Law § 220.09[1] ), defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained by the police following the stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. We reject that contention.

76 N.Y.S.3d 296

As defendant correctly concedes, the police properly stopped the vehicle for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(1)(b)(i) and, regardless of whether the stop was pretextual, it was lawful inasmuch as the police had probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle had committed a traffic violation (see People v. Pealer, 89 A.D.3d 1504, 1506, 933 N.Y.S.2d 473 [4th Dept. 2011], affd 20 N.Y.3d 447, 962 N.Y.S.2d 592, 985 N.E.2d 903 [2013], cert denied 571 U.S. 846, 134 S.Ct. 105, 187 L.Ed.2d 77 [2013], rearg. denied 24 N.Y.3d 993, 997 N.Y.S.2d 105, 21 N.E.3d 556 [2014] ).

Following the lawful stop of the vehicle, the police determined that neither the driver nor defendant had a valid driver's license. "At that point, the [police] had a reasonable suspicion either that the vehicle had been operated by an unlicensed driver, or that the vehicle was soon going to be operated by an unlicensed driver, and thus its ... towing was lawful" ( People v. Witt, 129 A.D.3d 1449, 1450, 11 N.Y.S.3d 767 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 937, 17 N.Y.S.3d 100, 38 N.E.3d 846 [2015] ; see People v. Wilburn, 50 A.D.3d 1617, 1618, 856 N.Y.S.2d 767 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 742, 864 N.Y.S.2d 401, 894 N.E.2d 665 [2008] ; People v. Cochran, 22 A.D.3d 677, 677, 804 N.Y.S.2d 346 [2d Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 753, 810 N.Y.S.2d 421, 843 N.E.2d 1161 [2005] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, given the terms of the police department's written policy that was received in evidence at the suppression hearing and the testimony of one of the police officers that the decision to tow the vehicle was made in accordance with that policy, which we note was in conformance with applicable law (see generally Witt, 129 A.D.3d at 1450, 11 N.Y.S.3d 767 ; Wilburn, 50 A.D.3d at 1618, 856 N.Y.S.2d 767 ), we conclude that the officers' decision to tow the vehicle was lawful (see People v. Tardi, 28 N.Y.3d 1077, 1078–1079, 44 N.Y.S.3d 366, 66 N.E.3d 1084 [2016] ; People v. Gabriel, 155 A.D.3d 1438, 1440–1441, 66 N.Y.S.3d 359 [3d Dept. 2017] ). Moreover, "[t]he record does not support defendant's contention that the [corresponding] inventory search was a mere pretext to uncover incriminating evidence; rather, the testimony established that the [officers'] ‘intention for the search was to inventory the items in the vehicle’ " ( People v. Morman, 145 A.D.3d 1435, 1436, 43 N.Y.S.3d 619 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 999, 57 N.Y.S.3d 721, 80 N.E.3d 414 [2017], quoting People v. Padilla, 21 N.Y.3d 268, 273, 970 N.Y.S.2d 486, 992 N.E.2d 414 [2013], cert denied 571 U.S. 889, 134 S.Ct. 325, 187 L.Ed.2d 158 [2013] ).

Defendant further contends in his pro se supplemental brief that suppression is warranted because an officer's trial testimony established for the first time that defendant was subjected to an illegal pat frisk, which unreasonably prolonged his detention and revealed no evidence of criminality. That contention is not properly before us. " ‘Where, as here, the defendant fails to move to reopen a suppression hearing, he or she may not rely upon the trial testimony to challenge the suppression ruling’ " ( People v. Mosca, 294 A.D.2d 938, 939, 741 N.Y.S.2d 780 [4th Dept. 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 538, 752 N.Y.S.2d 599, 782 N.E.2d 577 [2002] ; see People v. Gonzalez, 55 N.Y.2d 720, 721–722, 447 N.Y.S.2d 145, 431 N.E.2d 630 [1981], rearg. denied 55 N.Y.2d 1038, 449 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 434 N.E.2d 1081 [1982], cert denied 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1306 [1982] ). Defendant's contention that the police otherwise unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop is not preserved for our review because he did not raise his contention before the suppression court (see CPL 470.05[2] ). In

76 N.Y.S.3d 297

any event, we conclude that defendant's contention lacks merit inasmuch as there is no evidence that the police " ‘inordinately prolong[ed] the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances’ " ( People v. Hale, 130 A.D.3d 1540, 1541, 14 N.Y.S.3d 603 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1088, 23 N.Y.S.3d 645, 44 N.E.3d 943 [2015], reconsideration denied 27 N.Y.3d 998, 38 N.Y.S.3d 108, 59 N.E.3d 1220 [2016] ; see People v. Rainey, 49 A.D.3d 1337, 1339, 853 N.Y.S.2d 807 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 963, 863 N.Y.S.2d 147, 893 N.E.2d 453 [2008] ; cf. People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562–563, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986, 650 N.E.2d 833 [1995], cert denied 516 U.S. 868, 116 S.Ct. 187, 133 L.Ed.2d 124 [1995] ; People v. Porter, 136 A.D.3d 1344, 1345, 24 N.Y.S.3d 470 [4th Dept. 2016] ).

We reject defendant's contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that he...