People v. Hale, 716 KA 14-00566

• Decision Date: 10 July 2015
• Docket Number: 716 KA 14-00566
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 06063,130 A.D.3d 1540,14 N.Y.S.3d 603
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrell HALE, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

130 A.D.3d 1540

14 N.Y.S.3d 603

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 06063

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Terrell HALE, Defendant–Appellant.

716 KA 14-00566

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

July 10, 2015.

The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Kristin M. Preve of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Jeremy V. Murray of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND DeJOSEPH, JJ.

OpinionMEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence on the basis that it was the fruit of an unnecessarily prolonged traffic stop. We reject that contention. The evidence at the suppression hearing established that the police lawfully stopped the rental vehicle being driven by defendant because it did not have a license plate lamp, and the license plate was rendered unreadable by a covering of dirt (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 375[2][a][4] ; 402[1]; People v. Brooks, 23 A.D.3d 847, 848, 804 N.Y.S.2d 140, lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 810, 812 N.Y.S.2d 449, 845 N.E.2d 1280 ; People v. Potter, 266 A.D.2d 920, 920–921, 697 N.Y.S.2d 798, lv. denied94 N.Y.2d 865, 704 N.Y.S.2d 541, 725 N.E.2d 1103 ). During their initial visit to the vehicle, the police asked to see defendant's license and registration, as well as the rental agreement for the vehicle. Upon examination of those documents away from the vehicle, they concluded that defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle, but that he was not listed on the vehicle rental agreement as an authorized driver of the vehicle. That conclusion provided the police with at least “a founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot” (People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 ), i.e., that defendant was committing the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see Penal Law § 165.05[1] ; People v. Bryant, 77 A.D.3d 485, 485, 909 N.Y.S.2d 57, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 829, 921 N.Y.S.2d 193, 946 N.E.2d 181 ). The police were therefore justified in returning to the vehicle a second time to inquire into the identity of the person named on the rental agreement and whether defendant had permission to use the vehicle (see generally People v. Jones, 66 A.D.3d 1476, 1477, 885 N.Y.S.2d 840, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 908, 895 N.Y.S.2d 322, 922 N.E.2d 911 ; People v. Kelly, 37 A.D.3d 866, 867, 829 N.Y.S.2d 259, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 986, 838 N.Y.S.2d 490, 869 N.E.2d 666 ). During their second visit to defendant's vehicle, one of the police officers saw a gun on the floor of the vehicle, which provided the police with probable cause to arrest defendant (see People v. Johnson, 114 A.D.3d 1132, 1132, 979 N.Y.S.2d 735, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 961, 996 N.Y.S.2d 221, 20 N.E.3d 1001 ).

We therefore conclude that the police “did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances” (People v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d 741, 742, 898 N.Y.S.2d 538, 925 N.E.2d 576, rearg. denied 14 N.Y.3d 794, 899 N.Y.S.2d 125, 925 N.E.2d 928 ).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, the testimony from police officers at the suppression hearing was not “ ‘unbelievable as a matter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory’ ” (People v. Bush, 107 A.D.3d 1581, 1582, 966 N.Y.S.2d 720, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 954, 977 N.Y.S.2d 186, 999 N.E.2d 551 ). “ ‘The suppression court's credibility...