People v. Ingram, 99SA118.

Citation984 P.2d 597
Decision Date28 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99SA118.,99SA118.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason Christopher INGRAM, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

F. Michael Goodbee, District Attorney, Fifth Judicial District, Mark Hurlbert, Deputy District Attorney, Georgetown, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Meinert & Hodges, LLC, Timothy A. Meinert, Anne Hodges-Parmley, Dillon, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant Appellee.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The prosecution brought this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 to challenge an order entered by the Clear Creek County District Court suppressing all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the defendant's arrest. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the defendant's arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court further held that the defendant's statement that he owned a gun was inadmissible, as it was not only a fruit of the illegal arrest, but also was taken in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. We reverse the order of suppression with respect to the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims and remand the case to the trial court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, as the record before us is insufficient to permit appellate review. However, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order in which it suppressed the defendant's admission of gun ownership.

I.

The defendant, Jason Ingram (Ingram), was charged in Clear Creek District Court with two counts of felony menacing,1 tampering with physical evidence,2 reckless endangerment,3 and driving while ability impaired.4 Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence and statements gathered by police in the case.

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing at which the following facts were established. Mike Lilley, a deputy sheriff for the Clear Creek County Sheriff's Office, received a call at 12:45 a.m. on October 25, 1998, regarding a disturbance at a house on Colorado Highway 103. The dispatch also indicated that gunshots had been fired. Deputy Lilley drove toward the location and requested backup.

At approximately 1:00 a.m., as Deputy Lilley was driving along Highway 103 toward the site of the alleged shooting, he noticed Ingram's vehicle coming toward him at a high rate of speed with the "body rolling as it went through the curves." Highway 103 is a winding, mountain road which was icy in places on the date in question. As Ingram passed him, Deputy Lilley noticed that he hit the brakes hard, causing the car body to roll forward. Deputy Lilley turned his patrol car around, turned on his overhead lights, and stopped Ingram's vehicle. Ingram was the driver of the vehicle. His wife, Ulla Ingram, was seated in the passenger seat. Deputy Lilley advised Ingram that he was driving at an unsafe speed for the conditions, and asked Ingram to produce his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. During the course of the conversation, Deputy Lilley noted that Ingram smelled of alcohol; however, Ingram claimed that he had not been drinking. When Deputy Lilley asked Ingram if he was coming from a party on Highway 103, Ingram answered "yes." Deputy Lilley then told Ingram that he was investigating a disturbance at a party on Highway 103, but that if Ingram's information was valid, Ingram and his wife "would be on their way."

The check on Ingram's driver's license revealed that it was under denial. Upon learning this information, Deputy Lilley asked Ingram to step out of the car, at which time he observed that Ingram was unsteady on his feet. Deputy Lilley performed a "cursory examination" of Ingram's ability to drive. The results of these tests led Deputy Lilley to believe that Ingram was too intoxicated to drive. Deputy Lilley then asked Ingram again where he had been earlier in the evening, at which point Ingram stated that he had "nothing more to say."

During the course of the stop, Deputy Lilley was listening to his police radio. He overheard conversations among fellow officers to the effect that, although officers had arrived at the scene of the alleged disturbance, no one had answered the door. Deputy Lilley learned that the officers on the scene had requested backup and that the investigation was continuing. Ingram was also in a position to hear the police radio. When Ingram heard that the investigation was in progress, he "rolled his eyes back and said, `oh shit.'" Deputy Lilley then placed both Ingram and his wife in handcuffs, which he believed to be necessary for his own safety. Officer Lilley explained to Ingram that he was not under arrest but was being detained for investigation of his involvement in or knowledge of the shooting. Deputy Lilley informed Ingram and his wife that they could face criminal charges for withholding information in a criminal investigation, to which Ingram replied, "I would like to tell you something, officer, but I don't know anything more." At some point after placing Ingram in handcuffs, Deputy Lilley learned that Ingram's driver's license was, in fact, not under denial.

Thereafter, a trooper with the Colorado State Patrol, Mark Savage, arrived at the scene of the stop. Trooper Savage estimated that he arrived at the scene at approximately 1:17 a.m. Notably, daylight savings time ended and standard time began at 2:00 a.m. on October 25. As a result, clocks were turned back one hour. Therefore, although Trooper Savage arrived at 1:17 a.m. on October 25, Ingram had already been detained by Deputy Lilley for approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Trooper Savage advised Ingram that he was investigating the shooting on Highway 103. He also advised Ingram that he was suspected of driving while intoxicated. While Ingram's hands were still cuffed, Deputy Lilley and Trooper Savage placed paper bags over them in order to preserve any evidence of gunshot residue which might have been present on his hands. Trooper Savage then advised Ingram of his Miranda5 rights, and Ingram declined to waive those rights. Trooper Savage asked Ingram if he would participate in voluntary roadside tests in order to determine whether he was intoxicated. Ingram agreed to the roadside tests, which he performed while his hands were still cuffed. Trooper Savage believed that Ingram's performance on the roadside tests was unsatisfactory. After Trooper Savage administered the roadside tests, he placed Ingram in the back of his patrol car.

Ingram was not arrested for investigation of driving while under the influence. Instead, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Deputy Lilley received information from an officer at the scene of the shooting that one of the witnesses had identified Ingram by name as the shooter. At that time, Ingram was placed under arrest for felony menacing. The record reflects that approximately two hours had passed from the time Officer Lilley initially stopped Ingram to the time of his arrest.

After Ingram was placed under arrest, Trooper Savage brought him to the scene of the disturbance and shooting that had occurred earlier in the evening. At the scene, witnesses identified Ingram as the person who had been involved in the earlier incident. Following the identification, Trooper Savage transported Ingram to the Sheriff's Department. Ingram's hands were tested for gunshot residue upon his arrival at the Sheriff's Department.

Another investigator for the Sheriff's Department, Detective Birch, arrived at the Sheriff's Department in order to assist in the investigation. As the officers at the scene of the traffic stop found no gun in Ingram's car or on his person, Detective Birch called Ingram's mother and asked her whether Ingram owned a handgun. Ingram's mother told Detective Birch that her son did own a handgun, but that she could not identify what type of gun it was.

Although Detective Birch was aware that Ingram had refused to waive his Miranda rights, he initiated an interview with Ingram at approximately 4:10 a.m. Detective Birch asked Ingram to tell him what type of gun he owned and where the gun was located. Detective Birch informed Ingram that the information he was requesting could not be used against him later in court. Detective Birch told Ingram that he needed to know this information because he was concerned that the handgun would fall into the wrong hands. Ingram then told Detective Birch that the gun was a black, Springfield, nine-millimeter, semi-automatic handgun; however, he claimed that he did not know where it was located.

Detective Birch then proceeded to interview Ingram's wife, who was also in custody at the Sheriff's Department. Like her husband, Ulla Ingram had previously invoked her Miranda rights. Again, Detective Birch claimed that he was only seeking information in order to recover the gun and that such information would not be used against her in court. Detective Birch explained that he was concerned that someone could injure themselves with the gun if it was not recovered by the police. Ulla Ingram told Detective Birch that Ingram had instructed her to throw the gun out of the car window when he first saw Deputy Lilley's police car. This information enabled the police to locate the gun, which was recovered a few feet off the highway in the area where Ingram's vehicle and Deputy Lilley's vehicle had first passed one another.

II.

Ingram moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his arrest on the grounds that they were the fruits of an illegal arrest. Specifically, Ingram argued that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, Ingram asserted that his statements to police were taken in violation of Miranda, as Detective Birch interrogated him after he had invoked his right to remain silent. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the prosecution argued that Ingram's arrest was...

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