People v. J.L. (In re J.L.)
Decision Date | 04 December 2015 |
Docket Number | No. B261634,B261634 |
Citation | 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 482,242 Cal.App.4th 1108 |
Parties | IN RE J.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.L., Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A minor student, appellant J.L., stole another student's cell phone out of a school locker. The juvenile court found J.L. committed burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459.1 After the passage of Proposition 47 in November 2014, J.L. petitioned to change his juvenile felony burglary offense to a misdemeanor shoplifting offense under newly-enacted section 459.5. We consider whether J.L.'s theft of the phone from the school locker was a theft from a "commercial establishment" such that it is eligible for reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5.
On May 15, 2014, a teacher at Canyon High School in Santa Clarita found J.L. and another student hiding in the bathroom after class. The teacher told them to go to their next class, but J.L. and the other student went into the locker room. The teacher saw them do so and notified a supervisor. The teacher and supervisor entered the locker room and found J.L. and the other student in possession of paper clips that had been formed into a shape to open or pick locks. J.L. and the other student were taken to the school office, and another student at the school subsequently reported that his phone was missing from his locker.
When interviewed by a School Resource Sheriff's Deputy, J.L. admitted that he and his companion intended to steal from the locker room. J.L. told the deputy that after the teacher told him and his companion to return to class, they entered the locker room and stole the phone, which they placed in an empty locker. J.L. showed the deputy where the phone was located. J.L. and his companion were placed under arrest.
The district attorney's office filed a Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 petition charging J.L. with one count of burglary, a felony (§ 459 ), one count of possession of burglar's tools, a misdemeanor (§ 466), and one count of receiving stolen property of a value not exceeding $950, a misdemeanor (§ 496, subd. (a)).
J.L. admitted the count 1 burglary allegation in the petition, and the juvenile court dismissed counts 2 and 3. The court declared J.L.'s burglary offense to be a felony and placed him on probation pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 790, subdivisions (a) and (b).
California voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act, on November 4, 2014. Proposition 47 was intended to "ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K–12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment." (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.)
The Act reclassified certain drug and theft offenses, which had previously been felonies or "wobblers,"3 as misdemeanors.
(People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 889–890, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 698.)
Proposition 47 created a new crime of "shoplifting," a misdemeanor offense that punishes certain conduct that previously would have qualified as a burglary. Now codified at section 459.5, the statute added by the initiative provides: (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 5, p. 71.) The ballot pamphlet for Proposition 47 explained that (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47, p. 35.)
Proposition 47 also included a provision that allows certain offenders to seek resentencing. Defendants who are serving a sentence for a felony that would have been a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of the offense may file a petition for recall of sentence. (§ 1170.18.)
On January 8, 2015, J.L. filed a petition for recall of sentence seeking to reclassify his felony burglary offense to misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5. He argued that a school was "open during normal business hours as is any commercial establishment" and he asserted there did not appear to be any other language or restriction in section 459.5 that would bar finding his offense eligible for resentencing.
The court denied J.L.'s motion, finding that the facts of his case did not qualify as an offense under section 459.5, which applies only to thefts from a "commercial establishment." The court reasoned that section 460 defined degrees of burglary, and The juvenile court therefore denied J.L.'s petition to recall his sentence.
J.L. argues his felony adjudication for burglary based on his theft of the cell phone from a school locker may be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5.4 He correctly observes that section 459.5 does not define the term "commercial establishment," and he urges us to hold that a public high school is such an establishment because, as he puts it, a school "share[s] similar traits with a commercial establishment, such as maintaining regular hours of operation, being closed regular days and hours, engaging with members of the public, and conducting normal functions associated with most businesses (e.g. maintaining personnel, handling payroll, accounting, accepting phone calls, dealing with inventory, etc.)." Respondent counters that the generally accepted meaning of the term "commercial establishment" does not include a school, at least under the circumstances presented by J.L.'s offense conduct. Respondent gets the better of the argument.
" " (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 459, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 99 P.3d 1007 ; Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) "
[Citation.] In other words, ‘our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative measure.’ " (People v. Briceno, supra, at p. 459, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 99 P.3d 1007.) Our review is de novo. (California Chamber of Commerce v. Brown (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 233, 244, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 214.)
Burglary of a school is second degree burglary. (§ 460, subds. (a)-(b).) Section 459.5, however, carves out an exception to second degree burglary and states that shoplifting, as defined in the statute, can be charged only as a misdemeanor offense (unless specified exceptions apply). (§ 459.5, subds. (a)-(b).) The crime of shoplifting has three elements: (1) entry into a commercial establishment, (2) while the establishment is open during regular business hours, and (3) with intent to commit larceny of property valued at $950 or less. (§ 459.5, subd. (a).)
J.L.'s argument fails on the first of these elements. Whatever broader meaning "commercial establishment" as used in section 459.5 might bear on different facts, J.L.'s theft of a cell phone from a school locker room was not a theft from a commercial establishment. Giving the term its commonsense meaning, a commercial establishment is one that is primarily engaged in commerce, that is, the buying and selling of goods or services. That commonsense understanding accords with...
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