People v. J.T., 5591/2016.

Decision Date24 August 2017
Docket Number5591/2016.
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. J.T., Defendant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Brian Buckmire, Esq., for the Defendant.

Josh Scheier, Esq., for the Defendant.

Eva Oginar, Esq., for the People.

Maria Park, Esq., for the People.

JOANNE D. QUIÑONES, J.

Defendant is charged, by way of indictment, with the crimes of Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law (PL) section 120.05 (3), Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of PL section 120.00(1), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon, in violation of PL section 265.01(2).

On August 2, 2017, this court conducted a combined Huntley/Dunaway/Wade hearing with respect to Defendant's motion to suppress an oral statement and two show up identifications that the People had given notice of pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) section 710.30(1). The sole witness at the hearing was Police Officer Soney Varghese, who testified on behalf of the People. At the end of the testimony, the court heard oral arguments from both sides. The court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

Police Officer Varghese has been with the New York City Police Department for 3 years, and is assigned to the 81st Precinct. He testified credibly that on June 26, 2016, he was working, in uniform, with a partner in a marked patrol car, when at approximately 11:05 PM, while driving southbound on Stuyvesant Avenue at the intersection of Pulaski in Kings County, he was flagged down by a female. The female, who he learned to be M.A., stated that she and her daughter had been stabbed. She described the perpetrator as a Black female, approximately 5'5? in height with a slim build. She indicated the perpetrator had fled in a grey Infiniti and pointed southbound on Stuyvesant. He asked M.A. to get into his vehicle and to canvass for the perpetrator. Two to three minutes later, he observed a grey Infiniti right in front of him on Lewis and Kosciusko. He asked M.A. if that was the Infiniti and when she answered yes, he stopped the Infiniti. He approached the Infiniti and observed three passengers: a male driver, a male passenger in the front seat, and a female passenger in the back seat. At the time, M.A. was with his partner approximately 10 feet away. He asked the female to step out of the car. The officer observed that the female matched exactly the description that had been provided by M.A. After the female stepped out, Officer Varghese's partner gave him a thumbs up sign, which was a sign they used to signal that a positive identification had been made. He then placed that female, who he identified at the hearing as Defendant, under arrest and called an ambulance for M.A. who was bleeding. M.A. had a cut on her left arm and on the left side of her back. M.A. was taken via ambulance to the original scene of Pulaski and Stuyvesant, while Defendant was taken to that same location by Officer Varghese and his partner in their patrol car. During the ride, neither officer spoke to Defendant.

Back on the scene there were 3 ambulances, 5–6 patrol cars and approximately 15–20 uniformed police officers. Three complainants were identified: M.A., T.A. and C.J. Each of the complainants were in separate ambulances, which were parked one in front of the other. Officer Varghese went into each ambulance and asked each complainant to identify Defendant. He first approached the ambulance with M.A. Defendant was with his partner, in handcuffs, approximately 10 feet away. He asked M.A. if this was the person who stabbed her and she said yes. He then approached the ambulance T.A. was in. His partner followed with the cuffed Defendant, at a distance of approximately 5 feet. T.A. also identified Defendant as the perpetrator and told the officer that she had an argument with Defendant at a baby shower on Lafayette Avenue, that Defendant followed her and her mother to Stuyvesant and Pulaski and then stabbed them with a knife. He observed that T.A. had a cut on her left arm, a cut on her chest and a cut underneath her left eye. The officer then approached the ambulance C.J. was in but C.J. was uncooperative and would not answer any of the officer's questions. He observed that C.J. had a cut on her left arm.

Defendant was then transported to the 81st Precinct for processing by Officer Varghese and his partner. Neither officer spoke to Defendant during the 4 minute ride. At the precinct, Defendant complained of stomach pain and stated she was pregnant and an ambulance was called. At approximately 11:40 PM, Defendant left the precinct to go to the hospital. She returned to the precinct at approximately 4:30 AM. When she returned from the hospital, Officer Varghese provided her with a sandwich and soda. At approximately 5:10 AM, Officer Varghese went to speak to Defendant while she was in a holding cell. He read her Miranda warnings from a printed form. After each question Defendant answered yes that she understood by writing the word yes after each question on the form. Defendant and the officer then signed the bottom of the form, which was entered into evidence without objection as People's No. 1. Defendant then spoke to the officer and stated she carried the knife for protection, that the complainants were trying to jump her and that she slashed them with the knife because she had no other option. There was no evidence of any promises or threats having been made to Defendant or of any guns having been drawn.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Dunaway

Here, the police officers were flagged down by M.A. who informed them that she and her daughter had been stabbed. She provided a description of the perpetrator and the direction in which the perpetrator had fled in a grey Infiniti. Two to three minutes and a few blocks later, the officer spotted a grey Infiniti which the complainant identified as the car the perpetrator fled in. Defendant, the sole female passenger in the car, was identified by M.A. as the perpetrator. It is well-settled that the statement of an identified citizen complainant is sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest ( People v. Read, 74 A.D.3d 1245, 1246, 904 N.Y.S.2d 147 [2nd Dept.2010] ; People v. Boykin, 187 A.D.2d 661, 662, 590 N.Y.S.2d 261 [2nd Dept.1992] ). Here, the information available to the police established sufficient probable cause for Defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the motion to suppress any evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest is denied.

Huntley

At a Huntley hearing, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary. It is manifest that a defendant who is in custody may not be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966] ). "Both the elements of police custody and police interrogation must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda " ( People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29, 33, 390 N.Y.S.2d 843, 359 N.E.2d 353 [1976] ).

Here, the record clearly establishes that Defendant was orally given her Miranda warnings by Officer Varghese and that she acknowledged that she understood her rights by handwriting the word "yes" on a pre-printed form after each right was read to her. She then agreed to speak to the officer. The People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's statement was made after she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights (see People v. Dunwoody, 89 A.D.2d 569, 570–1, 452 N.Y.S.2d 96 [2nd Dept.1982] [defendant's affirmative response to final Miranda question "constituted a sufficient, expressly stated waiver of his constitutional rights ... [and] must be evaluated in light of the context of the question, which called for an acknowledgment of his understanding of his constitutional rights, ... and having such understanding, to willingly submit to interrogation"] ). Accordingly, Defendant's motion to suppress her statement on involuntariness grounds is denied.

Wade

As to the Wade portion of the hearing, the People gave notice pursuant to CPL section 710.30(1)(b) of two identifications made of Defendant. On June 28, 2016, at Defendant's arraignment on the felony complaint, People served notice of two "point-out" identifications of Defendant made to Officer Varghese. The notice specified that both identifications were made by T.A. on June 26, 2016 at 23:30 hours at Pulaski Street and Stuyvesant. On August 31, 2016, at Defendant's arraignment on the indictment, the People filed and served their Voluntary Disclosure Form (VDF) which gave notice of two "corporeal non-lineup" identifications of Defendant made to Officer Varghese on June 26, 2016 at 23:30 hours at Pulaski Street and Stuyvesant Avenue, one by T.A. and the other by M. [first name misspelled] A. On June 14, 2017, almost 10 months after Defendant had been arraigned and on the second date the matter had been scheduled for hearing and trial, the People served an amended CPL section 710.30(1)(b) indicating that two "corporeal non-lineup" identifications of Defendant had been made to Officer Varghese: one on June 26, 2016 at 23:10 hours at Lewis Avenue and Kosciusko Street by M.A. and the other on June 26, 2016 at 23:30 hours at Pulaski Street and Stuyvesant Avenue by T.A.

On August 2, 2017, prior to the start of the hearing, the defense moved for preclusion of the identification made by M.A. on June 26, 2016 at 23:10 hours at Lewis Avenue and Kosciusko Street on the ground that the People failed to give timely notice as required by CPL section 710.30(2). The People countered that the amended notice merely corrected the time and location of the identification made by complainant M.A., which was made 20 minutes before the time and three to four blocks away from the location designated in the original notice. In...

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