People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 23 February 2021
• Docket Number: D077095
• Citation: 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 509,61 Cal.App.5th 189
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph Leon JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

61 Cal.App.5th 189

275 Cal.Rptr.3d 509

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Joseph Leon JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

D077095

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 23, 2021

Stephen M. Hinkle, Oceanside, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Randall Einhorn and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BENKE, Acting P. J. Defendant Joseph Leon Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code ¹ section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly "is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime." The trial court in November 2019 denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who are convicted of first degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP.

On appeal, defendant asserts section 3051's exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. As we explain, we independently conclude the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder is not an equal protection violation.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

On the evening of January 30, 1997, defendant shot and killed Charles (Charles) Downing and Linda Lewis. He also shot James Robinson in the chest and Sonja (Sonja) Downing in the right and left thigh. Both Robinson and Sonja survived. All of the victims were inside an apartment that defendant and two accomplices entered at about 10:00 p.m., after learning earlier that evening that Charles was selling cocaine from the apartment. Once inside, defendant asked about the drugs while announcing, "This is a robbery." As noted, defendant was 19 years old when he committed the crimes.

In 1998, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3); three counts of attempted premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a) & former § 664; counts 4, 6 & 8); five counts of attempted first degree robbery (§§ 211, 213, subd. (b) & 664; counts 10-14); one count of residential burglary (§ 459; count 15); three counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (former § 245, subd. (b); counts 5, 7 & 9), and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery (former § 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1).

As to both murder counts, the jury found true the special circumstances of multiple murder (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); murder during an attempted robbery (id. , subd. (a)(17)); and murder during a first degree burglary (ibid. ). The jury also found true the allegations as to all counts that defendant was armed with a firearm (former § 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that he personally used a firearm (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). As to counts 4 through 7, 10 through 13, and 15, the jury found true the allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on a nonaccomplice (former § 12022.7, subd. (a)). The People sought the death penalty for defendant, but the jury was unable to unanimously agree on the penalty and the People did not seek a retrial on the issue.

As noted, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of LWOP. Defendant also was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 27 years four months. Defendant appealed. After striking a parole revocation fine, this court in January 2001 affirmed the judgment in defendant's direct appeal. (See People v. Bowman et al. (Jan. 19, 2001, D032440) [nonpub. opn.].)²

As also noted, the trial court in November 2019 denied defendant's motion seeking a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, based on his argument that exclusion of offenders between the ages of 18 and 25 sentenced to LWOP is a violation of equal protection laws.

DISCUSSION

A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings

Enacted in 2013, the Legislature intended in section 3051 et seq. to " ‘establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity ....’ " ( In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 ( Trejo ).) Section 3051 therefore provides for youth offender parole hearings that guarantee youth offenders a meaningful opportunity for release on parole. ( § 3051, subd. (e).) Youth offenders who committed their "controlling offense" prior to reaching a specified age are entitled to a parole hearing after serving a designated period in custody. (Id. , subd. (b).) A " ‘controlling offense’ " is defined as "the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment." (Id. , subd. (a)(2)(B).)

As originally enacted, section 3051 applied where the controlling offense was committed before the offender was 18 years old. ( Trejo, supra , 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 981 & fn. 6, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 855.) By amendment effective January 1, 2016, the Legislature extended the availability of youth offender parole hearings to offenders who were under 23 years old when they committed their controlling offenses. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471 (Sen. Bill No. 261), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016; see Trejo , at p. 981 & fn. 6, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 855.) By subsequent amendments, the Legislature further extended the availability of youth offender parole hearings to offenders who were 25 years old or younger when they committed their controlling offenses. (Stats. 2017, ch. 684 (Sen. Bill No. 394), § 3051, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)

Under section 3051 "an offender who committed a ‘controlling offense’ under the age of 26 is entitled to a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during his or her 15th year of incarceration if he [or she] received a determinate sentence; during his or her 20th year of incarceration if he or she received a life term of less than 25 years to life; and during his or her 25th year of incarceration if he or she received a term of 25 years to life. ( § 3051, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) An offender convicted of a controlling offense committed before the age of 18 for which he or she was sentenced to LWOP is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his or her 25th year of incarceration. ( § 3051, subd. (b)(4).)" ( In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 266, 277, 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 868.)

Subdivision (h) of section 3051 includes various exceptions to a person's right to a youth offender parole hearing. It provides in part: "This section shall not apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or Section 667.61,^{[3 ]} or to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age. " ( § 3051, subd. (h), italics added.)

Defendant recognizes he is statutorily ineligible for relief under the plain language of subdivisions (b)(4) and (h) of section 3051, as he was 19 years old when he committed the homicides and was subsequently sentenced to two consecutive LWOP terms as a result. Accordingly, he argues he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing because section 3051 denies his right to equal protection of the laws in two ways: (1) it grants a youth offender parole hearing to persons under the age of 18 sentenced to LWOP, but denies such a hearing to persons 18 to 25 years old sentenced to LWOP; and (2) it grants a youth offender parole hearing to persons 25 years of age or younger who are convicted of first degree murder but not sentenced to LWOP, but denies such relief to persons 18 to 25 years old convicted of murder but sentenced to LWOP.

B. Guiding Principles

We independently review defendant's challenge to section 3051. (See People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1154, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution guarantee to all persons the equal protection of the laws. The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when "the government ... treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification." ( People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 410 P.3d 9 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3.) "The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause." ( People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 313.)

" ‘ "The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but "whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged." ’ " ( People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.)

Where our Legislature fixes different punishments for different crimes, those differences do not violate...