People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 22 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. D013222,D013222
• Citation: 6 Cal.App.4th 1185,8 Cal.Rptr.2d 239
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Goldwire Alichia JACKSON, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 239

8 Cal.Rptr.2d 239

6 Cal.App.4th 1185

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Goldwire Alichia JACKSON, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. D013222.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

May 22, 1992.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1992.

Review Denied Aug. 12, 1992.

Robert F. Gusky, San Diego, Barbara A. Smith, Spring Valley, and Jeffrey J. Stuetz, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendants and appellants.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Keith I. Motley and Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WIENER, Acting Presiding Justice.

Defendants Goldwire Alichia Jackson and Subodai J. Davis appeal the judgment entered on jury verdicts convicting them of robbery in the first degree. (Pen.Code, § 212.5, subd. (a).) ¹ Both argue that the

undisputed facts indicate they are guilty, at most, of second degree robbery. Jackson also contends the trial court erred in excluding certain proffered evidence. As we shall explain, we reject their contentions and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 1990, Darius Horton and the eventual victim, Jeffrey Johnson, obtained a ride from the Navy base with two of Horton's friends, defendants Davis and Jackson. The group drove to a house where Davis rented a room. Another man, Jake Jones, was at the apartment when they arrived. The house contained a communal kitchen, a common living room area and three locked bedrooms. Davis was in the process of moving out but had not yet done so.

After drinking and talking for some time, everyone began to leave the house and head back to the car. Davis asked Johnson and Horton to return to the house, and the three men went into Davis's bedroom. Following a short conversation, Davis struck Johnson on the bridge of the nose with a beer bottle. Johnson bent over with blood running off his nose and noticed Jackson coming towards him with a rifle in his hand. Davis and Jackson demanded Johnson give them his money. Johnson reached into his pocket to get his wallet, and Davis helped pull it out to begin counting the money. Jackson then fired a shot from the rifle, hitting Johnson in the leg.

Davis, Jackson, Horton and Jones then drove off, taking Johnson's money, driver's license and military identification. The police found Davis, Jones and Jackson at a nearby hotel.

DISCUSSION

I

Both Jackson and Davis argue they could not properly be convicted of first degree residential robbery.

A

Section 212.5 provides in relevant part, "[E]very robbery which is perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, ... or the inhabited portion of any other building, is robbery of the first degree." (§ 212.5, subd. (a).) An "inhabited dwelling house" means a structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes. (People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 838, 848, 193 Cal.Rptr. 54 [interpreting identical language in the section 460 definition of first degree burglary].) "A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to do so in the future." (People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612.)

Jackson and Davis contend the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for first degree robbery because Davis's bedroom, in which the robbery occurred, was not currently inhabited at the time of the robbery. Relying on People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109, they assert that Davis's possessions were moved from the house to his vehicle prior to the robbery, and therefore no evidence supported the conclusion that Davis currently or in the future intended to use the house for habitation. We disagree.

In Cardona, the previous residents of a burglarized house had moved into their new home the night before the burglary but had not yet finished removing all their belongings. The residents admitted, however, that they never again intended to occupy their previous house as a residence. (Id. at p. 482, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109.) This court held that first degree burglary is a crime against habitation. Therefore, when residents move out of a house with no intent to again use the house as sleeping quarters, the house is considered "uninhabited". (Id. at p. 483, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109.)

Where a dwelling was previously inhabited, it does not become "uninhabited" within the meaning of Cardona until the residents leave never again intending to return to use the dwelling as sleeping quarters. Here, in contrast, Davis may have It is clear that Davis was still presently using the house, and in particular his bedroom, at the time of the robbery. Under defendants' theory, a dwelling would become "uninhabited" as soon as the occupants awoke on their last day in a residence. The distinction between first and second degree burglary must turn on more substantive considerations. When residents vacate a dwelling without intending to sleep there again, but leave personal property to pick up later, the character of the use arguably changes from a residence to a storage facility. Here, because Davis had never vacated the premises, the character of the use never changed and the bedroom remained "inhabited" within the meaning of section 212.5.

been in the process of moving out, but had not yet moved out at the time of the robbery. The record shows that just prior to the robbery, the five men were sitting in a common area drinking and talking. Davis invited Johnson into his bedroom in order to commit the robbery.

In any event, whatever the status of Davis's bedroom, it does not appear to be disputed that the other bedrooms in the house remained in use even after Davis's departure, and thus the house was an "inhabited dwelling" within the meaning of the statute. Where the principal use of a building is as a single residence and that residence is inhabited, the character of the use of the particular room in the building where the robbery occurs is irrelevant.

B

Even accepting that the room and/or house was "inhabited", Davis relies on the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the first degree residential robbery statute to argue that a residential robbery cannot be committed unless the robber's entry of the residence constituted a residential burglary. Here, Davis claims, because he cannot be convicted of burglarizing his own residence (see People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365), he similarly is not guilty of first degree robbery.

Focusing on legislative intent poses particular problems in this area. By using identical language in the residential robbery and residential burglary statutes, it seems reasonable to assume the Legislature intended the two statutes to be interpreted similarly. Indeed, the enactment of the residential robbery statute appears to have been motivated by a legislative concern that residential burglary (the mere entry of a residence, even if unoccupied) was punished more severely than a robbery which occurred within the residence. (See People v. Fleetwood, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 987, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612.) Yet transfer of the concept of "habitation" from the burglary to the robbery context creates some difficulty. Burglary is a crime against a person's rights of possession in a building. (People v. Gauze, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 714, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365.) Burglary of an "inhabited" dwelling house is punished more severely because of the risk that occupants will be harmed. (See People v. Guthrie, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 847, 193 Cal.Rptr. 54.) In contrast, robbery is principally a crime against the person, not the possessory interest. (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 587, 589, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908.) By definition, a robbery cannot be committed inside a dwelling unless the dwelling is occupied. Section 212.5, however, by requiring that the robbery take place inside an "inhabited" dwelling, necessarily implies that robberies can take place inside occupied but uninhabited dwellings which are not deserving of increased punishment. We assume, for instance, that if a real estate agent waiting to show a vacant house was robbed inside that house, the crime would be only second degree robbery. (See People v. Cardona, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109 [vacated house not "inhabited"].) ²

At least two possible purposes suggest themselves for the Legislature's decision to enact a residential robbery statute. First, it could be asserted that potential robbery victims are more vulnerable inside dwellings because they are less visible and have less access to assistance. Were this the theory underlying section 212.5, however, there would be no need to require that the dwelling be "inhabited" because the robbery victim is just as vulnerable even where no identifiable person has the right and intent to use the dwelling as sleeping quarters.

Alternatively, it may be that the Legislature had in mind a similar but somewhat narrower rationale. A person inside a private residence, whether it be their own or that of an acquaintance, feels a sense of privacy and security not felt when outside or in a semi-public structure. The Legislature could have reasoned that people generally let their guard down inside a residence, providing the robber with the advantages of shock and surprise which may incapacitate the victim(s). This rationale focuses...