People v. Jacques

• Decision Date: 12 March 2014
• Citation: 115 A.D.3d 765,981 N.Y.S.2d 622,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01630
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Jacklin JACQUES, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

115 A.D.3d 765
981 N.Y.S.2d 622
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01630

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Jacklin JACQUES, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 12, 2014.

Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Patricia Pazner of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Robert J. Masters and Edward D. Saslaw of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Hanophy, J.), rendered July 26, 2010, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and unlawful possession of pistol ammunition, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the facts, by vacating the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and unlawful possession of pistol ammunition. Upon fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15; People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902), we agree with the defendant that the verdict of guilt with respect to the criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree count was against the weight of the evidence.

In conducting our weight-of-the-evidence analysis, we must first determine, based upon the credible evidence, whether a different result would have been unreasonable and, if it would not have been, then we must “ ‘weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony’ ” ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672, quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N.Y. 55, 62, 50 N.E.2d 542;see

[981 N.Y.S.2d 623]

People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1). Applying this principle to the evidence adduced at the defendant's trial, we determine, in the first instance, that acquittal of the criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree charge would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence presented ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902). Moreover, weighing the evidence adduced at the trial, in light of the defendant's...