People v. Jaeger

• Decision Date: 14 June 2012
• Citation: 946 N.Y.S.2d 680,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04796,96 A.D.3d 1172
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael JAEGER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

96 A.D.3d 1172

946 N.Y.S.2d 680

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04796

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Michael JAEGER, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

June 14, 2012.

Cliff Gordon, Monticello, for appellant.

James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello (Bonnie M. Mitzner of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., MERCURE, ROSE, LAHTINEN and EGAN JR., JJ.

PETERS, P.J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda, J.), rendered April 28, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, endangering the welfare of a child (four counts) and forcible touching.

Based upon allegations that defendant had subjected two of his girlfriend's daughters (born in 1992 and 1993) to sexual contact, State Police Investigator Nancy Stack arranged a controlled phone call by the older victim (hereinafter victim A) to defendant. During that recorded call, defendant made comments appearing to substantiate that some sexual activity had occurred between the two. Later that day, defendant agreed to accompany police to the State Police barracks and spoke with Stack. Defendant admitted that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with victim A on more than one occasion, but denied having sexual intercourse with victim A or engaging in any sexual contact with her younger sister (hereinafter victim B). He also signed a written statement to that effect.

Defendant was thereafter charged in a 17–count indictment with respect to his sexual conduct with the victims. Following a Huntley hearing, County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress his oral and written statements. At the conclusion of the ensuing jury trial, during which the victims testified and defendant's statements were admitted into evidence, defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and four counts of endangering the welfare of a child related to his sexual conduct with victim A, as well as forcible touching related to his conduct with victim B, but was acquitted of the remaining charges. Sentenced to an aggregate term of five years in prison with 10 years of postrelease supervision, defendant now appeals.

We reject defendant's assertion that his oral and written statements to police should have been suppressed because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.¹ Stack read defendant his Miranda rights from a printed card and defendant then asked to read the card himself. After doing so, he stated that he understood his rights and continued to speak with Stack, thereby impliedly waiving those rights ( see People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967, 968, 563 N.Y.S.2d 730, 565 N.E.2d 479 [1990];People v. Garcia, 79 A.D.3d 1248, 1250, 911 N.Y.S.2d 723 [2010],lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 797, 919 N.Y.S.2d 514, 944 N.E.2d 1154 [2011] ). Prior to taking defendant's written statement, defendant was asked and was able to read aloud the Miranda warnings, and initialed and signed that part of the statement acknowledging that he understood his rights and was agreeing to waive them. Thus, County Court's determination that defendant understood his rights and voluntarily waived them is amply supported by the record ( see People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d at 968, 563 N.Y.S.2d 730, 565 N.E.2d 479;People v. Garcia, 79 A.D.3d at 1250, 911 N.Y.S.2d 723;People v. Petrie, 3 A.D.3d 665, 666, 771 N.Y.S.2d 242 [2004];People v. Bolarinwa, 258 A.D.2d 827, 829, 687 N.Y.S.2d 442 [1999],lv. denied93 N.Y.2d 1014, 697 N.Y.S.2d 573, 719 N.E.2d 934 [1999] ).

Nor are we persuaded by defendant's contention that his statements were the product of coercive and deceptive interrogation practices by the police. “Police may generally engage in deception while investigating a crime, with suppression required only where ‘the deception was so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process or [where] a promise or threat was made that could induce a false confession’ ” ( People v. Colbert, 60 A.D.3d 1209, 1211, 875 N.Y.S.2d 339 [2009], quoting People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 [1980];see People v. Berumen, 46 A.D.3d 1019, 1020–1021, 846 N.Y.S.2d 820 [2007],lv. denied10 N.Y.3d 808, 857 N.Y.S.2d 42, 886 N.E.2d 807 [2008];People v. Dishaw, 30 A.D.3d 689, 690, 816 N.Y.S.2d 235 [2006],lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 787, 821 N.Y.S.2d 817, 854 N.E.2d 1281 [2006] ). On more than one occasion during the interview, Stack suggested to defendant that victim A accused him of having intercourse with her despite the victim neither stating nor implying that any intercourse had occurred. However, as the tactic employed by Stack was not accompanied by any threats or promises that might induce a false confession and was not fundamentally unfair, the deception did not render defendant's confessions involuntary ( see People v. Thomas, 93 A.D.3d 1019, 1027–1028, 941 N.Y.S.2d 722 [2012];People v. Dishaw, 30 A.D.3d at 690, 816 N.Y.S.2d 235;People v. Serrano, 14 A.D.3d 874, 875, 788 N.Y.S.2d 272 [2005],lv. denied4 N.Y.3d 803, 795 N.Y.S.2d 178, 828 N.E.2d 94 [2005];People v. Henderson, 4 A.D.3d 616, 617, 772 N.Y.S.2d 120 [2004],lv. denied2 N.Y.3d 800, 781 N.Y.S.2d 299, 814 N.E.2d 471 [2004] ).

We are similarly unconvinced that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. At trial, victim A testified that defendant subjected her to sexual contact on numerous occasions over the course of several years and victim B recounted an incident wherein defendant entered her bedroom and groped her breasts. The People also presented the controlled call between victim A and defendant, wherein defendant made several veiled references to having sexual contact with her, as well as the audio recording of the interview and defendant's written statement. Stack testified regarding her administration of Miranda warnings, and defendant's waiver thereof, and the circumstances surrounding the interview and defendant's admissions. Defendant, on the other hand, disavowed his confessions and denied ever having engaged in sexual contact with either of the victims. He testified that he was in a daze during the interview from lack of sleep, that his “mind was not there” when he was read his Miranda rights, and that he did not recall...