People v. Thomas

Citation2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02128,941 N.Y.S.2d 722,93 A.D.3d 1019
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Adrian P. THOMAS, Appellant.
Decision Date22 March 2012
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John C. Turi, Acting Public Defender, Troy (Jerome K. Frost of counsel), for appellant.

Richard J. McNally, District Attorney, Troy (Gordon Eddy of counsel), for respondent.

Before: SPAIN, J.P., LAHTINEN, MALONE JR., STEIN and EGAN JR., JJ.

SPAIN, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Ceresia, J.), rendered November 12, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree.

On Sunday, September 21, 2008, defendant's wife, Wilhemina Hicks, woke around 9:00 A.M. in their two-bedroom apartment in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County to find that their four-month-old son Matthew was unresponsive and not breathing regularly; she awoke defendant, 911 was called and emergency personnel responded. Upon arrival at a local hospital with Hicks, Matthew was in critical condition, in severe respiratory distress, unconscious and nonresponsive, and placed on a ventilator and antibiotics; blood tests later showed that he had streptococcal pneumonia, a bacterial infection. The infant was transferred to the pediatric intensive care unit of Albany Medical Center Hospital (hereinafter AMCH), where he arrived unresponsive, with very little brain activity or neurological functions, and was not adequately breathing on his own. A CAT scan disclosed what treating physicians determined to be subdural hematomas on both sides of his brain consistent with severe head trauma resulting from rapid acceleration and then sudden deceleration of the head, causing the brain to move back and forth inside the skull. Matthew also exhibited signs of sepsis, an overwhelming systemic infection. Shortly after his arrival at AMCH, despite extensive medical intervention, it was determined that Matthew was brain dead; two days later he was removed from life support and died.

Defendant remained at the apartment with the couple's six other children, all under nine years old, including Matthew's twin brother. That evening City of Troy police detectives accompanied Rensselaer County Child Protective Services (hereinafter CPS) caseworkers to the apartment where they briefly questioned defendant and CPS removed the children, leaving defendant alone. Interviewed by detectives hours later and again the next evening at length, defendant ultimately confessed that he had thrown Matthew onto a mattress and box spring located—without a bedframe—directly on the floor in defendant's bedroom, three times in the four days preceding the 911 call. Defendant also admitted that he had unintentionally hit the infant's head against the side of his crib several times, including after the 911 call. The police interviews were recorded on DVDs, which captured defendant, self-described at 500 pounds, demonstrating how he had forcefully thrown the infant to the mattress. Defendant signed two statements that reflected essential parts of his admissions during each interview. It was also established that Matthew, who weighed just 15 pounds and had been born two months premature, had been ill and experiencing fevers, diarrhea and vomiting in the days preceding his death.

Defendant was indicted on one count of depraved indifference murder and, at trial, Hicks testified, denying harming Matthew. A plethora of highly credentialed medical subspecialists were called by both sides, offering two sharply conflicting opinions regarding the primary cause of death. The People's experts, including the pediatric critical care supervisor and pediatric neurosurgeon who treated Matthew at AMCH and the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, all testified that the cause of death was the subdural hematomas or brain swelling and bleeding caused by severe blunt force head trauma, and that sepsis and pneumonia were secondary contributing factors, but not the sole cause. Defendant's experts, by contrast, concluded that sepsis leading to meningitis and septic shock and not head trauma was the cause of death. Whereas the pediatric critical care physician who treated Matthew opined that defendant's admitted actions in throwing a four month old with considerable force onto a mattress and box spring—the surface of which was located 17 inches above the floor—several times in four days is the type of rapid acceleration-deceleration that could cause the severe head trauma and subdural hematomas found in Matthew, the neuropathologist who testified on behalf of the defense opined that such an injury would “probably not” result from such actions. Defendant, in his trial testimony, disavowed his confession as coerced and false, and denied throwing Matthew or hitting his head against the crib.

After a jury trial, at which the jury viewed a redacted video version of most of defendant's interviews with police, defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder and sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant now appeals.

Initially, defendant argues that his oral and written statements to police should have been suppressed on the grounds that they were involuntarily obtained and the product of coercive custodial interrogation methods, which included false promises, misrepresentations and threats. After a hearing, County Court denied defendant's suppression motion finding that the statements had been voluntarily made in a noncustodial setting in which police did not employ impermissible coercive tactics.

The voluntariness of defendant's statements is evaluated by looking at the totality of the circumstances in which they were obtained ( see People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 [1977]; see also People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 413–414, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 [2004], cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828 [2004]; People v. Pouliot, 64 A.D.3d 1043, 1044, 883 N.Y.S.2d 372 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 838, 890 N.Y.S.2d 454, 918 N.E.2d 969 [2009] ), guided by the axiom that deceptive police strategies in securing a confession “need not result in [a finding of] involuntariness without some showing that the deception was so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process or that a promise or threat was made that could induce a false confession” ( People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 [1980] [emphasis added] [internal citations omitted]; see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 413, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Tankleff, 84 N.Y.2d 992, 994, 622 N.Y.S.2d 503, 646 N.E.2d 805 [1994]; People v. Munck, 92 A.D.3d 63, 68, 937 N.Y.S.2d 334 [2011]; People v. Dishaw, 30 A.D.3d 689, 690, 816 N.Y.S.2d 235 [2006], lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 787, 821 N.Y.S.2d 817, 854 N.E.2d 1281 [2006]; see also CPL 60.45[2][b][i] ). Upon our review of the unredacted recorded interviews and the Huntley testimony, we find that defendant—who did not testify at the hearing—voluntarily confessed during noncustodial interviews in which police employed permissible strategies aimed at eliciting the truth of what had occurred leading up to Matthew's death.

According to the police officers who testified, defendant was interviewed by police on two separate occasions: for about two hours beginning around midnight on Sunday, September 21, 2008, and the next day, Monday, for approximately seven hours—from around 6:00 P.M. until 1:00 A.M. on Tuesday, when he was arrested. On Sunday, after the other children were removed by CPS, the officers told defendant that they would be in touch and left him alone. Hours later, around midnight, Detectives Adam Mason and Ronald Fountain, who had been to AMCH, returned to defendant's apartment; he was awake and agreed to accompany them to the police station to discuss the incident. At the outset of the first interview, Mason read defendant each individual Miranda warning, some of which he explained at defendant's request, and he was advised that he was not under arrest and could stop questioning at any time; defendant indicated that he understood, signing a waiver after they had him read the document aloud to ascertain his reading ability. Defendant was questioned by Mason and Fountain for two hours in an unlocked interview room, during which he was apprised that Matthew was not expected to live and that doctors suspected that Matthew had been slammed into something,1 and they suggested, among other things, that someone might have bumped the infant's head against the crib. Defendant denied any wrongdoing or knowledge of anyone harming Matthew, and he reviewed and signed a one-page witness statement to that effect; officers indicated that they would want to speak with him again the next day, and defendant agreed. When defendant expressed suicidal thoughts, i.e., that he might jump off a bridge if Matthew were to die, he was immediately offered an opportunity to speak with a counselor which, after some discussion,2 he accepted, and he was then transported to the mental health unit of a local hospital around 2:00 A.M. ( see Mental Health Law § 9.41).

After about 15 hours of mental health observation—a significant break in police questioning—it was determined that defendant was not a danger to himself and he was discharged around 5:45 P.M. on Monday; upon his release, he asked the discharge nurse if it would be okay to wait there for the detectives who would be coming to speak with him, supporting the conclusion that he wanted to speak with them. The testimony and records of that evaluation demonstrate that defendant was somewhat depressed, preoccupied and anxious, but do not suggest that he was incapable of making voluntary and knowing choices, such as whether to speak with police, or that he was unable to fully understand and invoke his rights.

As defendant exited the mental health unit, Mason, accompanied by another detective,...

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