People v. James

• Decision Date: 12 March 1993
• Citation: 594 N.Y.S.2d 499,191 A.D.2d 957
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Barbara JAMES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 499

594 N.Y.S.2d 499

191 A.D.2d 957

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Barbara JAMES, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Fourth Department.

March 12, 1993.

Linda S. Reynolds by David Schopp, Buffalo, for appellant.

Kevin M. Dillon by Susan Nusbaum, Buffalo, for respondent.

Before DENMAN, P.J., and GREEN, BALIO, DOERR and BOEHM, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant was convicted of murdering her two infant daughters and attempting to murder her nine-year-old son. Defendant argues that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence because she proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15). We disagree. Where there is conflicting expert evidence, resolution of the issue of defendant's criminal responsibility is for the jury (see, People v. Justice, 173 A.D.2d 144, 579 N.Y.S.2d 502). The jury is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the opinion of any expert (see, People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44, 187 N.E.2d 116; People v. Surdak, 167 A.D.2d 436, 437, 561 N.Y.S.2d 840, lv. denied 77 N.Y.2d 911, 569 N.Y.S.2d 943, 572 N.E.2d 626). In the absence of a "serious flaw" in an expert's testimony, the jury is entitled to rely upon it (see, People v. Enchautequi, 156 A.D.2d 461, 548 N.Y.S.2d 567, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 787, 559 N.Y.S.2d 992, 559 N.E.2d 686). We cannot conclude that the jury, in accepting the opinion of the expert for the People, failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).

County Court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's challenge for cause to a potential juror based upon the juror's occupation as a correction officer. The fact that a potential juror is a correction officer does not lead inexorably to an inference that he is inherently biased against criminal defendants (see, People v. Ruiz, 162 A.D.2d 637, 638, 556 N.Y.S.2d 952, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 990, 563 N.Y.S.2d 779, 565 N.E.2d 528). Here, the potential juror testified that his ability to render a fair and impartial verdict would not be affected by the nature of his employment, that he would not "lean more" to the prosecution side of the case, and that he would "listen to the facts". Under those circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the juror had a predisposition against defendant that would affect his ability to discharge his responsibilities as a juror (see, People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410, 418, 526 N.Y.S.2d 932, 521 N.E.2d 1075, cert. denied 487 U.S. 1239, 108 S.Ct. 2911, 101 L.Ed.2d 943; People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 483 N.Y.S.2d 198, 472 N.E.2d 1026; cf., People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 78-79, 447 N.Y.S.2d 886, 432 N.E.2d 758).

We conclude that the testimony of two Crisis Services counselors who arrived on the scene shortly after the killings was properly admitted as rebuttal to disprove defendant's evidence that she was in a psychotic state at that time (see, People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 248, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808; People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 442 N.E.2d 1205, cert. denied 460 U.S. 1047, 103 S.Ct. 1448, 75 L.Ed.2d 803).

County Court did not abuse its discretion...