People v. Jeffries
| Decision Date | 27 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,Docket No. 10796,3 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert L. JEFFRIES, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Richard J. Howard, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Donald A. Burge, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and TARGONSKI, * JJ.
On the evening of October 11, 1969, a police officer for the City of Kalamazoo was approached by an unidentified male and told that an individual by the name of Robert L. Jeffries was waiving a pistol around in a nearby cafe. He and another officer then proceeded to enter the cafe where they observed an individual fitting the description as related by the unknown informant. The suspect then proceeded to leave the bar and walk down the street and the two police officers who had followed him, asked him to stop and identify himself. The suspect identified himself as Robert Jeffries.
When asked if he was carrying a pistol, the defendant answered, The suspect then started to reach into his left hand pocket and the police officer stopped him and removed from the pocket a small caliber pistol. The suspect was then arrested and read his Miranda rights.
Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion to suppress his statement that he did possess a gun, and also to suppress the pistol itself. The defendant contended that these pieces of evidence were the result of an illegal search and seizure. The judge denied the motion to suppress.
On October 14, 1970, the defendant was tried on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. 1 The judge, sitting as trier of fact, found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years probation.
On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction was obtained through the use of illegally obtained evidence, arguing that when the police officers stopped him, he was under arrest. He theorizes that at that point, he was so substantially deprived of his liberty that it was an in-custody interrogation and since he was not given his Miranda rights, the statement he made referring to possession of a gun should have been suppressed.
Defendant also claims that because the above-mentioned statement could not be used, the police officers did not have probable cause to stop him and make a search and an arrest. As a result, he says, the gun found was illegally obtained evidence and under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1971), the evidence should have been suppressed.
Defendant further argues that the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), should not apply in that the facts of the present case show that the police officers were motivated by a desire to seek evidence rather than by any fear for their own protection.
The defendant's contention that this is an in-custody interrogation cannot be sustained. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1609, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 704 (1966), specifically states that 'we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation'. Further on in the case, the Court announced that:
'General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding.' 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725.
In the case at hand, the police officers merely asked the defendant to stop. He was only asked one question, and the answer was readily given to the police officers. Neither officer had his gun drawn nor made any threatening gestures.
Under the above facts, it is clear that the defendant was not substantially deprived of his freedom of action, nor was he threatened or coerced into making any kind of a statement; therefore, it should be found that the defendant's statement was voluntarily given and properly admitted into evidence.
As to the defendant's contention that the search was illegal, this also cannot be sustained. The case of Terry v. Ohio, Supra, authorizes police officers to stop and frisk an individual when they are conducting legitimate investigations of suspicious circumstances, and where the officers reasonably fear for their safety. The officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant. The police conduct in this case cannot be grounds for reversal.
The case of Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), relied on by defendant is not analogous. The fact that the Orozco case followed a shooting and related to subsequent investigations removes it from serious consideration as controlling precedent in the instant case.
Affirmed.
For the purposes of this dissent we can and we do adopt the statement of facts and the theories of the defendant as presented in the majority opinion.
The majority makes no reference to one factual matter which we add into our consideration of this case. The two police officers entered the cafe in which their informer allegedly said the defendant was brandishing a gun. They watched the defendant in the cafe and observed no violations or any untoward conduct but nevertheless followed him when he departed from the premises. The ensuing conduct of the officers is set forth in the majority opinion and gives rise to the issues here. However, as to certain conclusions therein contained we must respectfully disagree. The first item of disagreement is an issue as to when the arrest actually occurred.
This was a situation of an arrest by a police officer without a warrant. A police officer may arrest for the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor committed in his presence, when he knows the person has committed a felony although not in his presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that the person in question committed the felony, when he has positive information from an authoritative source, when another officer holds a warrant for such arrest, when he has received Positive information as may afford him reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or Reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed it, and when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person is an escaped convict or parole violator. See M.C.L.A. § 764.15; M.S.A. § 28.874. None of these fact situations seems to apply in this case if we determine that the arrest took place at the time that the defendant's forward motion was first restricted by the challenge of the police officers in uniform.
The question of the existence of reasonable or probable cause is best determined from the analysis of the statute providing for the necessary elements in an affidavit for a search warrant. M.C.L.A. § 780.653; M.S.A. § 28.1259(3). In the first instance it is necessary that the information supplied be reliable and from a Credible person and that such person have the Personal knoeldge of the matters reported. In the instant case, there is no showing that the information came from a Credible person nor is there any basis on which to conclude that the person furnishing the information was a Credible source. The informant apparently was a person unknown to the officer who took the information and to all intents and purposes the officer had no prior knowledge of the individual upon which to base a conclusion that he was dealing with a Credible person.
In People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 253, 97 N.W.2d 16, 19 (1959), the Court cited favorably from 4 Am.Jur. Arrest, § 2, wherein arrest is defined as follows:
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