People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 17 May 1990
• Docket Number: 4-89-0182,Nos. 4-89-0181,s. 4-89-0181
• Citation: 144 Ill.Dec. 293,555 N.E.2d 412,197 Ill.App.3d 762
• Parties: , 144 Ill.Dec. 293 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David W. CARTER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 412

555 N.E.2d 412

197 Ill.App.3d 762, 144 Ill.Dec. 293

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David W. CARTER, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 4-89-0181, 4-89-0182.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

May 17, 1990.

Donald D. Bernardi, State's Atty., Pontiac, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, J.A.C. Knuppel, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendants-appellees.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., Terence M. Madsen, Sally L. Dilgart, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, amicus curiae.

Presiding Justice KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

This consolidated appeal involves the application of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, to correctional center inmates who make admissions to an informant.

This case involves the murder of Robert Taylor, the superintendent at Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois. In the course of that murder investigation, the prosecution obtained an eavesdrop order to tape conversations between the inmate suspects and an informant visiting them at the prison. The suspects ultimately implicated themselves in a gang conspiracy to solicit the murder of Taylor.

The suspects, David W. Carter and Michael Johnson, were indicted on multiple counts of conspiracy (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38 par. 8-2(a)), solicitation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 8-1(a)), and murder (first degree) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)). Prior to trial, Carter and Johnson filed motions to suppress the tapes of their respective conversations with the inmate informant. At the consolidated suppression hearing, the defense argued the admission of these conversations, taped in the absence of Miranda warnings, would violate the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. (U.S. Const., amend. V.) The Livingston County circuit court ordered suppression of the tapes in accordance with the dictates of People v. Perkins (1988), 176 Ill.App.3d 443, 126 Ill.Dec. 8, 531 N.E.2d 141, appeal denied (1989), 125 Ill.2d 572, 130 Ill.Dec. 487, 537 N.E.2d 816. The prosecution now appeals from the suppression orders of the circuit court. 107 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1).

The sole issue on review is whether the circuit court erred in suppressing the tapes of incriminating conversations between the inmate suspects and the inmate informant. We reverse the suppression orders of the circuit court.

On appeal, the prosecution argues the inmate suspects were not entitled to Miranda warnings because they were not subjected to a custodial interrogation when their conversations with the inmate informant were taped at the prison. The prosecution further argues Perkins is an aberrational application of the Miranda decision.

In Perkins, the police obtained incriminating statements via conversations between the inmate defendant, an inmate informant, and an undercover agent at a jail. At the ensuing suppression hearing, the circuit court ruled the conversation constituted custodial interrogation for the protection purposes of Miranda. The Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed the suppression order of the circuit court on review.

The circuit court's order here is consistent with Perkins but we decline to follow that decision because we believe it was wrongly decided. Inmate suspects who choose to meet with and discuss their criminal activity with an informant are not subject to the coercive custodial environment accompanying an interrogation which was the reason for Miranda. See Kamisar, "Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?" 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 63-64 (1978) (hereinafter Kamisar).

Miranda warnings must precede custodial interrogation. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07.) Absent waiver of such warnings, all incriminating conversations obtained through interrogation will be inadmissible as evidence at trial. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.) The rationale of Miranda is that the coercion inherent in the custodial interrogation environment would "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner," thereby undermining the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. at 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d at 714.

Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.) The inmate suspects here, incarcerated on unrelated charges, were already in custody in the literal sense. (See Mathis v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381.) We do not believe, however, a suspect is automatically entitled to Miranda warnings by virtue of his inmate status. (See Cervantes v. Walker (9th Cir.1978), 589 F.2d 424, 427; United States v. Conley (4th Cir.1985), 779 F.2d 970, 972-73, cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. 830, 107 S.Ct. 114, 93 L.Ed.2d 61.) To the contrary, custody in the prison setting "necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the [inmate] which results in an added imposition on...