People v. Patterson

Decision Date31 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 4-90-0100,4-90-0100
Citation207 Ill.App.3d 104,564 N.E.2d 1361
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Parties, 151 Ill.Dec. 699 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vincent PATTERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

Donald D. Bernardi, State's Atty., Pontiac, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Timothy J. Londrigan, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Arden J. Lang, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellee.

Justice SPITZ delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from an order suppressing a conversation between defendant inmate and an internal affairs investigator. We affirm.

The undisputed facts are these. Defendant is a prison inmate at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois, serving a natural life sentence for offenses unrelated to this matter. On June 29, 1989, during a routine "shakedown" search of prison cells, prison officials found two knife-like instruments, commonly known as shanks, in defendant's cell. Defendant was the sole occupant of the cell at the time the shanks were found. Prison officials immediately ticketed defendant for the possession of the shanks, and took him to a housing unit called "segregation." Prison officials house inmates in segregation as punishment for disciplinary infractions or pending disciplinary hearings. Inmates in segregation are locked in their cells 24 hours a day; not permitted to attend classes or job assignments; permitted to shower and exercise on a limited basis, but only under the direct supervision of officers; escorted in restraints everywhere they go; and are not permitted to make telephone calls. Segregation is the most restrictive placement for an inmate.

On August 1, 1989, Richard D. Irvin, an internal investigator with the Department of Corrections (DOC) at Pontiac, called defendant to his office for an "interview." Irvin's primary duty at Pontiac is to investigate incidents and prepare cases for prosecution. Warden Lowery had asked Irvin to "interview" defendant and sent Irvin an incident report indicating that defendant was ticketed for allegedly possessing the shanks. At the time of the interview, Irvin knew defendant was in segregation, but did not know that defendant had been placed in segregation as an administrative punishment for allegedly possessing shanks. Irvin did not learn of the reason defendant was placed in segregation until after the interview. However, when a shank is found in a cell, at least one inmate goes to segregation.

Police officers escorted defendant in restraints, including handcuffs, from his cell in segregation to Irvin's office, which is located outside the confines of the prison setting. Irvin's office is positioned next to several other offices and contains several chairs, a filing cabinet, and his desk. The restraints remained on defendant during the interview. No other prison personnel were in Irvin's office at the time of the interview.

Defendant could have refused to go to Irvin's office, or to respond to Irvin's questions during the interview. However, such a refusal is a violation of prison rules and would result in a penalty. A uniformed correctional officer, not Irvin, would have the discretion to issue defendant a ticket for refusing to cooperate. The penalty for being ticketed ranges from a verbal reprimand to several days in segregation.

When defendant arrived at Irvin's office, Irvin did not introduce himself as an official from internal affairs. However, Irvin did have a sign on the door and an identification tag on his suit which indicated he was from internal affairs. In addition, a nameplate on the desk read "Chief Irvin." Irvin was formerly the chief of police in Dwight, Illinois.

Irvin did not give defendant Miranda warnings prior to the interview. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) In fact, upon orders from the State's Attorney of Livingston County, Irvin and the other investigators at Pontiac do not give Miranda warnings in interviews with inmates alleged to have possessed shanks. This policy evolved after an inmate, Brian Nelson, successfully mounted a necessity defense to a charge of possession of a weapon in DOC. Miranda warnings are given before questioning in other types of cases, however, such as when one inmate stabs another with a shank. The reason for not giving Miranda warnings prior to interviews with inmates alleged to have possessed shanks is the belief that the inmates would become "terrorized" and not talk about their safety concerns. Irvin had given Miranda warnings to inmates hundreds of times in the past and only a few of these inmates had responded to questioning.

There are two reasons why prison officials conduct interviews with inmates alleged to have possessed shanks: (1) for internal institutional security, and (2) to prepare for an actual, potential criminal case. Irvin wanted to know if defendant feared for his own safety and whether defendant would claim to have a necessity defense. To obtain this information from the inmates, the State's Attorney's office had prepared a series of questions concerning the necessity of possessing a shank. If an inmate reveals no necessity during the interview, the information is used to negate the possibility of the inmate asserting a necessity defense if charges are subsequently filed. Prison officials apparently only became concerned with the inmates' (apprehensions concerning their) safety after inmate Nelson successfully used the affirmative defense of necessity at his trial for possessing a weapon in prison. The interviews were not conducted until after Nelson staged his successful defense.

A few inmates actually do benefit from the interview, as not all shank possession cases are prosecuted. The Department of Corrections and State's Attorney decide which cases to prosecute. There have been some cases where inmates possessing shanks are not prosecuted because they informed internal affairs of fears for their lives.

During the interview, defendant did not specifically mention a necessity defense. However, defendant did make various statements indicating he would be inclined to possess a weapon because he saw a friend stabbed at another prison.

On October 2, 1989, the State filed an indictment against defendant alleging the unlawful possession of weapons by a person confined in a facility of the Illinois DOC in violation of section 24-1.1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 24-1.1(b).) The charge under section 24-1.1(b) is a Class 1 felony, carrying a potential prison term of 4 to 15 years, or an extended term of 15 to 30 years. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 24-1.1(d), 1005-8-1(a)(4), 1005-8-2(a)(3).) The State later filed a second charge against defendant alleging the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon in violation of section 24-1.1(a) of the Code. This second charge is a Class 3 felony, carrying a potential prison term of 2 to 5 years, or an extended term of 5 to 10 years. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 24-1.1(a), (d), 1005-8-1(a)(6), 1005-8-2(a)(5).

On December 18, 1989, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress defendant's statements made to Irvin during the August 1, 1989, interview. A hearing was held on January 24, 1990, at which Irvin was the sole witness. Irvin's testimony provided the basic facts. The court granted defendant's motion to suppress, but allowed the statements to be used for impeachment purposes. In an extensive written order, the court concluded:

"10. Although defendant had not been charged with the offense of Unlawful Possession of Weapon by Person in the Custody of the Department of Corrections at the time of his 'interview' on August 1, 1989, there appears to be no question that it was the intention of the Illinois Department of Corrections to pursue criminal charges by attempting to obtain an indictment.

11. Although the People take the position that Miranda is not required unless a prison inmate has been formally charged with an offense, this court finds that in circumstances where a prison inmate has been identified by prison officials as a primary suspect and an investigation has focused upon that individual for an offense occurring within the prison that they are obligated to give to that inmate Miranda warnings before questioning him about the specific offense in question. The court rejects the People's position that the choice is to never Mirandize uncharged inmates or to constantly Mirandize every inmate any prison official ever talks to for any purpose. Once a prison investigation has focused on an inmate for [a] specific offense, that inmate should receive Miranda warnings. This is in recognition of the fact that a prison inmate, unlike someone who is not incarcerated, has no real choice as to whether to be subjected to questioning even if he refused to answer. He literally is not free to go 'home' unless he can persuade prison officials to terminate an interview and permit him to return to his cell which many inmates describe as their 'house.' "

The court also noted that although defendant was physically restrained when brought to Irvin's office, no threats or physical coercion was used to obtain any statement from defendant, and the specific location of the questioning was a comparatively nonthreatening environment. The court found no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the suppression order and the State filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in suppressing statements defendant made to Irvin during the interview in the absence of Miranda warnings. The State believes the court erred by applying a per se rule requiring Miranda warnings anytime such a prisoner is questioned by a prison official. Defendant responds...

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3 cases
  • People v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 20, 1992
    ...defendant's motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the order of suppression, with one justice dissenting. (207 Ill.App.3d 104, 151 Ill.Dec. 699, 564 N.E.2d 1361.) This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). Briefs in support of the State's posi......
  • People v. Smith
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 30, 2016
    ...the defendant's motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting. People v. Patterson , 207 Ill.App.3d 104, 151 Ill.Dec. 699, 564 N.E.2d 1361 (1990). The appellate court found that the defendant was interrogated while "in custody" for Miranda purposes.¶ 50 I......
  • People v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1991

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