People v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 15 November 1989 |
| Citation | 155 A.D.2d 924,547 N.Y.S.2d 747 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Andre JOHNSON, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Edward J. Nowak by James Eckert, Rochester, for appellant.
Howard R. Relin by Wendy Lehmann, Rochester, for respondent.
Before DILLON, P.J., and CALLAHAN, BALIO, LAWTON and DAVIS, JJ.
Defendant was charged in a 10-count indictment with crimes arising out of five separate robberies of the same Stop-N-Go food store in the City of Rochester. Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever the charges relating to the last robbery, on which he was apprehended at the scene, from the other charges set forth in the indictment.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a severance (see, People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1, 451 N.Y.S.2d 6, 436 N.E.2d 456; People v. Mercer, 151 A.D.2d 1004, 542 N.Y.S.2d 443; People v. Casiano, 138 A.D.2d 892, 526 N.Y.S.2d 627, lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 857, 532 N.Y.S.2d 507, 528 N.E.2d 897; People v. Telford, 134 A.D.2d 632, 521 N.Y.S.2d 523; lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 903, 527 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 523 N.E.2d 319). The crimes charged in the indictment were "the same or similar in law" (CPL 200.20[2][c], and, consequently, were properly joinable (see, People v. Lane, supra ). Where the crimes charged in the indictment are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions, applications for severance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court (CPL 200.20[3]. Defendant failed to make a convincing showing that he would be unduly and genuinely prejudiced by the joint trial of these charges, and failed to demonstrate in concrete terms that he had a strong need to refrain from testifying concerning the charge arising from one incident and important testimony to present concerning the other incidents (see, CPL 200.20[3], [a], [b]; People v. Lane, supra, 56 N.Y.2d at 8, 451 N.Y.S.2d 6, 436 N.E.2d 456; People v. Telford, supra ). In our view, the court properly weighed the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy, and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from an unfair advantage in favor of the People ( see, People v. Lane, supra, at 8, 451 N.Y.S.2d 6, 436 N.E.2d 456; People v. Mercer, supra; People v. Angelo, 133 A.D.2d 832, 520 N.Y.S.2d 204).
The testimony at trial regarding defendant's usage of cocaine was admissible despite the general prohibition against evidence of uncharged crimes because it was relevant on the issue of his motive in committing the crimes charged (see, People v. Vails, 43 N.Y.2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 479, 372 N.E.2d 320; see also, People v. Hardwick, 140 A.D.2d 624, 625, 528 N.Y.S.2d 665). Defendant admitted to the police that he was drug dependent and needed money to supply his drug habit. This evidence came in as part of testimony relating to the admissions defendant made to the police following his arrest. Thus, this case is unlike those relied upon by defendant where the prosecutor cross-examined defendant about his drug usage in order to suggest that such drug usage was the motive for the crime charged (see, People v. Wright, 41 N.Y.2d 172, 175, 391 N.Y.S.2d 101, 359 N.E.2d 696; People v. Balkum, 149 A.D.2d 976, 540 N.Y.S.2d 111; People v. Torres, 119 A.D.2d 508, 509-511, 500 N.Y.S.2d 701; People v. Hicks, 102 A.D.2d 173, 182-183, 478 N.Y.S.2d 256). Inasmuch as defendant supplied his own motive for committing the crimes, the court properly admitted such evidence of motive and properly permitted the prosecutor in summation to comment on such drug usage as a motive for the robberies charged.
The court erred, however, in...
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